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All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and the State wherein they reside. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although legal scholars tend to focus on the second sentence of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in trying to determine the 
original meaning of the Amendment,2 the first sentence of the Amend-
ment is, arguably, equally important. As the majority of the Supreme 
Court in the Slaughter-House Cases noted, the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a "definition of citizenship," a matter 
of great controversy prior to ratification of the Amendment.3 According 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2. Much recent scholarship has focused on the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Amendment. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1262-84 (1992) (proposing a method of "refined 
incorporation" for incorporating certain rights in the Bill of Rights through the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1457-62 (1992) (proposing an interpretation of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as prohibiting "caste legislation" and providing 
"antidiscrimination" protection with respect to rights traditionally within the regulatory 
control of the state governments). 
3. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873). Justice Miller 
recounted the history of the controversy concerning the definition of "citizenship" and 
the relevance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. According to 
Justice Miller, "[n]o such definition was previously found in the Constitution, nor had 
any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of 
much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals." 
Id. Miller stated that the Dred Scott decision, 
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to Justice Miller in his Slaughter-House majority opinion, controversy 
existed not only concerning whether individuals of African descent were 
citizens of the United States, but also concerning whether residents of 
the District of Columbia or of the territories were citizens of the United 
States, as they were not citizens of any state.4 The Amendment ended 
this controversy by providing a definition of "citizenship of the United 
States" as well as citizenship of a state. 5 
However, technically, the language of the first sentence of Section 1 
does not provide a true "definition" of the term "citizen," but rather a 
statement of the conditions sufficient for attaining the status of "citizen" 
of a state as well as of the United States. The meaning of the term 
"citizen," as used within the legal culture of the United States prior to 
ratification of the Amendment, involved something more than merely 
being a person "born or naturalized in the United States." Accompany-
ing the status of "citizen" were certain powers or capacities, privileges 
and immunities of citizenship.6 For example, Representative William 
Lawrence of Ohio stated: 
[T]here are certain absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are 
inherent, and of which a state cannot constitutionally deprive him. 
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These 
are rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there 
are others, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and 
while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitu-
tional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be 
accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the 
negro race who had recently been made freemen, were still, not only not 
citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amend-
ment to the Constitution. 
Id. (emphasis added). This was also the conclusion of Thomas Cooley, a contemporary 
constitutional scholar, who thought that the purpose of the first Clause was "to put at rest 
forever the question whether colored persons were to be recognized as citizens." 1 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 653 
(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. Little, Brown, and Co. 1873). 
4. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72-73. In 1805 Chief Justice Marshall 
concluded that citizens of the District of Columbia were not state citizens. Hepburn v. 
Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445, 453 (1805). 
5. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 73. 
6. As Justice Bradley stated in his Slaughter-House dissent, "[c]itizenship of the 
United States ought to be, and, according to the Constitution, is, a sure and undoubted 
title to equal rights in any and every State[ ] in this Union, subject to such regulations 
as the legislature may rightfully prescribe." Id. at 113. 
683 
enjoy property, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and 
property.7 
Furthermore, both the majority and the dissenters in the Slaughter-House 
Cases believed there were certain rights inherent in citizenship, which 
were to be protected under Section 1 of the Amendment, although they 
disagreed concerning the nature of the privileges and immunities of 
"citizens of the United States" guaranteed under the Amendment.8 
An understanding of the concept of citizenship and the privileges and 
immunities of citizens is crucial to a comprehension of the meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1. The importance of the 
concept of citizenship was emphasized by Justice Bradley in his dissent 
in the Slaughter-House Cases. According to Justice Bradley: 
In this free country, the people of which inherited certain traditionary rights and 
privileges from their ancestors, citizenship means something. It has certain 
privileges and immunities attached to it which the government, whether 
restricted by express or implied limitations, cannot take away or impair. It may 
do so temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And these privileges 
7. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866). Other members of Congress 
stated that the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect those 
fundamental rights inherent in citizenship of the United States. For example, 
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont stated that the proposed amendment 
"merely gives the power to Congress to enact those laws which will give to a citizen of 
the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to citizenship." Id. at 1088. 
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio stated in the context of the debate over the 
Civil Rights Act that the rights of life and liberty were inherent and existed anterior to 
the establishment of government. According to Representative Lawrence: 
It has never been deemed necessary to enact in any constitution or law that 
citizens should have the right to life or liberty or the right to acquire property. 
These rights are recognized by the Constitution as existing anterior to and 
independently of all laws and constitutions. 
Without further authority I may assume, then, that there are certain absolute 
rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent, and of which a State 
cannot constitutionally deprive him. But not only are these rights inherent and 
indestructible, but the means whereby they may be possessed and enjoyed are 
equally so. 
Id. at 1833. Similarly, Representative Henry J. Raymond of New York, a member of 
the Joint Committee, stated that "the right of citizenship involves everything else. Make 
the colored man a citizen of the United States and he has every right which you or I 
have as citizens of the United States under the laws and constitution of the United 
States." Id. at 1266. 
8. For example, the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases argued that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed certain "common rights" that were inherent 
in the concept of citizenship in the United States. Justice Field argued that "[t]he 
[fourteenth] amendment was adopted to obviate objections which had been raised and 
pressed with great force to the validity of the Civil Rights Act, and to place the common 
rights of American citizens under the protection of the National government." Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. at 93. 
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and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the United States as to 
citizenship of the States.9 
This passage from Justice Bradley's Slaughter-House dissent indicates 
. that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges and immunities of 
citizens were understood to be those privileges and immunities that were 
essential to citizenship, or inherent in the status of "citizen."10 One's 
status as a citizen was sufficient, in and of itself, for entitlement to 
certain powers or capacities. Justice Field also stated that the Amend-
ment "assumes that there are such privileges and immunities which 
belong of right to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be 
9. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). Justice Bradley later wrote: "I think sufficient 
has been said to show that citizenship is not an empty name, but that, in this country at 
least, it has connected with it certain incidental rights, privileges, and immunities of the 
greatest importance." Id. at 116. Justice Bradley also stated the rights of citizenship in 
terms of the Lockean triumvirate of life, liberty, and property. For example, in 
discussing the Declaration of Independence Justice Bradley stated: 
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen, 
asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty and property. These are 
the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, 
and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be 
modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all; 
and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every free government. 
Id. at 116. 
I 0. These were the "common rights" of citizens that had been recognized by the 
common law in England. For example, Justice Field declared that the Fourteenth 
Amendment "was intended to give practical effect to the declaration of 1776 of 
inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, which the law does not confer, 
but only recognizes." Id. at 105. Field elaborated concerning the mechanism by which 
citizens of the United States were entitled to these "common rights": 
The common law of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of the United 
States. It was brought to this country by the colonists, together with the 
English statutes, and was established here so far as it was applicable to their 
condition. That law and the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed 
at the time of their colonization, and which they had by experience found to 
be applicable to their circumstances, were claimed by the Congress of the 
United Colonies in 1774 as a part of their "indubitable rights and liberties." 
Id. at 104. 
Field seems to have been in agreement with arguments made by plaintiffs' counsel. 
As counsel for the plaintiffs argued, the Privileges or Immunities Clause dictated that the 
citizen's "'privileges and immunities' must not be impaired, and all the privileges of the 
English Magna Charta in favor of freemen are collected upon him and overshadow him 
as derived from this amendment." Id. at 54. According to plaintiffs' counsel, the 
privileges and immunities were ''undoubtedly the personal and civil rights which usage, 
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common sentiments of people have 
recognized as forming the basis of the institutions of the country." Id. at 55. 
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abridged by State legislation."11 Whether these powers or capacities 
were to be uniform throughout the United States and receive substantive 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, as Justice Bradley 
contended, or whether they were to receive merely antidiscrimination 
protection, is debatable.12 However, it would seem that some form of 
both substantive and antidiscrimination protection was envisioned under 
the Clause. 13 
The peculiar characteristic of dual citizenship established under the 
complex federal system of the Constitution complicated the issue of 
citizenship in the United States.14 Individuals within the jurisdiction of 
the United States may be both citizens of a state and citizens of the 
United States. The distinction between these two forms of citizenship, 
and the privileges and immunities attaching to each, is the crucial 
distinction that the Miller majority recognized in its decision in the 
Slaughter-House Cases. In Slaughter-House the majority held that the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment are certain limited privileges and immunities 
of national citizenship alone.15 The Fourteenth Amendment declares 
11. Id. at 96. 
12. John Harrison, among others, has argued that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is primarily an antidiscrimination provision. See Harrison, supra note 2. 
Harrison reasons that "[t]hese rights [the privileges and immunities of state citizenship] 
are not minimum Lockean freedoms but rather a full specification of state law on basic 
subjects." Id. at 1418. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that the Republicans often spoke 
of securing "an equality of basic rights to citizens." MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE 
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1986). 
Similarly, William Nelson has contended that "[b]y understanding section one as an 
equality guarantee, the puzzle of how Congress could simultaneously have power to 
enforce the Bill of Rights and not have power to impose a specific provision of the Bill 
on a state is resolved." WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 119 
(1988). Nelson notes that many of the states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not provide for all of the same Bill of Rights protections in their state constitutions and 
yet did not oppose ratification of, or change their constitutions to reflect, the federal Bill 
of Rights after ratification. Id. at 117. 
13. See infra Part V.B. 
14. Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the political complexi-
ties of this dual status "were never rigorously analyzed." See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 1608-1870, at 248 (1978). However, the 
subject certainly arose in legal discussion prior to ratification. For example Justice 
Bushrod Washington, who would later render the opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, which 
was cited by Republicans in the Forty-Second Congress as providing the accepted usage 
of the terms "privileges" and "immunities," stated in 1820 that "[e]very citizen ofa State 
owes a double allegiance; he enjoys the protection and participates in the government 
of both the State and the United States." Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 33 
(1820). 
15. As Justice Miller stated in the majority opinion: 
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that individuals born or naturalized in the United States shall be citizens 
of both the "State wherein they reside" and the "United States."16 
Therefore, the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the 
distinction between state citizenship and citizenship of the United States. 
This distinction was also acknowledged prior to ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford17 and played an important role in the debate over the citizen-
ship of freed blacks and their entitlement to the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizenship in the United States. 18 An understanding of this 
distinction is therefore necessary to determine the original meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Although a distinction may have been made between 
citizenship of a state and citizenship of the United States, that does not 
mean that there existed no single conception of the meaning of the term 
"citizen" and the accompanying privileges and immunities of citizenship. 
An analysis of this distinction in terms of social compact theory 
indicates that the Miller majority's reading in the Slaughter-House Cases 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, as only guaranteeing certain 
limited privileges and immunities of national citizenship, was in error. 
Part II of this Article examines the meaning of the term "citizen" as 
used in the social compact theories of various natural law theorists and 
in the Roman law. The theories of John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean 
Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel are discussed in detail, as 
these theories are representative of social compact theories influential in 
nineteenth century America. The theories of such political philosophers, 
as well as the Roman law of persons, with its gradation of status into 
several different levels, provided important models of citizenship that 
influenced nineteenth . century thinking concerning the meaning of 
citizenship. 
upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. 
We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of 
great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, 
which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak 
of those of citizens of the several States. 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). 
16. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
17. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
18. See infra Part III. 
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Part III examines the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford in terms of the historical-theoretical framework developed in 
Part II. In particular, Part III analyzes the Court's treatment of the 
problem of dual citizenship. Both the majority's and dissenters' 
interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 are examined in relation to the conferral of state and national 
citizenship. 
Part IV discusses the implications of the Court's dicta concerning 
citizenship in Dred Scott and its creation of a constitutionally-mandated 
system of caste with respect to United States citizenship, and constitu-
tionally-permitted systems of caste with respect to state citizenship. The 
term "caste," as used in this Article, implicates an intermediate status 
between that of the slave and that of the citizen, members of which do 
not have a right to exercise all of the privileges and immunities 
traditionally inherent in the status of "citizen."19 Both the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were designed to eliminate 
the caste systems that arose in the form of Black Codes in the United 
19. This term "caste" was explicitly used to refer to the degraded status of blacks 
under the Black Codes in the Southern States. For example, William Nelson has noted 
that J.H. Martindale, the Attorney General of New York, made the argument that blacks 
in the South were placed in an inferior caste and therefore could not exercise all of the 
political and civil rights inherent in citizenship. 
[N]early all precedents in the General & State Govts. up to the time of the late 
amendment abolishing slavery have recognized the power to classify the 
inhabitants of African descent, and to deprive them of political & civil rights. 
As to them, exclusion from the suffrage has not been the result of a want of 
intelligence to acquire property or education, or any other qualifications, which 
by the customs of the country, and the Constitution of the U.S. might be 
imposed by the several States, on the electors of public officers. The disability 
of the negro penetrated deeper than the rules of qualification for the ballot; 
which rules simply define some conditions that an honest, diligent, & 
intelligent citizen may usually acquire. His disability was one of caste or 
class, which made him and his race liable to be enslaved. . . . The amendment 
to the constitution has abolished the liability and all its consequences. . . . 
There does not remain a logical argument on which to rest the exclusion of the 
native born black man from all the civil and political rights inherent in 
citizenship. 
NELSON, supra note 12, at 128 (quoting Letter from J.H. Martindale to John Sherman 
(May 12, 1866), in SHERMAN PAPERS (emphasis in original)). However, other sources 
indicate that certain rights of free blacks were recognized in the south: 
Free Negroes, without any of the political rights which belong to a citizen, are 
still, to some extent, regarded by the law as possessing both natural and civil 
rights. The rights of life, liberty and property, belong to them, and must be 
protected by the community in which they are suffered to live. They are 
regarded, in law, as persons capable of committing and receiving an injury; 
and for the one, they are liable to punishment, and for the other, they are 
entitled to redress. 
State v. Harden, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 152, 153 (1832). 
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States. However, the flaws in both necessitated ratification of Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Finally, Part V discusses the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment upon 
citizenship in the United States. Given the understanding of the terms 
"citizen," "privileges," and "immunities" derived in Parts II through IV, 
it becomes clear that the text of Section 1 itself dictates an interpretation 
of the Amendment as nationalizing citizenship in the United 
States----making citizenship of the United States the primary form of 
citizenship, and citizenship of a state derivative. .As a result, this Article 
concludes that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was originally intended to provide both 
substantive and antidiscrimination protection for a core set of privileges 
and immunities understood to be inherent in American citizenship. The 
implication of this theory is that "incorporation" of certain provisions of 
the Bill of Rights is a misnomer,2° a conclusion reached by other 
commentators for varying reasons.21 
The view presented in this Article might be termed a "declaratory" 
theory of Section 1. However, it is a positivist declaratory theory in that 
the rights declared are acknowledged as embodied in positive law. 
Under this theory, the privileges and immunities of citizens are 
understood to be those powers or capacities of citizens existing anterior 
20. This conclusion should hardly be surprising. As Justice Frankfurter noted in 
Adamson v. California, "[t]hose reading the English language with the meaning which 
it ordinarily conveys ... would hardly recognize the Fourteenth Amendment as a cover 
for the various explicit provisions of the first eight Amendments." 332 U.S. 46, 63 
(1947). See also RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS (1986) [hereinafter BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT]; RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1997) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]; Raoul Berger, Constitutional 
Interpretation and Activist Fantasies, 82 KY. L.J. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Berger, Activist 
Fantasies]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: Akhil Amar's Wishing 
Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Berger, Wishing Well]; Raoul Berger, 
Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Michael Curtis's Response, 44 Omo ST. 
L.J. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Berger, Reply to Curtis]; Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter 
Berger, Response to Zuckert]; Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment 
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing against incorpora-
tion). 
21. The view articulated in this Article is similar to the theory of "refined 
incorporation" recently espoused by Akhil Amar, who concluded that "the very metaphor 
of incorporation may mislead." Amar, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 
1266. However, there are some differences between the view of fundamental privileges 
and immunities advanced in this Article and Amar's hypothesis. See infra Part V. 
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to the establishment of all government, and the states remain free to 
regulate the manner of exercise of these privileges and immunities. 
Consequently, some overlap between the privileges or immunities 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and the privileges and 
immunities protected under the Bill of Rights is not surprising, insofar 
as some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are declaratory of certain 
fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens to be protected against 
abridgement, or perhaps even regulation, by the federal government. 
However, this conclusion does not dictate that the privileges and 
immunities guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights, or that the state governments are 
bound to the same standards as the federal government under the Bill of 
Rights. Finally, because the term "citizen" used in Section 1 referred to 
a status inherent in which were certain fundamental rights and because 
the Citizenship Clause of the Amendment does not employ the "No state 
shall" language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Fourteenth 
Amendment may apply to the federal government as well as to the state 
governments. The Citizenship Clause of Section 1 may be interpreted 
to represent a guarantee binding upon both the state and federal 
governments of certain fundamental rights inherent in the concept of 
citizenship as understood at the time of ratification of the Amendment. 
Thus, "citizenship" was a central concept in Section 1 of the 
Amendment. The term "citizen" must be viewed as a legal term of art 
possessing a well-developed meaning within the legal community.22 
An understanding of the meaning of this concept within the nineteenth 
century legal community is crucial to achieving an understanding of the 
original meaning of Section 1. Therefore, this Article begins its analysis 
with the first sentence of Section 1 and the definition of the term 
"citizen." 
22. Raoul Berger has noted that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" already 
had a well-established meaning prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
that they were consequently legal "words of art having a circumscribed meaning." 
Berger, Activist Fantasies, supra note 20, at 5; see also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth 
Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 305 (1988) 
("An examination of antebellum thought reveals that equal protection, due process, and 
privileges and immunities were terms symbolizing a core set of basic rights in which 
there was substantial agreement in both free state and slave state society."). The same 
may certainly be said with respect to the term "citizen." The argument presented in this 
Article is that there was a well-developed and specialized meaning attached to this legal 
term well before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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IL THE DEFINITION OF "CITIZEN" 
The body of the Constitution nowhere defined the term "citizen" prior 
to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Although controversy 
existed concerning which individuals were included in this class of 
persons, there was widespread agreement concerning the meaning of the 
term "citizen" within the legal community. For example, Thomas 
Cooley, a contemporary constitutional scholar, gave a definition of 
citizenship as used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
indicated that, in his view, as used within Section 1, there was a 
relatively determinate meaning of this term. According to Cooley, 
"citizen" meant "a person owing allegiance to the government, and 
entitled to protection from it."24 Cooley stated that individuals who 
qualified as citizens included "females as well as males, minors as well 
as adults, those who do not as well as those who do possess the 
privileges of the elective franchise."25 Therefore, political privileges 
such as the right to vote or to participate in government were not viewed 
as being essential to citizenship.26 Individuals could still possess the 
23. As Attorney General Bates noted in 1862: "The Constitution of the United 
States does not declare who are and who are not citizens, nor does it attempt to describe 
the constituent elements of citizenship." Edward Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 
382, 385 (W.H. & O.H. Morrison eds., 1868). 
24. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654. This notion of citizenship as owing allegiance 
to the government based upon compact was also expressed in Blackstone, who stated: 
[T]he original contract of society [is] . . . that the whole should protect all its 
parts, and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, 
in other words, that the community should guard the rights of each individual 
member, and that (in return for this protection) each individual should submit 
to the laws of the community . . . . 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47-*48. 
25. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654. 
26. For example, James H. Kettner has noted that during the antebellum years "the 
right to the elective franchise had never seemed absolutely inherent in the status" of 
citizen. KETTNER, supra note 14, at 323. See also CURTIS, supra note 12, at 29. 
Attorney General Bates in his opinion concerning citizenship stated that "it is manifest 
that American citizenship does not necessarily depend upon nor coexist with the legal 
capacity to hold office and the right of suffrage, either or both of them." Bates, supra 
note 23, at 387. According to Senator Bingham, "All free persons ... born and 
domiciled in any State of the Union, are citizens of the United States; and, although not 
equal in respect of political rights, are equal in respect of natural rights." CONG. GLOBE, 
35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). As William Lawrence noted, speaking of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Section 2, the privileges referred to were 
"such as are fundamental civil rights, not political rights nor those dependent on local 
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status of "citizen" without being entitled to exercise certain political 
privileges.27 Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
problem was not so much one of defining the term "citizen" as defining 
the conditions sufficient for attaining this status. As a consequence, 
law .... " CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866). Political rights were not 
thought to be conferred under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, either. As Congressman 
Russell Thayer noted, the words in the Civil Rights Bill were "'civil rights and 
immunities,' not political privileges .... " Id. at 1151. Furthermore, many Republicans 
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote upon free blacks. 
Id. at 2539-40 (Farnsworth), 2058 (Boutwell), 2462 (Garfield). However, exercise of 
political rights was an indication of one's status as a citizen. As the Democrats 
observed, according to the Webster's Dictionary definition of the term "citizen," a citizen 
was one "who has the privilege of exercising the elective franchise." James E .. Bond, 
The Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. REV. 435, 451 (1985). 
This distinction between the political and civil rights of citizens is also found in the 
Roman law. Edward Poste, a contemporary translator of Gaius, identified a bifurcation 
in the rights of citizens under the Roman Law into political rights involving electoral and 
legislative power (jus suffeagii) and capacity for office (jus honorum) and civil rights 
involving power over property (commercium) and marriage (connubium). GAIUS, 
ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 45 (Edward Poste trans., 2d ed. 1875). Chief Justice Taney 
also recognized the distinction between political and civil rights in his Dred Scott 
opinion. According to Taney, citizenship was neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for the power to exercise political rights. 
Undoubtedly, a person may be a citizen, that is, a member of the community 
who from the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the political 
power, and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and 
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote; and when a 
property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those who 
have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold office, yet they are 
citizens. 
So too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not 
a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of the Union 
foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the State may give the 
right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not make them citizens of 
the State, and still less of the United States. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1856). Justice Curtis also 
mentioned the elective franchise in h_is dissent as being "one of the chiefest attributes of 
citizenship under the American Constitutions." Id. at 581. However, he conceded that 
it was not "essential to citizenship." Id. 
27. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 654. Cooley also pointed to the opinion of Attorney 
General Bates in order to show that no political privileges were conveyed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
See this point discussed at length in Opinion of Attorney-General Bates of 
Nov. 29, 1962. He very correctly remarks that "no person in the United States 
ever did exercise the right of suffrage in virtue of the naked unassisted fact of 
citizenship. In every instance the right depends upon some additional fact and 
cumulative qualification, which may as perfectly exist without as with 
citizenship." 
Id. at 654 n.2. This passage indicates that the privileges and immunities protected under 
the Fourteenth Amendment were those privileges and immunities that were inherent in 
the concept of citizenship, "privileges or immunities of citizens." In other words, they 
were those privileges and immunities for which citizenship alone was a prerequisite. 
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Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a true 
definition of the term "citizen" so much as it defines the conditions 
sufficient for attaining the status of "citizen". 
One of the purposes of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to embody these conditions within the text of the United States 
Constitution, thereby removing from the states ( and Congress) any power 
to deny citizenship of a state or of the United States to individuals 
meeting these qualifications. As Thomas Cooley noted, "the rights of 
a class of persons still suffering under a ban of prejudice could never be 
deemed entirely secure when at any moment it was within the power of 
an unfriendly majority in Congress to take them away by repealing the 
act which conferred them. "28 According to Cooley, the first sentence 
was also designed to constitutionalize that part of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 that declared "the right of colored persons to citizenship" in the 
wake of the Dred Scott decision in which the Supreme Court had held 
that freed blacks were not citizens of the United States and could not 
become citizens of the United States through any mechanism except, 
perhaps, amendment of the Constitution of the United States.29 As 
Justice Miller noted in the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court in Dred 
Scott held that freed blacks "were incapable of becoming [citizens] . . . 
by anything short of an amendment to the Constitution."30 According 
to the Court in Dred Scott, Congress did not possess the constitutional 
authority to confer this status through legislation.31 Therefore, by 
expressing certain conditions that were sufficient for the conferral of 
both state and national citizenship in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the framers of the Amendment placed the ability to deny 
both state and national citizenship beyond the reach not only of the state 
governments, but also of the federal government. They made it possible 
for free blacks to be citizens of the United States, thereby annihilating 
the constitutionally-mandated system of caste with respect to United 
States citizenship that resulted from the Court's decision in Dred Scott. 
28. Id. at 653. 
29. Cooley noted that the Dred Scott decision "remained unreversed by any formal 
determination of the court, and if that decision was to be followed, it might be doubtful 
whether the Civil Rights Act itself would be held to be within the powers conferred upon 
Congress." Id. 
30. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-73 (1873). 
31. See infra Part III.B. 
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As Cooley noted, the term "citizen" had a well established legal 
meaning prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 In order 
to understand the meaning of the term "citizen" as used in Section 1, it 
is useful to examine two influential models of citizenship: the social 
compact theories of the natural law theorists and the Roman law of 
persons. Prior to ratification of the Amendment, it was widely 
acknowledged that a citizen was one who owed allegiance to the state, 
a member of the "political community" or "body politic" composing the 
state.33 For example, Justice Story stated that it was commonly thought 
that "civil society . . . depend[ s] upon a social compact of the people 
composing the nation."34 Under these social compact theories, citizens 
were described variously as "members of a civil society,"35 a "body 
politic,"36 or a "political body."37 The nature of this relationship is 
elaborated in these writings, with which the framers of the Amendment 
and the public in general were familiar. 
Subpart II.A discusses the prominence of social compact theories in 
nineteenth century legal thought. Legal scholars such as Justice Story 
32. However, the phrase "citizen of the United States" may not have had such a 
well-established meaning. As Attorney General Bates stated in his opinion concerning 
citizenship in 1862: 
Who is a citizen? What constitutes a citizen of the United States? I have 
often been pained by the fruitless search in our law books and the records of 
our courts, for a clear and satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the 
United States. I find no such definition, no authoritative establishment of the 
meaning of the phrase, neither by a course of judicial decisions in our courts, 
nor by the continued and consentaneous action of the different branches of our 
political government. For aught I see to the contrary, the subject is now as 
little understood in its details and elements, and the question as open to 
argument and to speculative criticism, as it was at the beginning of the 
Government. 
Bates, supra note 23, at 383. 
33. As James H. Kettner has described it, "Citizenship constituted membership in 
a federal community requiring allegiance to nation and state." KETTNER, supra note 14, 
at 287. Attorney General Bates stated in his widely-cited opinion concerning citizenship 
that this was what was meant by the term citizen as used in the United States 
Constitution: 
In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word citizen only to express the 
political quality of the individual in his relations to the nation; to declare that 
he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal 
obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other. 
Bates, supra note 23, at 388. Senator Bingham also indicated that being a citizen 
involved being a member of the "body-politic." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 
(1859). 
34. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 225-26. 
35. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NATURAL LAW 87 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institution ofWashington 1916). 
36. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 145. 
37. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). 
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and Chancellor Kent featured some version of these theories in their 
influential works on American law. Furthermore, several members of 
Congress referred to the Lockean triumvirate oflife, liberty, and property 
in describing the nature of the rights to be protected under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, a precursor of the Fourteenth Amendment,38 as 
well as under the Amendment itself. The theories of John Locke, 
Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel 
are discussed in detail.39 The conclusion reached is that the privileges 
38. Several members of Congress indicated that Section 1 of the Amendment 
merely incorporated the principles of the Civil Rights Bill. For example, George Latham 
stated that "the 'civil rights bill,' which is now law ... covers exactly the same ground 
as this amendment," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866), and Martin 
Thayer stated that the Amendment was "but incorporating in the Constitution of the 
United States the principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become a law." 
ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONS1RUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 213 (1967). The Civil 
Rights Bill was also thought to guarantee the rights of citizenship. In the words of 
Martin Thayer, the purpose of the Bill was to secure "the fundamental rights of 
citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of freedom . . . . [T]hose rights 
which secure life, liberty, and property, and which make all men equal before the law." 
Id. at 169. 
39. These natural law theorists and others were important since colonial times. 
Among the philosophers who were widely read by the American colonists were Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel. See 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 
(1967); CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
1760-76, at 83-84 n.10 (1933); CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE 
ORIGIN OF THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 224 (1953); Edwards. 
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. 
REV. 149, 365, 380-82 (1928). According to Mullet, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, 
Montesquieu, and Vattel were "scarcely, ifat all, less authoritative than the most popular 
English writers." MULLETT, supra, at 32. Furthermore, as James Wilson stated 
concerning the rights of citizens: 
All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf [sic] down to Vattel, 
have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate 
of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights, appertaining to the 
people as men and as citizens. 
James Wilson, Speech of Dec. 4, 1787, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 470 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
In addition, social compact theories seem to have served as the conceptual background 
for the various bills of rights found in state constitutions. For example, Virginia's 
Declaration of Rights asserted: 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain 
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, 
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
695 
and immunities essential to citizenship are certain fundamental powers 
or capacities inherent in persons, as well as those powers or capacities 
flowing from the conditions of the social compact. An implication of 
this theory is that these terms encompass civil but not political rights, or 
rights of participation in the government. Furthermore, under these 
theories, such privileges and immunities are outside of the power of the 
government to abridge since they existed anterior to the establishment 
of the government. 
Subpart II.B discusses the influence of Roman law on the development 
of natural law theories and legal thought in the United States. This 
influence is evident in statements made by certain Justices in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, abolitionist writings of the antebellum era, and statements 
made by members of Congress responsible for approving the Amend-
ment. Also addressed are the nature of the privileges and immunities of 
Roman citizens and the etymological roots of the terms "privileges" and 
"immunities," as well as the complex system under the Roman law of 
according different grades of civil status to persons. The conclusion 
reached is that the Taney Court adhered to this model in declaring that 
freed blacks occupied an intermediate level of status below citizen, that 
of freedman. As a result, the Court concluded that freed blacks were not 
constitutionally entitled to all of the privileges and immunities essential 
to citizenship in the United States. 
A. Citizenship and Social Compact Theory 
The concept of citizenship that serves as a foundation of the Four-
teenth Amendment originates in the social compact theories of John 
Locke and other natural law theorists.40 As Justice Swayne, one of the 
THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 1776: BILL OF RIGHTS§ 1, reprinted in 10 SOURCES 
AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 49 (William F. Swindler ed., 
1979). Similarly, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 declared: 
The body-politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a 
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and 
each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws 
for the common good .... ; that every man may, at all times, find his security 
in them. 
CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 1780, preamble reprinted in 5 SOURCES AND 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 92-93 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). 
40. Several other commentators have noted the influence of natural law theories 
on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 12; DANIEL 
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1990); 
HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968); JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL 
UNDER LAW (2d ed. 1969); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in 
the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Trisha 
Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
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Slaughter-House dissenters, acknowledged, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified because it was "necessary to enable the government of the 
nation to secure to every one within its jurisdiction the rights and 
privileges enumerated, which, according to the plainest considerations of 
reason and justice and the fundamental principles of the social compact, 
all are entitled to enjoy.',41 Justice Story in his Commentaries also 
noted the importance of the theory of society as being based upon a 
compact, as well as its genesis in the Roman writers: 
The doctrine maintained by many eminent writers upon public law in modem 
times is, that civil society has its foundation in a voluntary consent or 
submission; and, therefore, it is often said to depend upon a social compact of 
the people composing the nation. And this, indeed, does not, in substance, 
differ from the definition of it by Cicero, Multitudo, Juris consensu et utilitatis 
communione sociata; that is, (as Burlamaqui gives it,) a multitude of people 
united together by a common interest, and by common laws, to which they 
submit with one accord.42 
Justice Story referred to this as a "visionary" idea that was present also 
in the work of Blackstone, who described the social compact as forming 
the basis of a "union" necessitated by the "weakness and imperfection" 
of mankind.43 According to Story, the state governments in the United 
States were based upon compacts among the members of each of the 
states.44 Although Story contended that the United States Constitution 
was not a compact but rather a fundamental law, he quoted Chief Justice 
Jay for the proposition that the United States Constitution as well as the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347, 350 · (1995) (concluding that "the 
[Privileges and Immunities] Clause must be placed against the backdrop of the classical 
natural law tradition embraced by the 39th Congress."). 
41. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 129 (1873) (emphasis added). 
42. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 225-26 (footnotes omitted). 
43. Blackstone, as quoted by Justice Story, stated that the nature of the "original 
contract of society" was that "'the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part 
should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community 
should guard the rights of each individual member; and that in return for this protection 
each individual should submit to the laws of the community."' Id. at 227. 
44. Justice Story quoted the preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts that 
stated, '"the body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; that it is 
a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each 
citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common 
good."' Id. 
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state constitutions were "compacts" among the people based upon their 
consent.45 
Natural law ideas and concepts were prevalent in the legal culture 
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Like Justice Story, 
Chancellor Kent restated the propositions concerning the nature of civil 
society found in the writings of social compact theorists such as Locke 
in his Commentaries on American Law. According to Kent, "[t]he right 
of self-defence is part of the law of our nature, and it is the indispens-
able duty of civil society to protect its members in the enjoyment of 
their rights, both of person and property. This is the fundamental 
principle of the social compact."47 The rights of person and property 
to which Kent referred were the Lockean rights of "property." The 
rights of person correspond to Locke's property in life and liberty, while 
the rights of property correspond to Locke's right of property in one's 
goods. 
Chancellor Kent envisioned the Lockean state of nature more as a state 
of war, reminiscent of Hobbes. According to Kent, it was unrealistic to 
"suppose a state of man" where individuals lived "in innocence and 
45. Id. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay as stating that "'every State 
constitution is a compact made by and between the citizens of a State to govern 
themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the United States is, likewise, 
a compact made by the people of the United States, to govern themselves as to general 
objects in a certain manner."' Id. 
46. Natural rights theory had been influential in American legal thought since the 
time of the Revolution. CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW 
CONCEPTS (1930); Corwin, supra note 39; MULLETT, supra note 39; Thomas C. Grey, 
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in. American Revolutionary 
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). Prominent jurists had also espoused natural law 
concepts. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-36 (1810) (Marshall, 
C.J.); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); United States v. La 
Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 845-47 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551) (Story, Cir. 
J.); Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166-67 (N.Y. 1816) (Kent, C.). See 
generally BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW 
288-98 (1931) (citing early cases). In particular, many Republicans in Congress were 
influenced by natural law theory. Earl A. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: 
Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Rous. L. 
REV. 221, 224 (1987) [hereinafter Reconstruction Without Revolution] (stating that 
"Republicans were committed to the concept of natural rights, which they saw as 
embodied in the statement of the Declaration of Independence that all men were entitled 
to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."'). Earl Maltz has noted the importance of 
social compact theory in nineteenth century political thought, which he believes serves 
as the basis for what he has termed "'limited absolute equality[,]' ... the proposition 
that all men were equally entitled to certain natural rightsc-life, liberty, and property." 
Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 505-06 (1985) [hereinafter Maltz, Equal Protection of the 
Laws]. 
47. 1 JAMES KENT, CO!vlMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *48 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. 
ed., 12th ed. 1873). 
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simplicity."48 "It has been truly observed, that the first man who was 
born into the world killed the second; and when did the times of 
simplicity begin?"49 According to Kent, "[m]an was fitted and intended 
by the Author of his being for society and government, and for the 
acquisition and enjoyment of property. It is, to speak correctly, the law 
of his nature .... "5° Kent argued that the concept of exclusive 
property was consistent with principles of natural reason and, that, 
although 
[t]here have been modem theorists who have considered separate and exclusive 
property, and inequalities of property, as the cause of injustice, and the unhappy 
result of government and artificial institutions . . . human society would be in 
a most unnatural and miserable condition if it were possible to be instituted or 
reorganized upon the basis of such speculations.51 
Finally, Kent pointed to the Roman law as the source of some of the 
rules of property found in the common law. 52 
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, cited not only by 
Justice Story but also by Representative James Wilson of Iowa, 
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, as illustrative of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States under the 
Civil Rights Act and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reflects 
this well-established natural law theory of exclusive property rights. 
Blackstone stated that the right of property is "'that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world, in the total exclusion of the right of any other individual 
in the universe. "'53 In enumerating the rights and liberties of English-
men, Blackstone listed the Magna Carta, Habeas Corpus Act, Petition of 
48. 2id.at*317. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at *318. 
51. Id. at *319. Kent argued that "[t]he sense of property is graciously bestowed 
on mankind for the purpose of rousing them from sloth, and stimulating them to action 
.... " Id. 
52. Id. at *360-61. Chancellor Kent referred to 
those general rules which were formed, digested, and refined by the sagacity 
and discussions of the Roman lawyers, and transferred from the civil law into 
the municipal institutions of the principal nations of Europe. By means of 
Bracton they were introduced into the common law of England, and, doubtless, 
they now equally pervade the jurisprudence of these United States. 
Id. (footnote omitted). · 
53. JAMES TuLL Y, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS 
ADVERSARIES 73 (1980) (citation omitted). 
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Right, and the Bill of Rights. Subsequently, Blackstone stated that these 
rights "consist in a number of private immunities" that are "no other, 
than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the 
laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience . . . or else those 
civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the 
natural liberties so given up by individuals."54 Thus, Blackstone seems 
to have defined privileges as proxies for certain natural "liberties," while 
he defined immunities as the "residuum" of natural liberty. Blackstone 
described these rights as "the rights of all mankind" as well as "the right 
of people of England." He classified these rights into "three principal 
or primary articles[:] ... the right of personal security, the right of 
personal liberty, and the right of private property."55 According to 
Blackstone, "the preservation of these, inviolate, may justly be said to 
include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most 
extensive sense."56 
The relevance of Lockean social compact theory to understanding the 
meaning of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is clear from the 
tenor of the debates in Congress. During the debates over the Civil 
Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lockean triumvirate of 
absolute rights was cited frequently as describing those rights protected 
under the Bill and the Amendment.57 For example, Senator James 
54. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *125. The use of the terms "privileges" and 
"immunities" in Blackstone's Commentaries and Blackstone's importance to congressio-
nal Republicans is more fully explored by Michael Kent Curtis. See CURTIS, supra note 
12. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois made similar statements concerning the nature 
of the "civil liberty" that was to be protected under the Civil Rights Bill. According to 
Trumbull, "civil liberty" was that part of "natural liberty" that was left after the creation 
of civil society. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866). 
55. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *125. 
56. Id. 
57. According to Michael Kent Curtis, the "most common Republican refrain in 
the Thirty-ninth Congress was that life, liberty, and property of American citizens must 
be protected against denial by the states." CURTIS, supra note 12, at 41. John Bingham 
stated that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary to protect "the inborn 
rights of every person," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866), and Thaddeus 
Stevens stated that there was a need to '"fix the foundations of the government on 
principles of eternal justice.'" NELSON, supra note 12, at 66 (quoting fragment of 
undated speech draft, THADDEUS STEVENS PAPERS 2 (Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.)). Senator Trumbull stated that the rights to personal liberty, personal security, and 
private property "are declared to be inalienable rights, belonging to every citizen of the 
United States ... no matter where he may be." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
17 57 ( 1866). Congressman Wilson stated that the rights of personal security, personal 
liberty, and the right to acquire property were "inalienable." Id. at 1118. In debate over 
the Thirteenth Amendment, this natural law or "inalienable rights" philosophy was also 
espoused by other members of Congress. For example, Congressman Ebon C. Ingersoll 
stated: 
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Patterson stated, "[I] am opposed to any law discriminating against 
[blacks] in the security and protection of life, liberty, person, [ and] 
property .... Beyond this I am not prepared to go."58 Representative 
William Lawrence stated, "[i]t is idle to say that a citizen shall have the 
right to life, yet to deny him the right to labor, whereby alone he can 
live. It is a mockery to say that a citizen may have a right to live, and 
yet deny him the right to make a contract to secure the privilege and the 
rewards of labor."59 In discussing the "great fundamental [civil] 
rights," James Wilson stated: 
Blackstone classifies them under three articles, as follows ... [:] 
1. The right of personal security; which he says, "Consists in a person's 
legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his 
health and his reputation." 
2. The right of personal liberty; and this, he says, "Consists in the power 
of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatever 
place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, 
unless by due course of law." 
3. The right of personal property; which he defines to be, "The free use, 
enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitionso' without any control or 
diminution save only by the laws of the land.''6 
I am in favor of the adoption of this amendment because it will secure to the 
oppressed slave his natural and God-given rights. I believe that the black man 
has certain inalienable rights, which are as sacred in the sight of Heaven as 
those of any other race. I believe he has a right to live, and live in state of 
freedom. He has a right to breathe the free air and enjoy God's free sunshine. 
He has a right to till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and 
enjoy the rewards of his own labor. He has a right to the endearments and 
enjoyment of family ties; and no white man has any right to rob him of or 
infringe upon any of these blessings. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864). The importance of this trilogy was 
later recognized by the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Court stated: 
[T]he fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, 
considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of 
constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress 
of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of 
just and equal laws . . . . [T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to 
hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the 
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any 
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself. 
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) . 
. 58. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866). 
59. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 206. 
60. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 74-75. Elsewhere, Wilson stated that the phrase 
"Civil rights and immunities" in the Bill did not imply that 
in all things civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or 
color, shall be equal . . . . Nor do they mean that all citizens shall sit on the 
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Finally, Senator Bingham, principal draftsman of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, pointed to the principles of "equality and natural 
rights" embodied in the Constitution. According to Bingham, the 
advantage of the Constitution 
lies in the great democratic idea which it embodies, that all men, before the 
law, are equal in respect of those rights of person which God gives and no man 
or State may rightfully take away, except as a forfeiture for crime. Before your 
constitution, sir, as it is, as I trust it ever will be, all men are sacred, whether 
white or black, rich or poor, strong or weak, wise or simple. Before its divine 
rule of justice and equality of natural rights, Lazarus in his rags is as sacred as 
the rich man clothed in purple and fine linen; the peasant in his hovel, as sacred 
as the prince in his palace, or the king on his throne.61 
Thus, it is not improper to assert that, besides influencing the popular 
understanding of citizenship and the rights accompanying this status, the 
writings of natural law theorists such as Locke influenced members of 
Congress responsible for approving the Amendment. 
This Article adopts the position that the rights to be protected under 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were not only the natural law rights of person and property, or 
absolute rights, but also those rights that flowed from the social compact 
among members of society and were binding by principles of natural 
reason--the relative rights of citizens including the right to contract, to 
testify, to inherit, and if we accept the Lockean notion of exclusive 
property based upon consent, the right to hold property. Chancellor 
Kent discussed the distinction between absolute and relative rights in his 
Commentaries on American Law. According to Chancellor Kent, "[t]he 
rights of persons in private life are either absolute, being such as belong 
to individuals in a single, unconnected state; or relative, being those 
juries, or that their children shall attend the same schools . . . . I understand 
civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of individuals, such as-[t]he right 
of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and 
enjoy property. 
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 163 (citation 
omitted). 
61. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859). However, Bingham did not 




[A]ll ... classes [of] ... free inhabitants, irrespective of age, or sex, or 
complexion, and their descendants, were [made] citizens of the United States. 
No distinctions were made against the poor and in favor of the rich, or against 
the free-born blacks and in favor of the whites. This Government rests upon 
the absolute equality of natural rights amongst men. There is not, and cannot 
be, any equality in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights .... 
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which arise from the civil and domestic relations."62 Alternatively, one 
might say, as did Representative Lawrence,63 that these relative rights 
are "incidents" of the absolute rights of persons in that they arise when 
62. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *1. This distinction might have been recognized by 
Senator Wilson who stated that the absolute rights of personal security, personal liberty, 
and the right to enjoy property were among the "civil rights" guaranteed under the Civil 
Rights Act. Fairman, supra note 20, at 38. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that 
Republicans often spoke of "absolute rights," which included "the right to freedom of 
speech, the right to due process of law, and the right to bear arms." CURTIS, supra note 
12, at 104 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (Cowan), 1183 (Garfield), 
1263 (Broomall), 1629 (Hart), 1838 (Clarke), 1072 (Nye) (1866)). 
Chancellor Kent, himself, identified the absolute rights of persons with the Lockean 
triumvirate of life, liberty, and property. According to Kent: 
The absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal 
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy 
property. These rights have been justly considered, and frequently declared, 
by the people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable. The 
effectual security and enjoyment of them depend upon the existence of civil 
liberty; and that consists in being protected and governed by laws made, or 
assented to, by the representatives of the people, and conducive to the general 
welfare. 
2 KENT, supra note 47, at *1. The distinction between rights that individuals possessed 
before they entered into society (absolute rights) and those that flowed from the social 
compact (relative rights) seems also to have been recognized during the founding period. 
For example, the Federal Farmer made a distinction between natural and inalienable 
rights and constitutional or fundamental rights. 
[S]ome [rights] are natural and unalienable, of which even the people cannot 
deprive individuals: Some are constitutional or fundamental; these cannot be 
altered or abolished by the ordinary laws; but the people, by express acts, may 
alter or abolish them-These, such as the trial by jury, the benefits of the writ 
of habeas corpus . . . individuals claim under the solemn compacts of the 
people, as constitutions, or at least under laws so strengthened by long usuage 
[sic] as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature ... may alter or 
abolish at pleasure. 
Letters From the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Dec. 25, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 261 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). James Wilson seems 
to have made a similar distinction: 
In his unrelated state, man has a natural right to his property, to his 
character, to liberty, and to safety. From his peculiar relations, as a husband, 
as a father, as a son, he is entitled to the enjoyment of peculiar rights, and 
obliged to the performance of peculiar duties .... From his general relations, 
he is entitled to other rights, simple in their principle, but, in their operation, 
fruitful and extensive . . . . In these general relations, his rights are, to be free 
from injury, and to receive the fulfilment [sic] of the engagements, which are 
made to him; his duties are, to do no injury, and to fulfil [sic] the engage-
ments, which he has made. 
James Wilson, Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 308 
(James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896). 
63. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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individuals aggregate into societies. All of these rights of persons exist 
anterior to the formation of the government and involve the properties 
of individuals, in the Lockean sense of the term, and individuals' civil 
capacities as members of society. These rights are fundamental in the 
sense that it is outside of the power of the government to abridge these 
rights, which exist anterior to the establishment of the government itself. 
Thus, this theory of society based upon a "social compact" where the 
"citizens" of a state are the parties to the compact, thereby becoming 
members of a political community or body politic, was well-accepted 
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Story referred 
to John Locke's social compact theory as being representative of these 
theories in general.64 Therefore, an examination of the writings of 
Locke is useful for an understanding of what was meant by the term 
"citizen" in nineteenth century America. 
1. John Locke 
In his Two Treatises of Civil Government, John Locke developed a 
comprehensive theory of civil society which was extremely influential 
in both nineteenth as well as eighteenth century America. According to 
Locke, "citizens" were the members of society, the parties to the social 
compact, and this was the foundation of the rights and privileges that 
they enjoyed with respect to the civil government. · In his Second 
Treatise on Civil Government Locke stated that 
because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be 
dismembered, nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community, the son 
cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms 
his father did, by becoming a member of the society, whereby he puts himself 
presently under the government he finds there established, as much as any other 
subject of that commonweal [sic].65 
Conferral of citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment ensured 
that those naturalized or born in the United States would be put "under 
the government" or "under its jurisdiction,"66 and therefore, would be 
64. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 226 n.l. According to Story, "Mr. Locke is one of 
the most eminent authors who have treated on this subject." Id. 
65. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 66 (Prometheus 
Books 1986) (169-0) (emphasis added). 
66. In the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller noted that "[t]he phrase, 'subject 
to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, 
consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States." 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872). This is consistent with the 
social compact theory espoused by Locke and other natural law theorists. Individuals 
who were citizens of foreign states were parties to a social compact establishing the 
society in those states and as a result owed allegiance to those states. This distinction 
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qualified to enjoy the "rights and privileges" flowing from the social 
compact. Because of the peculiar nature of the federal system, it was 
necessary that these individuals be put under both the state and federal 
government and made parties to the social compacts that formed the 
basis of each in order to enjoy privileges and immunities flowing from 
both the state and national compacts.67 
Entering into a compact with the other members of society ended the 
state of slavery-a state of civil nonexistence-for freed blacks in the 
United States. In the words of Locke, "as soon as compact enters, 
slavery ceases, and he so far quits his absolute power and puts an end 
to the state of war who enters into conditions with his captive."68 This 
conferral of citizenship was the consummation of the social compact 
among all who were naturalized or born in the United States, including 
the freed blacks who had previously been denied the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship under both the state and federal governments. 
The object was to make all who were naturalized or born within the 
United States members of civil society and to put an end to that state of 
war that had existed between freed blacks and Southern whites, ensuring 
that freed blacks would no longer be the property of citizens, but would 
be citizens themselves possessing all of the powers or capacities that 
were inherent in the concept of citizenship in America. 
According to Locke, "[ w ]hen any number of men have so consented 
to make one community or government, they are thereby presently 
is also the reason for the application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to "citizens," 
while the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply to the more inclusive category 
of "persons." 
67. An example of a privilege or immunity flowing from the state compact might 
be the power of contracting, which was traditionally within the regulatory control of the 
state governments. One of the privileges or immunities of the national compact was the 
right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article III, which was denied to 
Dred Scott by the Taney Court because he did not possess the status of "citizen of the 
United States." See infra Part III. 
68. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 96. Locke's notion that the condition of slavery was 
analogous to the condition of living under despotism was mirrored in statements made 
by congressional Republicans. For example, Senator Howard stated that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed those "fundamental 
rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except 
as slaves, subject to a despotism." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). 
See also Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise--Section 
One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 Omo ST. L.J. 933, 965 (1984) (stating 
that "the equal protection and due process components of the Bingham [amendment] 
defined the condition which was the antithesis of slavery"). 
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incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a 
right to act and conclude the rest."69 This is perhaps the best statement 
of what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were trying ·to 
accomplish with the first sentence of Section 1. They were trying to 
better construct "one body politic" from the people of the United States 
after the disastrous Civil War by "nationalizing" citizenship and 
guaranteeing certain fundamental privileges and immunities inherent in 
the concept of citizenship of the United States. In doing so, they 
incorporated free blacks into the political community of both the United 
States and the several states individually, entitling them to the rights of 
citizenship implied by these relations. 
Locke's theory of civil government is based on his conception of 
property.70 According to Locke, the nature of property is that it cannot 
be taken from an individual without his consent.71 Locke stated that 
there are three things in which individuals have property: their person, 
their labor, and their goods, defined as "life," "liberty," and "property," 
respectively.72 Locke believed that the purpose of government is to 
protect these properties and stated that where there is no property, there 
exists a state of "slavery."73 According to Locke, "absolute dominion, 
however placed, is so far from being one kind of civil society that it is 
69. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 54-55. 
70. See generally LOCKE, supra note 65. Locke is not the only natural law theorist 
who analyzed civil society in terms of a social compact among the members of the 
society. Locke was preceded as well as followed by a number of philosophers exhibiting 
a continuity in terminology, if not ideas, regarding the fundamental rights of man. 
For example, James Tully has pointed out the similarity between Locke's natural law 
theory and that of Suarez. See TULLY, supra note 53, at 66. Suarez distinguished 
between a right already established in a thing (ius in re) and a right to a thing (ius ad 
rem). Id. at 67. Tully notes that these two concepts correspond to Locke's common 
property right found in the state of nature and exclusive proprietary right secured by civil 
government. Id. Individuals in a state of nature possess a right of common dominion 
in things-an equal right to use all of the things in nature. Id. at 67-68. This is 
identical to Suarez's concept of a right to a thing. Suarez follows Thomas Aquinas in 
using the term dominium in describing this common right of use in the things found in 
nature. Id. 
Once civil society has been instituted, it becomes possible to establish a secondary 
form of property that is exclusive and proprietary in nature. This is identical to Suarez's 
concept of a right in the sense of a property in something. Suarez follows Aquinas in 
using the term proprietas to denote this exclusive property in a thing. As Suarez states, 
"[n]ature has conferred upon all men in common dominion over all things, and 
consequently has given every man a power to use those things; but nature has not so 
conferred private dominion." Id. at 68 (quoting Francis Suarez, The Laws and God the 
Lawgiver§ 2.14.16, in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS (G.L. Williams trans., 1944)). 
71. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 105. Blackstone stated a similar view. 1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *411-12. 
72. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 69-70. 
73. Id. 
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as inconsistent with it as slavery is with property."74 When discussing 
"free men" Locke stated that "[t]heir persons are free by a native right, 
and their properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their 
own dispose ... or else it is no property."75 Thus, under Locke's 
theory, the state of "slavery," of being the property of another individual, 
is fundamentally at odds with possessing property.76 
According to Locke, in the state of nature, all individuals are born 
"with a title to perfect freedom" and "uncontrolled enjoyment of all the 
rights and privileges of the law of Nature ... :m In the state of 
nature, there is not the kind of exclusive property that exists in civil 
society. Individuals hold everything in common with each other, and 
possess no exclusive proprietary rights. For example, Locke described 
the grant of Dominion given to Adam in Genesis as not a "Private 
Dominion, but a Dominion in common."78 
74. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 96. During the Constitutional Convention it was also 
noted that slavery was inconsistent with "republicanism." Luther Martin stated that 
"[s]lavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and has the tendency to 
destroy those principles on which it is supported .... " WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE 
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 76 (1977). This theme 
may also be found in antebellum case law. As the court in Crandall v. State noted in 
construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, "[T]he reason 
why slaves are not citizens, is, because they are held to be property, and not men, and 
hence have not freedom of choice or action." Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 352 
(1834). 
75. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 105. 
76. Several Congressmen indicated that it was necessary to protect freed slaves' 
natural rights--the Lockean triumvirate ofnatural rights: live, liberty, and property. For 
example, Congressman Sidney Homes stated that freed slaves have the right to "life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to protection of person and property, [and] to equal 
and exact justice and privileges before the law." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1319 (1866). Similarly, Congressman Buckland stated that the government must "insist 
upon such measures as will secure to every American citizen the natural rights of life, 
liberty, and property in all the states." Id. at 1627. 
77. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 48 (emphasis added). 
78. TuLLY, supra note 53, at 60 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON 
GOVERNMENT § 1.29 (Peter Laslett ed., 1970)). This dominion in common was also 
recognized by another natural law theorist, Samuel Pufendorf, who stated: 
A right to all things, previous to every human deed, must be understood not 
exclusively, but only indefinitely, that is, not that one man may claim 
everything for himself to the exclusion of the rest of mankind, but that nature 
does not define what particular things belong to one man, and what to another, 
before they agree among themselves on their division and allocation. 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRJ OCTO (1688), reprinted in 
2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather, trans., James 
Brown Scott ed., 1934). 
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·AU individuals are born with the power to preserve their property in 
their lives, liberty, and estates. This right to preservation flows from 
"natural reason." However, individuals also have a duty to preserve all 
of mankind in the state of nature: "[F]or men being all the workmanship 
of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all servants of one 
sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His 
business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to 
last during His, not one another's pleasure."79 The natural right to self-
preservation is retained upon entering civil society, and the duty of 
preservation of mankind remains binding upon the members of society, 
but also adheres to the government. 80 Therefore, any failure to protect 
the citizens on the part of the government is a violation of the principles 
of natural reason. 
Individuals consent to abandon their natural right to their unrestrained 
natural liberty81 in favor of the superior protection that civil society 
may afford for their property.82 According to Locke, it is "consent 
which makes any one a member of any commonwealth."83 Individuals 
give up their power of self-preservation and the preservation of mankind 
79. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 9-10. 
80. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *3; 4 id. at *30, *180, *183-84. 
81. Blackstone also distinguished between natural liberty, which he defined as "a 
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of 
nature," 1 id. at *121, and civil liberty, which he defined as "natural liberty so far 
restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public." Id. (citing JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES§ 1.3.1). See also CHARLES 
DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. xi, ch. 3, at 200 
(David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748). During the nineteenth 
century, a similar notion of civil liberty was prevalent. For example, Thomas M. 
Cooley, a noted constitutional scholar, stated in his treatise on constitutional law: 
Civil liberty may be defined as that condition in which rights are established 
and protected, by means of such limitations and restraints upon the action of 
individual members of the political society as are needed to prevent what 
would be injurious to other individuals, or prejudicial to the general welfare. 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 226 (1880). 
82. This theme was not only expressed in the writings of Locke, but also was 
expounded by Blackstone, who stated that "the principal aim of society is to protect 
individuals in the enjoyment of ... rights, which were vested in them by the immutable 
laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without mutual assistance and 
intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities." 1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *120. 
83. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 69. This notion that society was based upon consent 
was echoed by congressional Republicans. For example, Orris S. Ferry noted "the 
fundamental principle on which our system rests, that all governments derive their just 
powers from the consent of the governed." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 855 
(1869). According to Ferry, this principle was recognized in the Declaration of 
Independence. Id. 
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"to be regulated by laws made by the society so far forth as the 
preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require .... "84 
For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for 
which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the 
people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that 
by entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it; too 
gross an absurdity for any man to own. 85 
The exclusive proprietary nature of property in society is secured by the 
government. The primary function of government is preservation of 
property, which Locke defined as including property in one's life, 
property in one's liberty, and property in one's goods. According to 
Locke: 
[t]o avoid these inconveniencies which disorder men's properties in the state of 
Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the 
whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing 
rules to bound it by which every one may know what is his.86 . 
This notion of exclusive private property involves individual and 
exclusive possession of property as opposed to inclusive possession 
inherent in common property. The equality of common property in the 
state of nature is replaced by the exclusive nature of private property 
through the consent of mankind in forming civil society.87 According 
to Locke, "it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a dispropor-
tionate and unequal possession of the earth-I mean out of the bounds 
of society and compact; for governments the laws regulate it .... "88 
Through civil society, what is mine and what is thine is made known to 
each individual through promulgated, standing laws. Locke reasoned 
that "men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of 
the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have 
84. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 71 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 77. 
86. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). 
87. Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford reflects this idea that 
government is the origin of property as an exclusive right. According to Justice Curtis, 
"[w]ithout government and social order, there can be no property; for without law, its 
ownership, its use, and the power of disposing of it, cease to exist, in the sense in which 
those words are used and understood in all civilized States." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 615 (1856). 
88. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 30. 
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standing rules to bound it by which every one may know what is 
his."89 
Individuals still retain that part of their right of self-preservation and 
the preservation of others that is not necessary to be ceded to society. 
A right of self-defense remains, for example, in members of society. 
However, slaves who have no property in their lives, whose lives are the 
property of their masters, do not have such a right of preservation. 
According to Locke, "[h ]e that is master of himself and his own life has 
a right, too, to the means of preserving it . . .. "90 The true end of 
government, according to Locke, is therefore the "preservation of the 
property [broadly construed to include property in one's life and one's 
liberty] of all of the members of that society, as far as is possible."91 
Slaves are not "members of society," or citizens, and therefore have no 
such right to preservation. 
In Chapter VII of Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government, 
entitled Of Political or Civil Society, Locke stated that slaves are "not 
capable of any property," are "subjected to the absolute dominion and 
arbitrary power of their masters [and] ... cannot in that state be 
considered as any part of civil society, the chief end whereof is the 
preservation of property."92 In Chapter IV of Locke's Second Treatise 
on Civil Government, entitled Of Slavery, Locke stated that the condition 
of slavery is "nothing else but the state of war continued between a 
lawful conqueror and a captive . . .. "93 Therefore, for Locke the 
essence of slavery was a total lack of capacity with respect to proper-
ty-a lack of property in one's life, in one's liberty, and in one's estate. 
Although citizens possessed a right to liberty, the nature of liberty in 
society was not unrestrained. According to Locke, the laws of society 
"in many things confine" the liberty that individuals possess in the state 
of nature.94 The liberty of individuals in society was "to be under no 
other legislative power but that established by consent in the common-
wealth, nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but 
what that legislative shall enact according to the trust put in it."95 
Freedom is to have a standing rule "common to every one of that 
89. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). 
90. Id. at 96. 
91. Id. at 49. 
92. Id. at 48. Slaves were defined as "chattel personal" in southern jurisdictions 
by the mid-eighteenth century. See William M. Wiecek, The Statutory Law of Slavery 
and Race in the Thirteen Mainland Colonies of British America, 34 WILLIAM & MARY 
· Q. 258, 264 (3d Ser. 1977). 
93. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 18. 
94. Id. at 71. 
95. Id. at 17. 
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society" that restricts one's actions and to be free from the "inconstant, 
uncertain, unknown, [and] arbitrary will of another man .... "96 
According to Locke: 
[L]iberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others, which cannot be 
where there is no law; and is not, as we are told, "a liberty for every man to do 
what he lists." For who could be free, when every other man's humour might 
domineer over him? But a liberty to dispose and order freely as he lists his 
person, actions, possessions, and his whole property within the allowance of 
those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will 
of another, but freely follow his own.97 
Therefore, under Locke's conception of civil society, freedom from 
"arbitrary" actions on the part of individuals, including the government, 
is the essence of liberty--to be free from "restraint and violence from 
others." However, individuals are still subject to the government's 
power of regulation of the natural liberty of its citizens. This condition 
of liberty certainly was not available to free blacks in the South under 
the Black Codes, and it was the purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to guarantee such civil liberty. 
2. Samuel Pufendoif 
John Locke was not alone in conceptualizing society as founded upon 
a social compact among citizens. Samuel Pufendorf, another natural law 
philosopher who was particularly influential in the antebellum period,98 
also conceptualized civil society as being founded upon a compact from 
which certain "precepts of natural law" could be deduced.99 For 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 33-34. 
98. Philip Hamburger has observed that during the founding period, 
[t]he arguments of Pufendorfwere among the most scholarly of many [natural 
law philosophers] that employed a common vocabulary and mode of analysis. 
In popularizing a succinct, generally stated, and attractive version of the state-
of-nature analysis, the briefer works of Hutcheson and Pufendorf were 
particularly important. 
Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 
YALE L.J. 907, 914 n.24 (1993). 
99. Pufendorf distinguished between pacts by which "a right is constituted which 
contributes to the use of all mankind," and those by which "a right arises which benefits 
only certain men." PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 454. Pufendorf pointed to the 
institutions of "speech, ownership of property, value, and sovereignty or command" as 
presupposing "a universal pact, tacit or express, whereby a fixed form has been assigned 
them." Id. 
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Pufendorf, this social com.pact was dictated by "reason." From. this 
social com.pact, certain institutions naturally arose, among them. "speech" 
and "the ownership of property." This com.pact arose from. a hypotheti-
cal state of nature. Pufendorf posited a natural state of m.an, similar to 
that of Locke, wherein individuals enjoyed a "natural liberty."100 In 
this "natural state," individuals 
may use and enjoy everything that is open to them, and may secure and do 
everything that will lead to their preservation, in so far as no injury is done to 
the right of others [and] may use their own judgement and decision, provided, 
of course, that it is framed on this natural law, just as they use their own 
strength, to secure their own defence and preservation. 101 
Therefore, like Locke, Pufendorf concluded that individuals in a state of 
nature had a natural right to self-preservation as well as an ability to act 
upon natural reason in exercising this fundamental right. From. these 
propositions flowed the natural equality of individuals in the state of 
nature. 
Pufendorf, in his Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, outlined a 
conception of society as a political body, which he defined as "several 
persons . . . united [so] that both their action and their will are regarded 
as the action and will of a single individual, and not of several."102 
Pufendorf termed the mutual agreement upon which society was founded 
a union of the people formed through "intervening pacts" whereby the 
people reserve to them.selves certain powers or privileges.103 From. this 
com.pact arose the supreme civil sovereignty of a state.104 
100. According to Pufendorf: 
[T]he state of nature has come to be described as a natural liberty, since every 
man, antecedent to any act of man, is understood to be under his own right 
and power, and to be subject to the power of no other man. And so every 
man is considered equal to every other man, since neither is the subject of the 
other. 
Id. at 158. 
101. Id. 
102. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI 
Duo 20 (1672), reprinted in 15 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown 
Scott ed. & William Abbot trans., 1931). 
103. Pufendorf stated: 
For a multitude, or many men, to become one person, to whom one action can 
be attributed and certain rights belong, in so far as this one person is distinct 
from individuals, and the rights be such as the individuals cannot attribute to 
themselves, it is necessary for them to have united their wills and strength by 
intervening pacts, without which a union of several persons equal by nature is 
impossible of comprehension. 
PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 974. 
104. See id. at 1000. 
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Pufendorf also subscribed to Locke's view that out of common 
ownership, exclusive private property naturally arose. 105 
"[P]roprietorship, in so far as it introduces the division of things among 
several owners exclusive of others, is due to the suasion of nature, but 
that actually it has been established by the pacts of men."106 There-
fore, Pufendorf recognized that property rights are "conventional" in that 
civil society defines property rights through compact: "[t]he only 
conclusion, therefore, is that the distinction between possessions is 
derived from a pact. " 107 Although Pufendorf argued that proprietorship 
is "conventional," this convention was binding by principles of natural 
law. "[T]he law of nature approves all conventions which have been 
introduced about things by men, provided they involve no contradiction 
or do not overturn society. Therefore, the proprietorship of things has 
resulted immediately from the convention of men, either tacit or express . 
• • • " 108 Thus, the agreement flowing from the social compact on the 
part of all of the members of society to recognize private property is 
binding based on principles of natural law.109 
Like Locke, Pufendorf also indicated that the purpose of forming 
states or unions of individuals is protection from injury from others. 
"[T]he chief end of states is that men should by mutual understanding 
and assistance be insured against losses and injuries which can be and 
commonly are brought upon them by other men, and that by these means 
they may enjoy peace or have sufficient protection against enemies."110 
Pufendorf reasoned that if it were the case that a union did not afford an 
individual greater protection than that individual possessed in a state of 
nature, "it would be folly to tum ... [his] back upon natural liberty, in 
105. PUFENDORF, supra note 102, at 35. 
106. Id. 
107. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 538. 
108. Id. at 537. 
109. Pufendorf recounted the way in which exclusive property, propriety or 
dominion, arises from a state of common dominion. See id. at 539-40. Once this 
property was established by convention, its inviolability was dictated by natural law or 
principles of reason. 
[T]he precept of natural law about abstaining from what is another's first 
exerted its force when men defined by convention what each should hold to 
be another's, and what his own. Till that time it lay dormant, so far as its 
strength was concerned, in that general precept about the preservation of pacts 
and about not impairing another's right. 
Id. at 555-56. 
110. Id. at 1011. 
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which every man chooses his own means of defence."111 Therefore, 
the formation of the state is necessitated by principles of natural law. 
Individuals are by nature sociable, and formation of the state is 
reasonable given the natural state of man. 112 Pufendorf concluded that 
the duties inherent in being a member of society are based upon natural 
reason. According to Pufendorf, "'[a]s all the limbs act in unison, 
because it is the interest of the whole body to keep each one of them 
safe, so men should spare one another, because we are born for society. 
The bond of society, however, cannot exist unless it guards and loves all 
its members. "'113 Therefore, like Locke, it would seem that Pufendorf 
recognized a duty of preservation incumbent upon each member of 
society toward one another. 
Like Locke, Pufendorf also made a distinction between citizens, 
possessing an equality of rights, and slaves. The incapacity of slaves to 
be citizens was discussed at length by Pufendorf. According to 
Pufendorf, "free men need obey only the state and its general laws."114 
However, "slaves serve one who is even a fellow citizen, are subject to 
his special orders, penalties, and restraints, and are forced to bear his 
harshness, which is all the more irksome the more frequent and intimate 
the contact between them."115 Therefore, the distinction between 
slaves and citizens rests not only upon an inequality of birth, but also 
upon the slave's being within the power or dominion of another. 
Pufendorf elaborated upon this distinction between slaves and free 
men under the Roman law in his Elements of Universal Jurisprudence. 
According to Pufendorf: 
The Roman jurisconsults . . . formulated as the broadest and most general 
statuses of men . . . , liberty and servitude . . . . [L ]iberty is commonly 
conceived as a status in which one has the faculty of undertaking something 
upon one's own free will; servitude, on the contrary, as a status in which it is 
necessary to do things at the desire of another . . . . In general, however liberty 
denotes the status of those who serve merely the state, and not a fellow-citizen 
111. Id. 
112. Pufendorf quoted Seneca's On Benefits, wherein Seneca stated: 
It is by the interchange of benefits alone that we gain some measure of 
protection for our lives, and of safety against sudqen disasters. Taken singly, 
what should we be? A prey and quarry for wild beasts, a luscious and easy 
banquet . . . . Man is covered by a soft skin, . . . weak and naked by himself 
he is made strong by union .... Take away union, and you will rend asunder 
the association by which the human race preserves its existence. For man 
saves man, and city, city; one hand washes the other, and one finger the other; 
all our security rests in comrades. 
Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted). 
113. Id. at 314 (quoting Seneca's On Anger). 
114. Id. at 945. 
115. Id. 
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in addition; who may of their own free will direct any actions whatsoever of 
their own about which there has been made no disposition by general laws. 116 
Thus, "servitude" involved being within the dominion of others and was 
inconsistent with the liberty accorded the citizen. Therefore, Pufendorf 
concluded that those not possessing liberty "are understood to have no 
citizenship in the state and are enrolled under the head of things, and not 
of persons."117 
Pufendorf related the idea of liberty with authority, defining liberty as 
"[a]uthority over persons and actions which are one's own."118 He 
defined sovereignty as "[a]uthority over the persons of others ... 
whereby another can be enjoined legitimately and efficaciously to supply 
something, that is to say, so that another is under obligation not to resist 
my order or not to refuse the same."119 In defining sovereignty, 
Pufendorf distinguished between "absolute" and "restricted" sovereignty. 
In the case of restricted sovereignty, certain powers are reserved to the 
people.120 Thus, in the writings of Pufendorf there exists a justifica-
tion for the rights retained by the people as a form of sovereignty. The 
sovereignty delegated to the government may be restricted and not 
absolute, in the terminology of Pufendorf. Because slaves do not 
possess the requisite liberty and are within the private121 sovereignty 
of another, they cannot possess the civil authority or sovereignty retained 
by the people in the social compact. An equality of certain privileges 
and immunities is a characteristic of one's status as a citizen. However, 
status as a slave precludes one from sharing in these equal rights flowing 
116. PUFENDORF, supra note 102, at 14. 
117. Id. at 14-15. 
118. Id. at 56. 
119. Id. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 57. Pufendorf distinguished between private and public sovereignty. 
According to Pufendorf: 
Id. 
The former belongs to persons as private individuals for the use of each as 
such. Species of this command are the authority of a father, the authority of 
a master or owners of slaves, the authority of husbands over wives, preceptors 
over pupils, guardians over wards, &c. Public sovereignty is that which comes 
to persons in their public capacity for the use of civil society. If this 
sovereignty be supreme in the state it has an adjunct authority, which men call 
eminent, over the persons and property of subjects, an authority which is 
stronger than any rights whatsoever of individuals, but one to be exercised 
only for the public safety. 
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from a compact among the members of society because slaves are not 
and cannot be parties to any such compact. This was the position to 
which the Taney Court adhered in Dred Scott v. Sandford. As Justice 
Daniel stated in his concurrence: 
[T]he African . . . was regarded and owned in every State in the Union as 
property merely, and as such was not and could not be a party or an actor, 
much less a peer in any compact or form of government established by the 
States or the United States .... [S]o far as rights and immunities appertaining 
to citizens have been defined and secured by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, the African race is not and never was recognised [sic] either by 
the language or purposes of the former .... 122 
Justice Daniel argued that only the sovereignty, or the entire people, 
could subsequently admit Africans to membership in the political 
community as citizens. Emancipation was not sufficient to confer 
citizenship. 
Under Pufendorf's theory, upon formation of the state, certain rights 
were obtained by all of the members of the society, flowing from the 
social compact binding each. Like Locke's theory, Pufendorf's theory 
posited that members of society are restricted in their natural liberty. 
Among the natural rights Pufendorf recognized as powers of the citizen 
are some of the fundamental rights protected under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pufendorf 
mentioned that the power of alienation is a natural right flowing from 
proprietorship123 as well as the right to pass property by inheri-
tance.124 With respect to these rights there is an equality that "has its 
origin in the fact that an obligation to cultivate a social life is equally 
binding upon all men, since it is an integral part of human nature as 
such .... " 125 Individuals in a state of nature are possessed of an 
"equality of power or of liberty." According to Pufendorf, "[b]y this all 
men are recognized to be naturally equal, in so far as no one, apart from 
an antecedent deed or agreement of man, has any power over another, 
but every man is the governor of his acts or power."126 
However, individuals are not "equal" in all things. For example, the 
establishment of government may create an inequality among the 
members of society in terms of those responsible for governing and 
those who are governed.127 Furthermore, other inequalities existing 
anterior to the formation of government also may exist among citizens, 
122. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 481-82 (1856). 
123. See PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 606. 
124. See id. at 615. 
125. Id. at 333. 
126. Id. at 344. 
127. Id. at 344-45. 
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such as that arising from "the status of head of a family rJiaterfamilias], 
which preceded the formation of a state, and the power, which, under 
this institution, they secured over their wives, children, and slaves, the 
heads of families brought over into states."128 Pufendorf argued, 
however, that "[t]his inequality ... owes none of its origin to states, but 
is much older than they are, and so the institution of head of a family 
was not given by states, but was carried over into them .... "129 
Thus, inequalities conceptualized as existing anterior to the formation of 
the state may remain to a certain extent after formation of the state. 
This explains the Republicans' view that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not abolish civil disabilities imposed upon married 
women and children. However, Pufendorf also recognized that after. 
formation of the state, inequalities in the primordial power of the citizens 
might be imposed by the "supreme authority" of the state through 
conferral of special privileges. "[W]hatever inequality between citizens 
arises after the formation of states, owes its origin either to the public 
administration, whereby the supreme authority delegates . to certain 
citizens the exercise of some special authority over the rest, or to some 
special privilege granted by the supreme authority."130 This was the 
sort of inequality at which Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
struck. 
Finally, Pufendorf made a critical distinction between the social 
compact and the compact upon which government is based. According 
to Pufendorf: 
There are . . . two pacts which combine in the establishment of society, and 
primarily of civil society. One is the pact of individuals with individuals, to the 
effect that they desire to have their affairs which are mutually intertwined, 
administered by common counsel; the other is the one which is made with those 
to whom the care of the common safety is entrusted. 131 · 
This distinction is essential in understanding the belief on the part of the 
Republicans that the state governments had no power to abridge the 
128. Id. at 344. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 345. 
131. PUFENDORF, supra note 102; at 102. Pufendorf stated that the first pact is 
based upon "the consent of each and all." An individual who does not signify consent 
to this pact "is not regarded as a member of the society." Id. However, under the 
subsequent pact establishing the form of government, only the consent of the majority 
is required. 
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privileges and immunities of citizens prior to ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. These were powers or civil capacities of 
citizens, some inherent in all persons (absolute rights) and some flowing 
from the social compact (relative rights). The government possessed no 
power to abridge these rights because both of these forms of civil power 
existed anterior to the establishment of government and because such 
power was not delegated to the government. This distinction is 
important not only in understanding the lack of power in the state 
governments, but also in understanding the distinction between civil and 
political rights recognized by the Republicans. This dichotomy between 
civil and political rights was based on the distinction made between the 
social compact and the establishment of government. Privileges and 
immunities of citizens are those privileges and immunities that are 
inherent in persons or which flow from the social compact and arose 
prior to the establishment of government, whereas political privileges, or 
rights of participation in the government, exist only after such an 
establishment. 
3. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui 
Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, another influential natural law theorist from 
continental Europe, argued like Pufendorf and Locke that one could 
deduce principles of natural reason from the "nature of man." Accord-
ing to Burlamaqui: 
If we should be ... asked, what principles ought reason to make use of, in 
order to judge of what relates to the law of nature, and to deduce and unfold 
it? Our answer is in general, that we have only to attend to the nature of man, 
and to his states or relations; and, as these relations are different, there ma12 be 
likewise different principles, that lead us to the knowledge of our duties. 1 2 
Like Locke and Pufendorf, Burlamaqui posited that humans existed 
originally in a primitive state of nature. From this original state of 
nature, society arose naturally. If one studied the nature of human 
beings, one would find, as did Pufendorf, that they are by their nature 
social animals and, thus, the formation of society is dictated by human 
132. 1 JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC 
LAW 107 (photo. reprint 1972) (Nugent trans., 5th ed. 1807). Elsewhere, Burlamaqui 
stated: 
The only way to attain to the knowledge of natural law is to consider 
attentively the nature and constitution of man, the relations he has to the 
beings, that surround him, and the states thence resulting. In fact the very 
term natural law, and the notion we have given of it, show, that the principles 
of this science must be taken from the very nature and constitutions of man. 
Id. at 109. 
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nature. 133 Like the other social compact theorists, Burlamaqui identi-
fied the state as a "body politic."134 However, Burlamaqui also termed 
the social compact among the members of society a "union of wills:" 
All societies are formed by the concurrence or union of the wills of several 
persons, with a view of acquiring some advantage. Hence it is that societies are 
considered as bodies, and receive the appellation of moral persons; by reason 
that those bodies are in effect animated with one sole will, which regulates all 
their movements. This agrees particularly with the body politic or state. 135 
Like Locke, Burlamaqui believed that private property resulted from a 
covenant among the members of society. In the state of nature there 
was no such institution--all property could only be held in common. 136 
Individuals consented to give up some portion of their natural liberty, 
but retained that which was not necessary to cede to society. What 
remained of an individual's natural liberty, Burlamaqui termed "civil 
liberty. "137 According to Burlamaqui, civil liberty 
133. As Burlamaqui stated, "[s]uch in effect is the nature and constitution of man, 
that out of society he could neither preserve his life, nor display and perfect his faculties 
and talents, nor attain any real and solid happiness." Id. at 114. 
134. Burlamaqui stated: 
Among the various establishments of man, the most considerable without 
doubt is that of civil society, or the body politic, which is justly esteemed the 
most perfect of societies, and has obtained the name of State by way of 
preference. 
Id. at 134. 
135. Id. at 135. 
136. According to Burlamaqui, private property was an "adventitious" rather than 
a "primitive" state since it depended upon the consent of those individuals in society to 
respect individual ownership of goods: 
The property of goods is another very important establishment, which 
produces a new adventitious state. It modifies the right which all men had 
originally to earthly goods; and, distinguishing carefully what belongs to 
individuals, ensures the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of what they possess; 
by which means it contributes to the maintenance of peace and harmony 
among mankind. But, since all men had originally a right to a common use 
of whatever the earth produces for their several wants, it is evident that, if this 
natural power is actually restrained and limited in divers respects, this must 
necessarily arise from some human act; and consequently the state of property, 
which is the cause of those limitations, ought to be ranked among the 
adventitious states. 
Id. at 29. 
137. According to Burlamaqui, laws guided man's liberty rather than restricted it. 
We should . . . take care not to imagine, that laws are properly made in 
order to bring men under a yoke. So idle an end would be quite unworthy of 
a sovereign, whose goodness ought to be equal to his power and wisdom, and 
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is natural liberty itself, divested of that part, which constituted the independence 
of individuals, by the authority, which it confers upon sovereigns, and attended 
with a right of insisting on his making a good use of his authority, and with a 
moral security, that this right will have its effect. 138 
Like Pufendorf, Burlamaqui also distinguished between the social 
compact, which served as the foundation of society, and the establish-
ment of the government, which was instituted to protect and regulate the 
rights of the people. According to Burlamaqui, two things were 
necessary in creating a state: 
1. It was necessary to unite forever the wills of all the members of society 
in such a manner, that from that time forward they should never desire but one 
and the same thing, in whatever relates to the end and purpose of society. 2. 
It was requisite afterwards to establish a supreme power, supported by the 
strength of the whole body (by which means they might over awe those, who 
should be inclinable to disturb the peace) and to inflict a present and sensible 
evil on such, as should attempt to act contrary to the public good.139 
Burlamaqui also made a distinction between primary and adventitious 
rights, analogous to Chancellor Kent's distinction between absolute and 
relative rights. Both forms of rights were natural rights, :flowing from 
principles of natural law-the one existing originally in man's primitive 
state of isolation from other men, the other arising upon the formation 
of societies and the creation of relations among men. 140 According to 
who should always act up to these perfections. Let us say rather, that laws are 
made to oblige the subject to pursue his real interest, and to choose the surest 
and best way to attain the end he is designed for, which is happiness. 
Id. at 70. Elsewhere, Burlamaqui stated: 
Government is so far from subverting this first order, that it has been rather 
established with a view to give it a new degree of force and consistency. It 
was intended to enable us the better to discharge the duties prescribed by 
natural laws, and to attain more certainly the end, for which we were created. 
Id. at 135. 
138. 2 Id. at 21. 
139. Id. at 23-24. 
140. Burlamaqui described the process by which adventitious states arose from an 
original primitive state as follows: 
720 
[A]s man himself may make divers modifications in his primitive state, and 
enter into several adventitious ones; the consideration of those new states fall 
likewise within the object of the law of nature, taken in its full extent; and the 
principles, we have laid down, ought to serve likewise for a rule in the states, 
in which man engages by his own act and deed. 
Hence occasion has been taken to distinguish two species of natural law; the 
one primary, [and] the other secondary. 
The primary or primitive natural law is that, which immediately arises from 
the primitive constitution of man, as God himself has established it, indepen-
dent of any human act. 
Secondary natural law is that, which supposes some human act or establish-
ment; as a civil state, property of goods, &c. 
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[T]here is this difference between primitive and adventitious states, that the 
former being annexed as it were, to the nature and constitution of man, such as 
he has received them from God, are for this very reason, common to all 
mankind. The same cannot be said of the adventitious states; which, supposing 
an human act or agreement, cannot of themselves be indifferently suitable to all 
men, but to those only, who contrived and procured them. 141 
Thus, the primitive natural rights exist even in the state of nature prior 
to the formation of the social compact, while adventitious rights are 
dependent upon some action of human beings and, therefore, only arise 
after individuals aggregate through the mechanism of the social compact. 
As a result, all individuals are entitled to the primitive ( or absolute) 
natural rights, whereas only those who are parties to the social compact 
are entitled to the adventitious (or relative) rights. 
Finally, like Pufendorf, Burlamaqui seems also to have made a 
distinction between natural and civil laws, or natural rights and the 
modes in which these rights are allowed to be exercised in society. 
Burlamaqui concludes: 
[W]e may very properly distinguish two sorts of civil laws. Some are such with 
respect to their authority only, and others with regard to their original. To the 
former class we refer all the natural laws, which serve as rules in civil courts, 
and which are also confirmed by a new sanction of the sovereign. Such are all 
laws, which determine the crimes, that are to be punished by the civil justice; 
and the obligations, upon which an action may commence in the civil court, &c. 
As to the civil laws, so called because of their original, these are arbitrary 
decrees, which, for their foundation, have only the will of the sovereign, and 
suppose certain human establishments; or which regulate things relating to the 
particular advantage of the state, though indifferent in themselves and 
undetermined by the law of nature. Such are the laws, which prescribe the 
necessary forms in contracts and testaments, the manner of proceeding in courts 
of justice, &c. But it must be observed, that all those regulations should tend 
to the good of the state, as well as of individuals; so that they are properly 
appendages to the law of nature. 142 
Thus, the state may pass regulations that are binding through principles 
of natural law because of the authority of the state as sovereign, to 
which all members of society have consented. However, these 
regulations must be for the public good, or for the "particular advantage 
of the state." 
1 Id. at 125. 
141. Id. at 31. 
142. 2 Id. at 112. 
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4. Emmerich de Vattel 
Emmerich de Vattel, an eighteenth century political philosopher who 
wrote a widely-known treatise on natural law and the law of nations, 
reiterated the concept of citizenship as membership in a political 
community and described the methods of obtaining citizenship in The 
Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law. 143 In 1780, this 
work was a textbook in the universities. Chancellor Kent, who was the 
author of the first work on international law in the United States, 
extensively quoted Vattel. Furthermore, Vattel's writings likely 
represented an important influence upon the Framers of the Constitution. 
According to Benjamin Franklin, "'[i]t came to us in good season, when 
the circumstances of a rising State make it necessary frequently to 
consult the Law of Nations. "'144 Most importantly, Vattel was cited 
by Justice Daniel in Dred Scott v. Sandford as an authority in discussing 
the ways in which citizenship might be obtained in a state.145 There-
fore, the views of Vattel are relevant in determining what was meant by 
the term "citizen" in nineteenth century America. 
According to Vattel, "[t]he members of a civil society are its citizens. 
Bound to that society by certain duties and subject to its authority, they 
share equally in the advantages it offers."146 Vattel recognized two 
methods of obtaining this status: through naturalization and by birth.147 
Of naturalization, Vattel stated, "[a] Nation, or the sovereign who 
represents it, may confer citizenship upon an alien and admit him into 
the body politic. This act is called naturalization."148 Therefore, 
Vattel recognized the two means of attaining citizenship embodied in the 
first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
143. VATTEL, supra note 35, at xxxvii. 
144. Id. at XXX (quoting 2 WHARTON'S THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC 
CORRESPONDENCE 64). 
145. See infra notes 285-86 and accompanying text. 
146. VATTEL, supra note 35, at 87. 
147. Vattel defined the "natives" of a state as "those who are born in the country 
of parents who are citizens." According to Vattel, the children of citizens "naturally take 
on the status of their fathers and enter upon all the latter's rights . . . . each citizen, 
upon entering into the society, reserves to his children the right to be members of it." 
Vattel stated that the citizenship of children born of citizens is based on "tacit consent." 
Id. As Attorney General Bates observed in his opinion concerning citizenship in 1868, 
"[t]he Constitution itself does not make the citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It only 
intends and recognizes such of them as are natural-home-born; and provides for the 
naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-born; making the latter, as far as 
nature will allow, like the former." Bates, supra note 23, at 389. 
148. VATTEL, supra note 35, at 87. 
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Vattel's theory of civil government is extremely similar to that of 
Locke. Furthermore, there is evidence that Vattel's theory was at least 
as influential as Locke's. For example, Justice Story cited Vattel 
extensively in his discussion of the theory of society as being based on 
a compact. Story seems to have followed Vattel's distinction (analogous 
to that of Pufendorf and Burlamaqui) between the social compact and the 
form of government. It is to that distinction that we now tum. 
5. The Social Compact and the Establishment of Government 
As already noted with Pufendorf and Burlamaqui, many of the natural 
law theorists recognized a distinction between the social compact upon 
which society was based and the agreement between the people and the 
government dictating the form of government. 149 Justice Story, in his 
Commentaries cited Vattel as an authority in defining the term "state" 
and recognized Vattel's distinction between the social compact and the 
form of government: "[a] state [is] . . . a body politic, or society of 
men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety 
and advantage by their combined strength."150 According to Justice 
Story: 
[I]t is wholly immaterial what is the form of the government, or by whose 
hands this absolute authority is exercised. It may be exercised by the people 
at large, as in a pure democracy; or by a select few, as in an absolute 
aristocracy; or by a single person, as in an absolute monarchy. 151 
Therefore, Justice Story recognized the dichotomy between the civil 
and the political sphere as well as Vattel's distinction between the state, 
or the "body politic,"152 and the form of government established by the 
149. See supra note 131 and accompanying text, discussing Pufendorf' s distinction 
between the social compact and the pact establishing the government. Locke may also 
have recognized this distinction, for Locke cautioned that one must "distinguish between 
the Dissolution of the Society, and the Dissolution of Government." See KETTNER, supra 
note 14, at 53 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 151 (Peter 
Laslett ed., 1960)). 
150. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 144 (citing VATTEL, supra note 35, at bk.I, ch. 1, 
§ 1; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,455 (1793) (Wilson, J.)). See also id. 
at 145. 
151. Id. at 145 (citing VATTEL, supra note 35, at bk.1, ch. 1, §§ 2, 3). 
152. Id. at 145-46. Story elaborated upon this notion of the state as a political 
community. Quoting James Wilson, Story stated in his Commentaries that 
the word "state" is used in various senses. In its most enlarged sense it means 
the people composing a particular nation or community. In this sense the state 
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state. 153 The civil sphere encompassed the terms of the social com-
pact, whereas the political sphere encompassed the government and its 
form. 154 This is the basis for the distinction recognized in nineteenth 
century American between civil rights and political rights. 155 
Id. 
means the whole people, united into one body politic; and the state and the 
people of the state are equivalent expressions . . . . Mr. Justice Wilson, in his 
Law Lectures, uses the word "state" in its broadest sense. "In free states," 
says he, "the people form an artificial person, or body politic, the highest and 
noblest that can be known. They form that moral person, which in one ofmy 
former lectures I described as a complete body of free, natural persons, united 
together for their common benefit; as having an understanding and a will; as 
deliberating, and resolving, and acting; as possessed of interests which it ought 
to manage; as enjoying rights which it ought to maintain; and as lying under 
obligations which it ought to perform. To this moral person we assign, by 
way of eminence, the dignified appelation of STATE." 
153. One important difference between the social compact and the establishment of 
the form of government is the degree of consent required in each case. In Justice 
Story's opinion, the explicit consent of the majority is not needed in practice in order 
for a compact to be created, establishing the government. Pufendorf seemed to indicate 
that the consent of the majority was required to establish the form of government. See 
supra note 131. However, according to Justice Story: 
Even our most solemn instruments of government, framed and adopted as the 
constitutions of our State governments, are not only not founded upon the 
assent of all the people within the territorial jurisdiction, but that assent is 
expressly excluded by the very manner in which the ratification is required to 
be made. That ratification is restricted to those who are qualified voters; and 
who are or shall be qualified voters is decided by the majority in the 
convention or other body which submits the constitution to the people. 
1 STORY, supra note 3, at 228. Story specifically mentioned that the "assent of minors, 
of women, and of unqualified' voters has never been asked or allowed .... " Id. 
Instead, only a majority of the qualified voters was required "upon the general principle 
that the majority has at all times a right to govern the minority, and to bind the latter to 
obedience to the will of the former." Id. at 229. 
154. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment often made a distinction between 
civil and political rights. They intended to extend certain civil privileges and immunities 
under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but did not 
intend to convey any political privileges such as the elective franchise. See supra note 
26. 
155. For example, Representative James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, stated that civil rights were "those which have no relation to the establish-
ment, support, or management of the government." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1117 (1866). The court in Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), in construing the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, stated that only civil rights 
were inherent in citizenship. According to the court, the· mistake that had often been 
made in defining the term "citizen" 
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must arise from not attending to a sensible distinction between political and 
civil rights. The latter constitutes the citizen, while the former are not 
necessary ingredients. A state may deny all her political rights to an 
individual, and yet he may be a citizen. The rights of office and suffrage are 
political purely, and are denied by some or all the states, to part of their 
population, who are still citizens. A citizen, then, is one who owes to 
government, allegiance, service, and money by way of taxation, and to whom 
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Justice Story argued that the social compact upon which the federal 
government was founded existed, in a sense, prior to ratification of the 
Constitution. According to Justice Story, the view that the Constitution 
itself was a social compact and was not preceded by the actual social 
compact had been expressed by some individuals, among them Chief 
Justice Jay156 and Tucker in his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries 
on the Laws of England. 157 Justice Story endorsed this position in 
part. However, he argued that the social compact forming the union of 
the people in the United States was embodied in the Declaration of 
Independence and that it existed before the Constitution was ratified. 
According to him, the Constitution "is . . . to a certain extent, a social 
compact, ... [but] a contract of this nature actually existed in a visible 
form between the citizens of each State in their several constitu-
tions."158 Justice Story cited a speech by Mr. Adams supporting his 
claim that the "Declaration of Independence was a social compact" 
among all of the people of the United States, which existed prior to the 
establishment of the federal government under the United States 
the government in tum, grants and guarantees liberty of person and of 
conscience, the right of acquiring and possessing property, of marriage and the 
social relations, of suit and defence, and security in person, estate and 
reputation. These, with some others which might be enumerated, being 
guaranteed and secured by government, constitute a citizen. 
Id. at 342. 
156. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay's·opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia: 
"every State constitution is a compact, made by and between the citizens of 
the State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the 
United States is likewise a compact, made by the people of the United States 
to govern themselves, as to general objects, in a certain manner." The context 
abundantly shows that he considered it a fundamental law of government, and 
that its powers did not rest on mere treaty, but were supreme and were to be 
construed by the judicial department; and that the States were bound to obey. 
1 STORY, supra note 3, at 243 n.l (emphasis added). 
157. Id. at 215. Justice Story stated that Tucker believed that the 
Constitution of the United States is an original, written, federal, and social 
compact, freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into by the several States, 
and ratified by the people thereof, respectively; whereby the several States and 
the people thereof respectively have bound themselves to each other and to the 
Federal government of the United States, and by which the Federal govern-
ment is bound to the several States and to every citizen of the United States. 
Id. (citing l WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND App. 
n.D, 140 et seq.). According to Story, Tucker distinguished the constitutional compact 
from a charter or grant because the Constitution was founded by equals "whether 
considered as States in their political capacity and character, or as individuals .... " Id. 
158. Id. at 217. 
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Constitution.159 In arguing that the political community and social 
compact existed prior to ratification of the Constitution, Justice Story's 
concern was that states' -rights advocates might use the theory of the 
Constitution as a compact based on consent to erode the powers of the 
national government. 160 According to Justice Story, when the Consti-
tution is called a "compact," it means that "it is a voluntary and solemn 
consent of the people to adopt it, as a form of government .... "161 
Therefore, he recognized the establishment of government as being based 
upon consent, but declined to describe such an establishment as a 
"compact." 
Justice Story's arguments concerning the existence of a social compact 
anterior to the establishment of the form of government are consistent 
with the social compact theory most clearly stated by Pufendorf, who 
argued that there were in reality two compacts involved in the creation 
of society: (1) a social compact among the members of the state; and 
159. Justice Story recounted Adams's speech as follows:· 
"The body politic of the United States was formed by a voluntary association 
of the people of the united colonies. The Declaration of Independence was a 
social compact, by which the whole people covenanted with each citizen of the 
united colonies, and each citizen with the whole people, that the united 
colonies were, and of right ought to be, free and independent States. To this 
compact, union was as vital as freedom and independence . . . . Again, our 
Declaration oflndependence, our Confederation, our Constitution of the United 
States, and all our State constitutions, without a single exception, have been 
voluntary compacts, deriving all their authority from the free consent of the 
parties to them." And he proceeds to state that the modem doctrine of 
nullification of the laws of the Union, by a single State, is a solecism of 
language, and imports self-contradiction, and goes to the destruction of the 
government and the Union. It is plain, from the whole reasoning of Mr. 
Adams, that when he speaks of the Constitution as a compact, he means no 
more than that it is a voluntary and solemn consent of the people to adopt it, 
as a form of government; and not a treaty obligation to be abrogated at will 
by a single State. 
Id. at 237 n.3. If the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment also viewed the Declaration 
of Independence as a "social compact" among the people of the United States, this 
would explain their references to the Fourteenth Amendment as embodying the principles 
of the Declaration. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make freed blacks 
parties to this social compact among the people of the United States and to ensure that 
their status as citizens was constitutionally protected. 
160. Justice Story's concerns are evidenced in his remarks on the statements made 
by Chief Justice Jay and Mr. Adams. See supra notes 156-59. Justice Story argued that 
theories of the Constitution as a compact "seem mainly urged with a view to draw 
conclusions which are at war with the known powers and reasonable objects of the 
Constitution; and which, if successful, would reduce the government to a mere 
confederation." I STORY, supra note 3, at 260. Story argued that these views were "not 
justified by the language of the Constitution," had "a tendency to impair, and indeed to 
destroy, its express powers and objects" and involved "consequences which, at the will 
of a single State, may overthrow the Constitution itself." Id. at 260-61. 
161. Id. at 237 n.3. 
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(2) a compact between the members of the state and the government, 
through which the government was established. Pufendorf described this 
process as follows: · 
After the decree upon the form of government, a new pact will be necessary 
when the individual or body is constituted that receives the government of the 
group, by which pact the rulers bind themselves to the care of the common 
security and safety, and the rest to render them obedience, and in which there 
is that subjection and union of wills, by reason of which a state is looked upon 
as a single person. From this pact there finally comes a finished state. 162 
Justice Story identified the Declaration of Independence with the social 
compact and described the Constitution, not as a compact, but rather as 
a ":fundamental law." Because the Republicans in Congress responsible 
for approving the Fourteenth Amendment often stated that the privileges 
and immunities referred to in Section 1 of the Amendment were those 
that were ":fundamental," it is necessary to gain an understanding of 
what was meant by "fundamental" law in nineteenth century America. 
6. Fundamental Law 
According to Justice Story, instruments such as the Constitution 
formed part of the "fundamental law," being outside the power of the 
government, which is established after formation of the Constitution, to 
alter or change. This view is consistent with the theory that the 
government is not delegated the power to alter any law existing anterior 
to its establishment. Essentially, this is what is meant by a "fundamental 
law."163 Such a law may not be altered by the government and may 
162. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 975. 
163. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that the term "fundamental" was often used as 
a synonym for the term "constitutional." CURTIS, supra note 12, at 112-13. Further-
more, the first court to decide a case under the newly-ratified Fourteenth Amendment 
stated that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States referred to in 
the Amendment were "those which may be denominated fundamental; which belong of 
right to . . . the citizens of the several states which compose this union from the time of 
their becoming free, independent and sovereign." United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 
81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). Similarly, Locke termed certain of the principles 
of natural law "fundamental" laws: 
For no man or society of men having power to deliver up their preservation, 
or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of 
another, whenever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish 
condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a 
power to part with, and rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, 
sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation for which they entered into 
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be said to regulate the government itself. 164 In discussing the nature 
of constitutions, Justice Story summarized his position concerning the 
status of the Constitution: 
A constitution is in fact a fundamental law or basis of government, and falls 
strictly within the definition of law as given by Mr. Justice Blackstone. It is a 
rule of action prescribed by the supreme power in a state, regulating the rights 
and duties of the whole community. It is a rule, as contradistinguished from 
a temporary or sudden order; permanent, uniform, and universal. It is also 
called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact (he 
adds) is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. The 
language of a compact is, I will or will not do this; that of a law is, Thou shalt 
or shalt not do it. "In compacts we.ourselves determine and promise what shall 
be done before we are obliged to do it. In laws we are obliged to act without 
ourselves determining or promising anything at all." It is a rule prescribed; that 
is, it is laid down, promulgated, and established. It is prescribed by the 
supreme power in a state, that is, among us, by the people, or a majority of 
them in their original sovereign capacity. Like the ordinary municipal laws, it 
may be founded upon our consent or that of our representatives; but it derives 
its ultimate obligatory force as a law, and not as a compact. 165 
Thus, Justice Story seems to have adopted Pufendorf's view that the 
social compact existed anterior to the establishment of the government. 
society. 
LOCKE, supra note 65, at 82-83 (emphasis added). 
164. For example, Vattel stated: 
[W]hen the sovereign power is limited or regulated by the fundamental laws 
of the State, these laws define the extent and the bounds of his power and the 
manner in which he must exercise it. A prince is, therefore, strictly bound not 
only to respect them, but also to uphold them. 
VATIEL, supra note 35, at 22. 
165. 1 STORY, supra note 3, at 235. To support his view that a constitution is a 
"fundamental law," Justice Story referred to James Wilson's opinion on the nature of 
constitutions. "By a constitution is to be understood (says Mr. Justice Wilson) a 
supreme law, made and ratified by those in whom the sovereign power of the state 
resides, which prescribes the manner in which that sovereign power wills that the 
government should be instituted and administered." Id. at 340, n.2. Story also stated: 
In general the import is, that the people "ordain and establish," that is, in their 
sovereign capacity, meet and declare what shall be the fundamental LAW for 
the government of themselves and their posterity. Even in the constitution of 
Massachusetts, which, more than any other, wears the air of contract, the 
compact is declared to be a mere "constitution of civil government," and the 
people "do agree on, ordain, and establish the following declaration of rights 
and frame of government as the constitution of government." In this very bill 
of rights the people are declared "to have the sole and exclusive right of 
governing themselves, as a free, sovereign, and independent State"; and that 
"they have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute 
government, and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their 
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it." It is, and accordingly 
has always been, treated as a fundamental law, and not as a mere contract of 
government, during the good pleasure of all the persons who were originally 
bound by it or assented to it. 
Id. at 235-36. 
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In the United States, the Constitution establishing the government is a 
fundamental law issued by the people exercising their law-making 
capacity as the ultimate sovereigns. 
This notion of fundamental law consisting of the dictates of the social 
compact along with whatever laws were established regulating the form 
of government formed by the people was not unique to Pufendorf. 
Burlamaqui also discussed the nature of the "fundamental laws of a 
state." According to Burlamaqui, there were two bodies of laws that 
comprised the set of fundamental laws: 
The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the 
decrees, by which the entire body of the nation determine the form of 
government, and the manner of succeeding to the crown; but are likewise the 
covenants betwixt the people and the person, on whom they confer the 
sovereignty, which regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme 
authority is limited. 
. . . These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the 
basis, as it were, and foundation of the state, on which the structure of the 
government is raised, and because the people look upon those regulations as 
their principal strength and support. 
. . . The name of laws however has been given to these regulations in an 
improper and figurative sense; for, properly speaking, they are real covenants. 
But, as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they 
have the force of laws themselves. 166 
Thus, like Justice Story, Burlamaqui understood the fundamental laws 
of society to be binding upon the government, although he preferred to 
term them "real covenants," rather than laws. As a result, Burlamaqui 
concluded that the government could not act in an "arbitrary" manner 
since it was restrained by this body of fundamental law. 
What we have said of the nature of civil laws sufficiently shows, that though 
the legislative be a supreme, yet it is not an arbitrary power; but, on the 
contrary, it is limited in several respects. · 
1. And as the sovereign holds the legislative power originally of the will 
of each member of the society, it is evident, that no man can confer on 
another a right, which he has not himself; and consequently the legislative 
power cannot be extended beyond this limit. The sovereign therefore can 
neither command nor forbid any other actions, than such as are either 
voluntary or possible. 
2. Besides, the natural laws dispose of human actions antecedently to the 
civil laws, and men cannot recede from the authority of the former. 
Therefore, as those primitive laws limit the power of the sovereign, he can 
166. 2 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 132, pt. I, ch. 7, §§ 36, 37, 38, at 46. 
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determine nothing so as to bind the subject, contrary to what they either 
expressly command or forbid. 167 
Thus, both the natural law theorists and Justice Story acknowledged a 
body of fundamental laws that existed anterior to the formation of the 
government, which were comprised of principles of the social compact 
as well as the compact establishing the government. These fundamental 
laws restrained the legislative power and prevented it from being 
exercised in an arbitrary fashion. Thus, a guarantee of fundamental 
privileges and immunities, such as exists in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, would be an expression in the form of positive law of the 
principle that government was restrained from abridging the absolute and 
relative rights of citizens, which existed anterior to the establishment of 
government. 168 
7. The Distinction Between Citizens and Aliens 
Under these social compact theories, individuals who do not have the 
status of citizens might be left to enjoy certain privileges and immunities 
of citizens even though they have no natural right to them. Locke 
acknowledged this principle and observed a distinction between the 
rights of aliens and citizens with respect to property. According to 
Locke: 
[S]ubmitting to the laws of any country, living quietly and enjoying privileges 
and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society ... [;] 
foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the 
privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to 
167. Id. pt. III, ch. 1, § 10, at 113. 
168. Michael McConnell has noted three characteristics of fundamental privileges 
and immunities that are explained by the theory presented in this Article. According to 
McConnell: 
The three most common criteria seemed to be that such rights were uniform, 
not varying from state to. state; that they were a permanent and stable part of 
the American legal legacy, not subject to the vicissitudes of legislative policy; 
and that they were legally enforceable as a matter of right, as opposed to being 
privileges allocated among the citizens by government officials at their 
discretion. 
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947, 1028 (1995). Although it is true that the fundamental privileges and immunities 
of citizens were to be uniform among the several states, as being requisite capacities of 
the citizens of all free governments, the regulation of these fundamental privileges and 
immunities might vary from state to state. For example, two states might enact different 
statutes of limitations for contract actions, even though it was a fundamental privilege 
or immunity of citizenship to be able to contract and to enforce one's contracts in the 
courts. 
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submit to its administration as far forth as any denizen, yet do not thereby come 
to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. 169 
In other words, only those with the title of "citizens" are truly members 
of society and are entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
flowing from the compact among the members of society. There may 
be certain inalienable rights of persons (absolute rights) to which they 
would be entitled, but they would not be entitled to those rights flowing 
from the social compact among the members of society (relative rights). 
This explains the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
guarantees the privileges and immunities of citizenship only to "citizens" 
while it guarantees equal protection and due process to the broader 
category of"persons." In fact, Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman 
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment observed such a distinction 
between privileges and immunities of "citizens of the Republic" and the 
"inborn rights of every person."170 In a speech discussing the pro-
posed Section 1, Bingham stated: 
The necessity for the first section [is that] ... [t]here was a want hitherto 
... in the ... United States, by express authority of the Constitution to do that 
by congressional enactment which hitherto they have not had the power to do, 
and had never even attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the 
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn 
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be 
abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.171 
169. LOCKE, supra note 65, at 68-69 (emphasis added). A similar distinction 
between aliens and citizens existed in the Roman law. A man could not be a citizen of 
independent sovereign states. Aliens did not share in the civil rights of citizenship under 
Roman law and "were devoid of the proprietary and family rights as limited and 
protected by the civil law (commercium and connubium), though they enjoyed 
corresponding rights under the jus gentium." GAIUS, supra note 26, at 45-46. The Court 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford acknowledged distinctions in status among slaves, freedmen, 
and citizens that had their origin in the Roman law. See infra Part II.B.3. The Roman 
law recognized a number of separate legal categories of persons having different legal 
rights under distinct bodies of law. Under the Roman law, only citizens were entitled 
to exercise certain powers or capacities inherent in status as a citizen, privileges and 
'- immunities of citizenship. 
170. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
171. Id. Similarly, Howard stated: 
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State 
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, 
whoever he may be, oflife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, or 
from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This 
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of 
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another .... 
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These privileges and immunities of citizenship are based upon the terms 
of the social compact, and aliens, not being parties to the social compact, 
have no natural law right to the privileges and immunities recognized by 
it.172 
Through principles of comity, or voluntary respect for the rights of 
aliens and the laws of foreign states, however, aliens may retain certain 
rights while visiting in foreign states at the discretion of the government. 
Vattel argued that such respect is founded upon principles of natural 
reason. According to Vattel: 
[A] State, being obliged to respect the rights of other Nations and of men in 
general, irrespective of their nationality, can not claim any rights over the 
person of a foreigner who by his mere entrance into its territory does not 
become its subject. The foreigner can not claim the privilege of living in the 
country without obeying its laws; if he violates them he is punishable as a 
disturber of the public peace and an offender against the State; but he is not 
subject, as the citizens are, to all the commands of the sovereign, and if certain 
things are demanded of him which he does not wish to do, he may leave the 
country. 173 
Therefore, an alien traveling through a foreign state neither attains the 
status of citizen nor owes any allegiance to the government. The Equal 
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment mirror these principles of international comity. Foreign 
subjects are not entitled to any of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens because they are not parties to the social compact, but may 
enjoy the protection of the government and due process of law.174 
... I look upon the first section, taken in connection with the fifth, as very 
important. It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them 
from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges 
which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may 
happen to be within their jurisdiction. 
Id. at 2766. 
172. Vattel stated a similar principle with respect to residents. According to Vattel: 
Residents, as distinguished from citizens, are aliens who are permitted to take 
up a permanent abode in the country. Being bound to the society by reason 
of their dwelling in it, they are subject to its laws so long as they remain there, 
and, being protected by it, they must defend it, although they do not enjoy all 
the rights of citizens. They have only certain privileges which the law, or 
custom, gives them. 
VATIEL, supra note 35, at 87. 
173. Id. at 146. 
174. This principle seems to have been recognized by the court in Amy v. Smith, 11 
Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), in construing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, Section 2. The court distinguished between the "ordinary rights of personal security 
and property" and other rights and privileges conferred by the institutions of the state. 
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Furthermore, they might be permitted to enjoy certain privileges and 
immunities associated with citizenship. However, their continued 
exercise of these rights is subject to the government's discretion, and 
they have no constitutional entitlement to exercise these rights.175 
When the term ["citizen"] came to be applied to the inhabitants of a state, 
it necessarily carried with it the same signification, with reference to the 
privileges of the state, which had been implied by it with reference to the 
privileges of a city, when it was applied to the inhabitants of the city; and it 
is in this sense, that the term, citizen, is believed to be generally, if not 
universally understood in the United States. This, indeed, evidently appears 
to be the sense in which the term is used in the clause of the constitution 
which is under consideration; for the terms, "privileges and immunities," 
which are expressive of the object intended to be secured to the citizens of 
each state, in every other, plainly import, according to the best usages of our 
language, something more than those ordinary rights of personal security and 
property, which, by the courtesy of all civilized nations, are extended to the 
citizens or subjects of other countries, while they reside among them. 
No one can, therefore, in the correct sense of the term, be a citizen of a 
state, who is not entitled, upon the terms prescribed by the institutions of the 
state, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the 
highest class of society. It is true, that females and infants do not personally 
possess those rights and privileges, in any state in the Union; but they are 
generally dependent upon adult males through whom they enjoy the benefits 
of those rights and privileges; ... Nor do we mean to say, that it is necessary, 
even for an adult male to be a citizen, that he should be in the actual 
enjoyment of all those rights and privileges which belong to citizen [sic]. He 
may not only not be in the actual enjoyment of those rights and privileges, but 
he may even not possess those qualifications, of property, of age, or of 
residence, which most of the states prescribe as requisites to the enjoyment of 
some of their highest privileges and immunities, and yet be a citizen; but, to 
be a citizen, it is necessary that he should be entitled to the enjoyment of those 
privileges and immunities, upon the same terms upon which they are conferred 
upon other citizen; and unless he is so entitled, he can not, in the proper sense 
of the term, be a citizen. 
Id. at 333-34 (emphasis added). 
175. This difference between the rights of citizens and those of aliens was 
recognized in the case law in the United States during the period between ratification of 
the Constitution and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in New 
York Dry Dock v. Hicks, in examining the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, § 2 and the rights of citizenship referred to therein, the court stated: 
Foreigners, in some of the states, may hold lands, but they do not descend to 
their heirs unless by statutory provision. But they stand in a different relation 
from citizens of the United States. Each citizen of a state may claim, under 
the constitution, "all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states." 
New York Dry Dock v. Hicks, 18 F. Cas. 151, 152-53 (C.C.D. Mich. 1850) (No. 
10,204). 
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The social compact theories of political philosophers such as· Locke, 
Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel provide the background and 
terminology necessary to determine the original meaning of Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. From the foregoing discussion it is evident 
that (1) citizens were conceived of as members of a political community 
(2) that was founded upon a social compact (3) distinct from the form 
of government (4) from which certain fundamental powers or capacities 
flowed that could not be abridged by the government established after 
consummation of the social compact. A distinction was recognized 
between those who were parties to this compact (citizens) and those who 
were not (aliens and perhaps other classes of persons such as slaves). 
A distinction was also recognized between fundamental privileges and 
immunities (both absolute rights inherent in persons and relative rights 
based on compact) existing anterior to the establishment of government 
and special rights and privileges conveyed by the government after its 
establishment. A corollary of this distinction is that political privileges, 
rights of participation in the government, are not fundamental privileges, 
whereas civil privileges and immunities inherent in one's status as a 
member of the body politic and party to the social compact-privileges 
and immunities of citizens guaranteed in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment-are fundamental. 
B. Citizenship and Roman Law 
The concept of republican citizenship upon which the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was based may be 
traced to the Roman model of citizenship. Members of Congress 
responsible for approving the Fourteenth Amendment, members of the 
Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford,176 and antislavery writ-
176. Other courts also recognized the importance of the Roman model of citizenship 
in defining the privileges and immunities accorded citizens in the United States. 
Significantly, the court in Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326 (1822), a case construing 
the status of blacks under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2, also recognized that citizenship in the United States was analogous to the status of 
citizens under the Roman law. Although the court stated that "[t]he American colonies 
brought with them the common, and not the civil law," id. at 337-38 (Mills, J., 
dissenting), it also stated: 
734 
It is, in fact, not the place of a man's birth, but the rights and privileges he 
may be entitled to enjoy, which make him a citizen. The term, citizen, is 
derived from the Latin word civis, and in its primary sense signifies one who 
is vested with the freedom and privileges of a city. At any early period after 
the subversion of the Roman empire, when civilization had again begun to 
progress, the cities in every part of Europe, either by usurpation or concession 
from their sovereigns, obtained extraordinary privileges, in addition to those 
which were common to the other subjects of their respective countries; and one 
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ers177 all recognized the importance of this model of citizenship. For 
example, Senator Nye of Nevada stated that the "gist" of the Civil 
Rights Bill "was that it clothed these heretofore downtrodden slaves with 
the vesture of American citizenship .... If the cry 'I am a Roman 
citizen' protected the Roman in his mongrel republic, with what 
redoubled forces does the cry that I am an American citizen protect 
me."178 Congressman Woodbridge, in a speech before the Vermont 
legislature concerning the proposed Amendment, stated: 
The question to be considered by the people was, are these amendments 
republican in form? Are they general in their application? Are they just to the 
whole country? And will they answer the desired ends? They wish to cement 
the Union, that any of us can go into any State in the Union with the 
declaration "I am an American citizen" with the same consciousness of 
protection as of old it was sufficient for any citizen of the Roman empire to say 
"I am a Roman citizen."179 
Finally, Justice Daniel, in his Dred Scott concurrence, engaged in an 
extensive discussion of the Roman system with its distinctions among 
slaves, freedmen, and citizens. 180 He argued, in essence, that freed 
who was invested with these extraordinary privileges, whether he was an 
inhabitant of the city or not, or whether he was born in it or not, was deemed 
a citizen .... 
If we go back to Rome, whence the term, citizen, has its origin, we shall 
find, in the illustrious period of her republic, that citizens were the highest 
class of subjects to whom the }us civitatis belonged, and that the }us civitatis 
conferred upon those who were in possession of it, all rights and privileges, 
civil, political, and religious. 
Id. at 332 (citations omitted). 
177. For example, Joel Tiffany, who wrote the Treatise on the Unconstitutionality 
of American Slavery in 1849, stated that to be a citizen of the United States 
is to be invested with a title to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and 
to be protected in the enjoyment thereof, by the guaranty of twenty millions 
of people. It is, or should be, a panoply of defense equal, at least, to the 
ancient cry, "I am a Roman Citizen." And when understood, and respected in 
the true spirit of the immortal founders of our government it will prove a 
perfect bulwark against all oppression. 
CURTIS, supra note 12, at 44 (quoting JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITU-
TIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 56 (1849) (emphasis omitted)). 
178. Id. at 142 (quoting DAILY TERRITORIAL ENTERPRISE, Sept. 13, 1866, at 1, col. 
2). 
179. Id. at 143 (quoting BRATTLEBORO (VT.) RECORD AND FARMER, Nov. 3, 1866, 
at 1). 
180. See infra section 11.B.3. Other antebellum courts also made the analogy 
between American and ancient Roman citizenship. For example, as the court in 
Crandall v. State stated in construing the rights of a citizen under the Privileges and 
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blacks possessed the intermediate status of "freedman" rather than that 
of "citizen" and were therefore not entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens, including the privilege of suing in the courts of 
the United States. 
1. Natural Law and Roman Law 
The influence of the Roman law on the natural law writers was exten-
sive.181 The Roman law provided, at a minimum, certain of the 
concepts or terminology upon which the writings of later natural law 
theorists were based, particularly those of natural law theorists from 
continental Europe, such as Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui. 182 
Like the common law, which may have been influenced by the Roman 
law, 183 the Roman law represented a coherent body of law that exhibit-
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, "He may present the shield of the 
constitution, and, as Paul claimed the immunity of a Roman citizen, he may claim the 
immunity of an American citizen." Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 353 (1834). 
181. Edward Re makes the following observation: 
Most scholars would probably readily concede the existence of this 
contribution [ of the Roman law] since it is not difficult to see that many of the 
beautiful phrases of natural law philosophers embodied the eternal principles 
of justice of the corpus juris of Rome. The role of the Roman law as a 
universal law embodying principles of natural law applicable for all time is 
also generally admitted. 
Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 
452 (1961). Re also notes that Great Britain was "an imperial province of the first 
order" when occupied by the Roman Empire, and thus, quite possibly the law of England 
was influenced at this time by the Roman law. Id. at 455. 
182. M.H. Hoeflich has asserted that "Roman law and Roman legal terminology 
provided the basis for natural law discourse, if not its substance." M.H. Hoeflich, John 
Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil 
Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 36, 40 (1985); see also Re, supra 
note 181, at 451 n.14, 452,453 (citing Sherman, The Romanization of English Law, 23 
YALE L.J. 318, 328 (1914)), 470-71, 493. Similarly, Edward Corwin concluded that 
"[t]he notion of popular sovereignty, of a social contract, and of a contract between 
governors and governed are all foreshadowed by Cicero with greater or less distinct-
ness." Corwin, supra note 39, at 162 (footnotes omitted). 
183. See W. Hamilton Bryson, The Use of Roman Law in Virginia Courts, 28 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 135, 136 (1984); Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 36 (asserting that "[i]t is 
undeniable that Roman law exercised influence upon the common law during its 
formative years," and pointing to Bracton's On the Laws and Customs of England as 
evidence of this influence); M.H. Hoeflich, Roman Law in American Legal Culture, 66 
TuL. L. REV. 1723, 1733 (1992). See also Re, supra note 181. Edward Re noted that 
the words "common law" themselves "represent a borrowing since they are a translation 
of the ius commune of the canon and Roman law." Id. at 470. 
Lord Bryce noted that the whole system of English equity jurisprudence was based 
upon the Roman body of law termed the }us gentium, or law of nations. According to 
Bryce: 
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Our system of Equity, built up by the Chancellors, the earlier among the 
ecclesiastics, takes not only its name but its guiding and formative principles, 
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ed general principles thought to be founded in reason. For example, 
Pufendorf viewed the Roman law as containing much of the natural law 
along with some provisions that were merely positive laws. According 
to Pufendorf: 
[E]very one knows that most of the material in the books of the Roman Law 
concerns the subject of the Law of Nature and Nations, that is, the law which 
obligates all men and nations; but there is interspersed with it much that is 
positive, and of application to the special nature of the Roman state.184 
Pufendorf urged that it would 
be well worth while to make a concise index to the books of the Roman Law, 
which would determine what matters therein concern natural law, and what 
positive law, and whether the bounds are drawn carefully enough between 
Natural, or universal8 Law, and Roman Law properly so called, or that peculiar 
to the Roman state. 1 5 
Many of the natural law theorists were influenced by the Roman law, 
and many of their theories seem to be an attempt to explain the positive 
law of ancient Rome as flowing from "natural reason." Their natural 
law theories are analytical frameworks that predict that certain positive 
laws will be enacted if the law-makers are following the dictates of 
reason. Therefore, the Roman law is important not only because it was 
studied extensively and cited as authority in nineteenth and eighteenth 
century America, but also because the natural law theories that 
influenced the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were very much 
influenced by this body of law. 
and many of its positive rules, from the Roman aequitas, which was in 
substance identical with the Law of Nature and the ius gentium. For obvious 
reasons the Chancellors and Masters of the Rolls did not talk much about 
Nature, and still less would they have talked about ius gentium. They referred 
rather to the law of God and to Reason. But the ideas were Roman, drawn 
either from the Cannon Law, or directly from the Digest and the Institutes, and 
they were applied to English facts in a manner not dissimilar from that of the 
Roman jurists. 
Id. at 481 (quoting 2 JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 599-600 
(1901)). Furthermore, Max Radin has noted that the phrase "natural equity" is an 
Anglicization of naturalis aequitas, a phrase common in Roman texts. Max Radin, The 
Rivalry of Common-Law and Civil Law Ideas in the American Colonies, in 2 LAW A 
CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 404, 429 n.21 (1937). 
184. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at iii. 
185. Id. 
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2. Roman Law in the United States 
Roman law significantly influenced legal education, in particular, from 
the colonial period to the time of the Dred Scott decision. 186 During 
the colonial period, preparation for a legal career included study of 
works on natural law and the law of nations, containing many references 
to the civil law. The standard treatises on these subjects included 
Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis, Pufendorf's De iure naturae et gentium, 
Heineccius's Elementa iuris naturae et gentium, and Burlamaqui's 
Principes du droit nature!. 187 
The extent of the influence of the Roman law on certain areas of law 
in both England and America was recognized during the nineteenth 
century as well. 188 Caleb Cushing, who was later Attorney General of 
the United States, 189 discussed the influence of the civil law on topics 
relating to personal rights such as the distinction between aliens and 
citizens, the status of corporate bodies, and the rules on involuntary 
servitude. According to Cushing: 
The common, civil, and customary law of Europe have each precisely the 
same force with us in this branch; that is, our courts study them all, and adopt 
from them whatever is most applicable to our situation, and whatever is on the 
whole just and expedient, without considering either of course obligatory. If 
Mansfield, Scott, or Ellenborough, is cited with deference or praise, so likewise 
are Bynkershoek, Valen, Cleirac, Pothier, and Emerigon. The authority of a 
decision or opinion, emanating from either of these sources, is rested on exactly 
the same foundation, viz. its intrinsic excellence. 190 
186. See M.H. Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American Legal Education and 
Research Prior to 1930: A Preliminary Survey, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 719; Peter Stein, 
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 
(1966); see also PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965); ROSCOE 
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938). Hoeflich has noted the 
widespread availability of books on the Roman and civil law in American libraries 
during the nineteenth century. See Hoeflich, supra note 183, at 1738-39 (stating that 
"the holdings of a number of American libraries in this field were extensive"). 
187. Stein, supra note 186, at 404. See also Lewis C. Cassidy, The Teaching and 
Study of Roman Law in the United States, 19 GEO. L.J. 297 (1930-31); Roscoe Pound, 
The Influence of the Civil Law in America, l LA. L. REV. 1 (1938-39); MILLER, supra 
note 186, at 164-71; Radin, supra note 183, at 420 (noting the wide use of books on 
civil law and natural law by colonial lawyers). 
188. See Hoeflich, supra note 186, at 727-28 (claiming that "[i]n the early part of 
the nineteenth century, the course of legal instruction in the leading law schools, and the 
leading textbooks and treatises, included a healthy dose of Roman and civil law .... "). 
189. Stein, supra note 186, at 432. 
190. PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: 
HISTORICAL ESSAYS 429 ( 1988) ( quoting Cushing, On the Study of the Civil Law, 11 
NORTH AM. REV. 407, 412 (1820)). 
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David Hoffman, a professor of law at the University of Maryland from 
1816 to 1836, argued that knowledge of the civil law was necessary for 
a proper understanding of the common law. In his treatise, A Course of 
Legal Study, he stated: 
[I]t is unquestionable that there are large departments of our jurisprudence, in 
which, (in the absence of more authoritative law,) we may, and ought to resort 
to the Civil Law for light, for instruction and for authority . . . . [H]aving 
sprung from the Roman code, we are bound 'in casibus omissis,' (and so we 
have done by long usage) to resort for illustration and authority, to the pages 
of the Digest and Code, in the same manner, and with the same view, as we at 
present resort to the modem British authorities on innumerable other sub-
jects.191 · . 
Both Chancellor Kent and Justice Story were learned in the principles of 
the civil law and regarded Hoffman as their forerunner. 192 Their works 
on American law were some of the most influential during the nineteenth 
century in the United States. 
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law, borrowed 
heavily from the Roman law writers as well as the modem civilians. In 
describing the civil law Kent stated: 
In every thing which concerns civil and political liberty, it cannot be compared 
with the free spirit of the English and American common law .... But upon 
subjects relating to private rights and personal contracts, and the duties which 
flow from them, there is no system of law in which principles are investigated 
with more good sense, or declared and enforced with more accurate and 
impartial justice. 193 
Kent recognized the extensive influence of the Roman law upon the 
development of the common law in England beginning with Henry de 
Bracton, an ecclesiastic and royal judge, who for two years was Chief 
Justiciar of England under Henry 111.194 Both the common law and the 
Roman Code represented bodies of law that had grown over time 
191. Id. at 432 (quoting 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 508 (2d 
ed. 1836)). 
192. Id. at 435; see also Hoeflich, supra note 183, at 1732. 
193. 1 KENT, supra note 47, at 547-48. 
194. According to Edward Re, Bracton was "[t]he person who gave the greatest 
impetus to the early development of the common law of England." Re, supra note 181, 
at 471. Similarly, Edward Corwin concluded that the "outstanding importance of' 
Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus consisted in "the fact that for the first time it 
brought the rising common law into direct contact with Roman and medieval Continental 
ideas of a higher law." Corwin, supra note 39, at 172. 
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through the efforts of a series of learned individuals and that were likely 
to embody general principles upon which all just law was founded. 
Furthermore, Kent acknowledged the existence of an American common 
law, which he analogized to both the English common law and the 
Roman Code. 
Justice Story, who was also influenced by the writings of civil law 
theorists, 195 summed up the importance of the Roman law and its 
influence upon the common law and law in America as follows: 
Where shall we find such ample general principles to guide us in new and 
difficult cases, as in that venerable deposite of the learning and labors of the 
jurists of the ancient world, the Institutes and Pandects of Justinian. The whole 
continental jurisprudence rests upon this broad foundation of Roman wisdom; 
and the English common law, churlish and harsh as was its feudal education, 
has condescended sligl}tly to borrow many of its best principles from this 
enlightened code . . . .196 
Thus, the Roman law affected those American legal scholars who were 
in turn the most influential in nineteenth century America. 
Not only was the Roman law important in general, but also the Roman 
model of slavery and citizenship was recognized as being analogous to 
the system in the United States. For example, Chancellor Kent 
analogized the institution of slavery in the United States to that of 
ancient Rome. Kent explicitly rejected the English model of villeinage 
as a model for slavery in the United States. 197 According to Kent, the 
condition of slaves in the United States was "more analogous to that of 
the slaves of the ancients, than to that of the villeins of feudal times, 
both in respect to the degradation of the slaves and the full dominion 
and power of the master."198 Kent stated that slaves in the United 
States were under certain disabilities analogous to those imposed by the 
Roman Code. According to Kent, slaves 
195. See Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 58, 64-71 (asserting that "Story had more than 
a passing acquaintance with civilian scholarship"); Hoeflich, supra note 186, at 725 
(claiming that "Story was extraordinarily knowledgeable about Roman and civil law"); 
F.H. Lawson, Roman Law as an Organizing Instrument, 46 B.U. L. REV. 181, 198 
(1966); see also POUND, supra note 186, at 21-22; Roscoe Pound, The Place of Judge 
Story in the Making of American Law, 1 MASS. L.Q. 121 (1915-16) [hereinafter Pound, 
Place of Judge Story]; Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law in the Formation of American 
Common Law, in 1 ACTORUM ACADEMIAE UNIVERSALIS IURISPRUDENTIAE 
COMPARATIVAE 183-97 (1928) [hereinafter Pound, Comparative Law]. 
196. STEIN, supra note 190, at 425-36 (quoting Joseph Story, Address to the Suffolk 
Bar, 1 AMERICAN JURIST 1, 13-14 (1829)). 
197. In reality, the difference between the English and Roman models may have 
been mitigated by Roman influence on the development of European legal ideas 
concerning slavery. See Hoeflich, supra note 182, at 36-37. 
198. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *253. 
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cannot take property by descent or purchase, and all they find, and all they 
hold, belongs to the master. They cannot make lawful contracts, and they are 
deprived of civil rights. They are assets in the hands of executors, for the 
payment of debts, and cannot be emancipated by will or otherwise, to the 
prejudice of creditors. 199 
Furthermore, Chancellor Kent indicated that the slave codes of the South 
were modeled on the Roman law. 
The statute regulations follow the principles of the civil law in relation to 
slaves, and are extremely severe, but the master has no power over life or limb; 
slaves are still regarded as human beings under moral responsibility as to crimes 
and the severe letter of the law is softened and corrected by the humanity of the 
age and the spirit of Christianity. 200 
Kent also discussed the status of free blacks prior to ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, stating that, although they could properly be 
termed citizens, they were placed in a lower caste in society. According 
to Kent, "[t]he African race, even when free, are essentially a degraded 
caste, of inferior rank and condition in society .... "201 Kent pointed 
to the antimiscegenation laws of the states as evidence of their degraded 
status.202 According to Kent: 
Such connections, in France and Germany, constitute the degraded state of 
concubinage, which was known in the civil law as licita consuetudo 
semimatrimonium; but they are not legal marriages, because the parties want 
that equality of status or condition which is essential to the contract.203 
199. Id. (footnote omitted). 
200. Id. (footnote omitted). 
201. Id. at *258 n.(a). Kent noted that such laws existed in North Carolina, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Virginia. Id. at *258-59 n.(a). This was also the opinion of the 
court in Amy v. Smith, which stated that "[f]ree negroes and mulattoes are, almost 
everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people; insomuch so, that, 
under the constitution and laws of the United States, they cannot become citizens of the 
United States." 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822). 
202. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *258-59 n.(a). Similarly, the court in Amy v. Smith, 
pointed to the naturalization laws of the United States that "do not now authorize any 
but a white person to become a citizen .... " 11 Ky. (l Litt.) at 334. The court also 
noted that free blacks 
are incapable of holding the lowest office in the government; they do not 
enjoy the right of suffrage, and can not even be a witness in a civil case. In 
short, they possess not one of the privileges which are peculiarly characteristic 
of a citizen, and not even all those which are by courtesy allowed to aliens and 
strangers, while residing in the state. 
Id. at 334-35. 
203. 2 KENT, supra note 47, at *258-59 n.(a). 
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Therefore, the fact that intermarriage was not permitted between blacks 
and whites was evidence of their different status, in analogy to the 
structure of the civil law. Kent discussed other restrictive laws existing 
in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Connecticut concerning the 
capacity of free blacks to act as witnesses in civil cases,204 educa-
tion,205 and the ability of free blacks to reside in a state.206 Prior to 
the Dred Scott case, Kent recognized the controversy concerning whether 
free blacks were "citizens."207 He concluded that slaves were "natural 
born subjects" rather than citizens. However, he argued that free blacks 
were citizens and could exercise civil privileges, although they might be 
placed under certain disabilities such as not possessing the political 
privilege of voting. This was because "[t]he privilege of voting, and the 
legal capacity for office, are not essential to the character of a citizen, 
for women are citizens without either .... "208 One of the civil 
privileges Kent thought free people of color could exercise was the 
ability to "acquire, and hold, and devise, and transmit, by hereditary 
descent, real and personal estates."209 Kent concluded: 
Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants, born within the 
United states, or naturalized under the law of Congress. If a slave, born in the 
United States, be manumitted, or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage, 
or if a black man be born within the United States, and born free, he becomes 
thenceforward a citizen, but under such disabilities as the laws of the states 
respectively may deem it expedient to prescribe to free persons of color.210 
204. Kent stated that in Ohio and Indiana "a negro, mulatto, or Indian, is not a 
competent witness in civil cases . . . . " Id. 
205. According to Kent, "[i]n the act of Ohio of 1829, for the support and better 
regulation of common schools, the instruction in them is declared to be for the 'white 
youth of every class and grade, without distinction."' Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Among the authorities concerning the status of free blacks, Kent listed the 
opinion of Chief Justice Dagget in Crandall, and John F. Denny's An Inquiry into the 
Political Grade of the Free Colored Population Under the Constitution of the United 
States as stating that free blacks were not citizens, while he listed William Jay's An 
Inquiry into the Character and Tendency of the American Colonization and American 
Antislavery Societies as well as the "Constitution and statute law of New York" as 
indicating that free blacks were considered citizens. Id. Kent concluded that "the 
question depends more on a verbal than on an essential distinction." Id. Kent argued: 
Id. 
[I]f, at common law, all human beings born within the legiance of the king, 
and under the king's obedience, were natural born subjects, and not aliens, I 
do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to the United States, in all 
cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the 
contrary. 
208. Id. at *259 n.(a). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. Kent cited a Pennsylvania case for the proposition that a "negro or mulatto 
was not entitled to exercise the right of suffrage." Id. (citing Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 
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Therefore, although Kent acknowledged that, as citizens, free blacks 
were entitled to certain privileges "essential to the character of a citizen," 
he also acknowledged that they could be placed under certain disabilities 
that "the states respectively may deem it expedient to prescribe to free 
persons of color."211 
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford: The Institution of Slavery in America 
The Roman model of citizenship was not only important in terms of 
natural law theory and the understanding of citizenship in the legal 
culture of the United States, but it also played a substantial role in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.212 In his concur-
rence, Justice Daniel analogized the institution of slavery in the United 
States to that which existed in ancient Rome, illustrating the influence 
of the Roman law on the civil institutions of the United States. Like 
Chancellor Kent, he rejected the comparison of slavery in the United 
States to the English system of villeinage and, instead, pointed to the 
553). He cited a Tennessee case for the proposition that free blacks were not citizens 
for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Id. (citing 
State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331). Finally, he cited an opinion of the Attorney 
General of the United States for the proposition that "free persons of color in Virginia 
were not citizens within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress regulating the 
foreign and coasting trade." Id. (citing Op. Att'y Gen. i. 382.). 
211. Id. 
212. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Evidently, the practice of citing Roman law 
as authority for determining the status of individuals in the United States was 
widespread. Attorney General Bates argued that one of the sources of "artificial 
difficulties" that marked the debate over national citizenship was 
[t]he common habit of many of our best and most learned men, (the wise 
aptitude of which I have not been able to perceive,) of testing the political 
status and governmental relation of our people by standards drawn from the 
laws and history of ancient Greece and Rome, without, as I think, taking 
sufficient account of the organic differences between their government and 
ours. 
Bates, supra note 23, at 390-91. As Attorney General Bates observed: 
The Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It 
only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural-home-born; and 
provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien-foreign-born; 
making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former. 
Id. at 389. 
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Roman model as analogous to the institution of slavery in the United 
States.213 According to Justice Daniel: 
The institution of slavery, as it exists and has existed from the period of its 
introduction into the United States, though more humane and mitigated in 
character than was the same institution, either under the republic or the empire 
of Rome, bears, both in its tenure and in the simplicity incident to the mode of 
its exercise, a closer resemblance to Roman slavery than it does to the condition 
of villanage, as it formerly existed in England. Connected with the latter, there 
were peculiarities, from custom or positive regulation, which varied it materially 
from the slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any period within the United 
States.214 
Justice Daniel argued that under the Roman Code emancipation alone 
was not sufficient to confer citizenship upon a slave, but rather resulted 
in the slave's obtaining the status of freedman.215 "[W]ith regard to 
slavery amongst the Romans, it is by no means true that emancipation, 
either during the republic or the empire, conferred, by the act itself, or 
implied, the status or the rights of citizenship."216 Therefore, by 
analogy, emancipation of slaves in the United States would not 
automatically result in the conferral of citizenship. According to Justice 
Daniel, this result, distinguishing between citizenship and "lower grades 
of native domestic residents," was desirable in order to prevent 
"degradation of the free." 
The proud title of Roman citizen, with the immunities and rights incident 
thereto, and as contradistinguished alike from the condition of conquered 
subjects or of the lower grades of native domestic residents, was maintained 
throughout the duration of the republic, and until a late period of the eastern 
empire, and at last was in effect destroyed less by an elevation of the inferior 
classes than by the degradation of the free, and the previous possessors of rights 
and immunities civil and political, to the indiscriminate abasement incident to 
absolute and simple despotism.217 
213. As James H. Kettner has noted, "[f]ree Negroes appeared to occupy a middle 
ground in terms of the rights they were allowed to claim in practice, a status that could 
not be described in the traditional language of slave, alien, or citizen." KETTNER, supra 
note 14, at 319. Kettner is correct in asserting that the status of free blacks could not 
be described according to the traditional common-law terminology. However, it could 
be very adequately described in terms of the traditional Roman law terminology. 
214. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 477-78. 
215. Under the English system, there were various ranks and levels of persons, such 
as natural-born subjects, naturalized subjects, and denizens, with varying rights and 
privileges. See KETTNER, supra note 14, at 4-5. These distinctions were "blurred" after 
1700 when the status of denizen disappeared as a separate order of membership in the 
colonies. Id. at 126. Furthermore, both Kent and Justice Daniel rejected the English 
model as being less analogous to the American system. See supra notes 198, 214 and 
accompanying text. 
216. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 478. 
217. Id. Justice Daniel argued that "'[t]he first Caesars had scrupulously guarded 
the distinction of ingenuous and servile birth, which was decided by the condition of the 
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Justice Daniel cited Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire as authority in his discussion of the status of slaves in ancient 
Rome.218 He argued that historically the extension of citizenship in 
ancient Rome had resulted in a destruction of the equality of citizens and 
had led to despotism.219 
[I]n the eye of the law all Roman citizens were equal, and all subjects of the 
empire were citizens of Rome. That inestimable character was degraded to an 
obsolete and empty name. The voice of a Roman could no longer enact his 
laws, or create the annual ministers of his powers; his constitutional rights 
might have checked the arbitrary will of a master; and the bold adventurer from 
Germany or Arabia was admitted with equal favor to the civil and military 
command which the citizen alone had been once entitled to assume over the 
conquests of his fathers. 220 
mother. The slaves who were liberated by a generous master immediately entered into 
the middle class of Ubertini or freedmen .... "' Id. However, under Justinian, the 
"badge of disgrace" was removed '"from the two inferior orders of freedmen; whoever 
ceased to be a slave, obtained without reserve or delay the station of a citizen; and at 
length the dignity of an ingenuous birth was created or supposed by the omnipotence of 
the emperor."' Id. at 479 (citing 3 EDWARD GIBBON, DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
ROMAN EMPIRE 183 (London 1825)). 
218. Gibbon's forty-fourth chapter presented a well-known discussion of the Roman 
law. See 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, 
reprinted in 41 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 71-96 (Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ed., 1952). According to Gibbon, "[t]he slaves who were liberated by a 
generous master immediately entered into the middle class of libertines or freedmen . 
. . . " Id. at 82. 
219. Chancellor Kent had made this observation concerning the effect of granting 
citizenship to all persons in his Commentaries. According to Kent: 
The Romans were noted for their peculiar jealousy of the }us civitatis, or rights 
of a citizen. It was, at first, limited to the Pomoeria of Rome, and then 
gradually extended to the bounds of Latium. In the time of Augustus, as we 
were informed by Suetonius, De Aug. sec. 40, the same anxiety was 
discovered to keep the Roman people pure and untainted of foreign blood; and 
he gave the freedom of the city with a sparing hand. But when Caracalla, for 
the purpose of a more extended taxation, levelled all distinctions, and 
communicated the freedom of the city to the whole Roman world, the national 
spirit was lost among the people, and the pride of country was no longer felt, 
nor its honor observed. 
2 KENT, supra note 47, at *66 n.(a) (citing 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL 
OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 268). Roman citizenship was highly prized and was only 
extended to the whole Empire in 212 A.D. Peter J. Riga, The Influence of Roman Law 
on State Theory in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: A Study of the Roman Glossators 
and Their Influence on Modern State Theory, 35 AM. J. JURIS. 171 (1990). 
220. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 478 (1856). 
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Justice Daniel also cited Justinian's Institutes as authority for the 
proposition that slaves, upon emancipation, did not automatically possess 
the status of citizen but acceded to the status of "libertini or freedmen." 
Thus, book I st, title 3d, it is said: "The first general division of persons in 
respect to their rights is into freemen and slaves." The same title, sec. 4th: 
"Slaves are born such, or become so. They are born such of bondwomen; they 
become so either by the law of nations, as by capture, or by the civil law." 
Section 5th: "In the condition of slaves there is no diversity; but among free 
persons there are many. Thus some are ingenui or freemen, others Ubertini or 
freedmen."221 
Therefore, Justice Daniel argued that the emancipation of slaves did not 
automatically make citizens of freed blacks, conferring all of the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship upon them. Rather, they were 
possessed of an intermediate status, that of "freedman." 
The distinctions among persons found in the Roman law were also on 
the minds of the dissenters in Dred Scott v. Sandford. For example, 
Justice Curtis declared that "[w]hatever distinctions may have existed in 
the Roman laws between citizens and free inhabitants, they are unknown 
to our institutions."222 The basis of the dissenters' argument was that 
once emancipated, freed blacks automatically received the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship because no third caste or status of "freedman" 
existed in the United States.223 This position was subsequently 
Id. 
221. Id. at 479. Justice Daniel continued: 
Tit. 4th. DE INGENUIS.-"A freeman is one who is born free by being born 
in matrimony, of parents who both are free, or both freed; or of parents one 
free and the other freed. But one born of a free mother, although the father 
be a slave or unknown, is free." 
Tit. 5th. DE LIBERTINIS.- "Freedmen are those who have been manumitted 
from just servitude." 
Section third of the same title states that "freedmen were formerly 
distinguished by a threefold division." But the emperor proceeds to say: "'Our 
piety leading us to reduce all things into a better state, we have amended our 
laws, and reestablished the ancient usage; for anciently liberty was simple and 
undivided--that is, was conferred upon the slave as his manumittor possessed 
it, admitting this single difference, that the person manumitted became only a 
freed man, although his manumittor was a free man." And he further declares: 
"We have made all freed men in general become citizens of Rome, regarding 
neither the age of the manumitted, nor the manumittor, nor the ancient forms 
of manumission. We have also introduced many new methods by which 
slaves may become Roman citizens." 
222. Id. at 573 . 
. 223. This was also the conclusion reached by Attorney General Bates after the Dred 
Scott decision. Bates stated that he was "not aware of any provision in our laws to 
warrant us in presuming the existence in this country of a class of persons intermediate 
between citizens and aliens. In England there is such a class clearly defined by law, and 
called denizens." As Attorney General Bates observed: 
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adopted by some Republicans in Congress in debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment. However, others recognized that Dred Scott was still good 
law, not having been overruled, and, therefore, it was necessary to confer 
the status of citizen upon all those born or naturalized in the United 
States in order to avoid imposition of a system of caste similar to that 
of the Roman law.224 
4. Privileges and Immunities of Roman Citizenship 
The purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to ensure that all citizens were afforded the same 
fundamental civil capacities inherent in the concept of citizenship in the 
United States, analogous to those that had existed from the time of the 
Roman law, as well as all of the natural law rights of persons found in 
the English common law. Citizens were entitled under the Roman law 
to certain privileges of the civil law unavailable to other individuals.225 
Edward Poste's 1875 edition of Gaius's Elements of the Roman Law 
translates the title of Book I, De Personis, as "STATUS OR UNEQUAL 
RIGHTS."226 Under this heading, the Roman civil law classified 
persons into different or "unequal" categories having different capacities 
The Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. It 
only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural---home-born; and 
provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-born; 
making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former. 
Bates, supra note 23, at 389. 
224. See infra Part IV. 
225. Attorney General Bates, in discussing the applicability of the Roman law to 
the citizenship question, noted that "the ruling power at Rome, whether republican or 
imperial, granted, from time to time, to communities and to individuals in the conquered 
east, the title of Roman and the rights of Roman citizens." As Attorney General Bates 
observed, "[t]he Constitution itself does not make citizens; it is, in fact, made by them. 
It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural---home-bom; and provides for 
the naturalization of such of them as were alien--foreign-bom; making the latter, as far 
as nature will allow, like the former." Bates, supra note 23, at 389. Bates also 
discussed the biblical case of the apostle Paul, which he termed 
a leading case in Roman jurisprudence in the matter of the ''jus Romanum." 
And in so far as there is any analogy between Roman and American 
citizenship, it is strictly applicable to us . . . . It establishes the great 
protective rights of the citizen, but, like our own national Constitution, it is 
silent about his powers. It protected Paul against oppression and outrage, but 
said nothing about his right of suffrage or his eligibility to office. 
Id. at 393-94. 
226. GAIDS, supra note 26, at xiii. 
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or rights with respect to person and property. These nine classes were 
the Freeborn, the Freedman, the Slave, the Citizen, the Latin, the Alien, 
the Father of the household, the Son of the household, and the Bonds-
man. However, the greatest difference in respect to civil capacity 
existed between slaves and freedmen. It is stated in Justinian's 
Institutes: "Certainly, the great divide in the law of persons is this: all 
men are either free men or slaves."227 Freedom was defined as the 
"natural power of doing what one pleases, save insofar as it is ruled out 
either by coercion or by law," while slavery was the state of being 
subject to the ownership of another.228 Masters exercised the power 
of life and death over their slaves, and owned all of the acquisitions of 
their slaves.229 This definition of freedom parallels that of Locke who 
defined slavery as a state of war where there is no fundamental right of 
preservation and no property in one's life, liberty, or estate.230 Slaves 
were property, under the dominion or control of their masters, whereas 
the status of citizen involved being free of the dominion of others. 
The second Book of Gaius's Elements of the Roman Law, De Rebus, 
was translated as "EQUAL RIGHTS."231 These were the equal rights 
and civil capacities shared by Roman citizens. The purpose of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was to guarantee to all individuals born 
or naturalized the "equal rights" of citizenship in the United States. 
Under the Roman law, non-citizens were entitled to neither the 
commercium nor the connubium. Therefore, they could not enjoy the 
commercial rights of Roman citizens or the right to contract a civil law 
marriage. Neither their rights of property nor their domestic rights, such 
as the right to claim adultery or claim dominion over one's children, 
were recognized under the Roman civil law. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was an attempt to guarantee an equality 
of civil capacity and to abolish the distinction that had previously existed 
between slaves and freedmen in the Qnited States. The Taney Court in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford had argued that mere emancipation alone was not 
enough to confer the status of "citizen" and the accompanying privileges 
and immunities of citizenship.232 Furthermore, the Court concluded 
that neither the states nor the federal government had the power to 
confer the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to 
227. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 1, ch. 5, § 3 (Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 
1985). 
228. Id. bk. I, ch. 5, § 4. 
229. Id. bk. I, ch. 6, § I. 
230. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
231. GAIUS, supra note 26, at xiv. 
232. See infra Part III.B. 
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non-aliens-privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states as 
well as peculiarly national privileges and immunities conferred by the 
national compact.233 
The "equal rights" of Roman citizens were the embodiment of the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship in the Roman civil code. It was 
common to refer to the status of Roman citizens as "privileged." 
According to Edward Poste, a translator of Gaius' Institutes, "[t]he law 
of Persons, in other words, the law of Status, classifies men as slaves 
and free, as citizens (privileged) and aliens (unprivileged), as paterfamili-
as (superior) and filiusfamilias (dependent)."234 In 1841, Thomas 
Cooper, a translator of Justinian's Institutes, also spoke of the "privileges 
of freemen" and "privileges of Roman citizens."235 In 1880, James 
Muirhead translated Gaius as referring to the "privileges of Roman 
citizenship."236 Therefore, a connection may be established between 
the privileges and immunities of citizens and those civil capacities 
exercised by citizens under the Roman law. 
Under the Roman law, slaves had no civil existence. In Justinian's 
Institutes it is stated that "[a]s far as concerns the civil law[,] slaves are 
regarded as not existing, not, however, in the natural law; because as far 
as concerns the natural law all men are equal."237 Although slaves had 
no civil status, and thus had no civil existence, the laws of nature still 
governed slaves. As Ulpian stated, "[b ]efore the Civil law a slave is 
nothing, but not before the Natural law; for in the eye of Natural law all 
men are equal."238 According to Poste, "[t]he absolute privation of all 
rights was sometimes ex~ressed by saying that a slave has no persona, 
caput, or status .... "2 9 Unfortunately for the slave, the Roman 
natural law was relatively undeveloped and afforded relatively little in 
the way of rights. The hard, cold truth was concisely stated in 
Justinian's Institutes: "We compare slavery closely with death."240 
233. See infra Part III.B. 
234. GAIUS, supra note 26, at 40. 
235. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN WITH NOTES 413 (Thomas Cooper trans., 2d 
ed. 1841). 
236. THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN 10 (James Muirhead trans., 
1880). 
237. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 17, § 32. 
238. GAIUS, supra note 26, at 63-64 (quoting THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 50, ch. 
17, § 32). 
239. Id. at 64. 
240. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 17, § 209. 
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This concept of slavery as absence of civil existence was the foundation 
of the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Although slaves could be 
emancipated, and thereby enjoy freedom, the Court relegated them to the 
level of "freedman," a status lower than that of "citizen." 
The following excerpt from Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law 
describes the condition of slaves under the Roman law: 
Slaves were held pro nullis . . .. They had no head in the state, no name, title, 
or register: they were not capable of being injured: nor could they take by 
purchase or descent: they had no heirs, and therefore could make no will: 
exclusive of what was called their peculium, whatever they acquired was their 
master's: they could not plead nor be pleaded for, but were excluded from all 
civil concerns whatever: they could not claim the indulgence of absence 
reipublicae causa: they were not entitled to the rights and considerations of 
matrimony, and therefore had no relief in case of adultery: nor were they proper 
objects of cognation or affinity, but of quasi-cognation only: they could be sold, 
transferred or pawned, as goods or personal estate; for goods they were, and as 
such they were esteemed: they might be tortured for evidence: punished at the 
discretion of their lord, or even put to death by his authority: to~ether with 
many other civil incapacities which I have not room to enumerate. 41 
Slaves could not alienate property, incur obligations, enter into bilateral 
contracts, make wills, or inherit.242 "A slave cannot really owe or be 
owed anything .... "243 Slaves also suffered disabilities in regard to 
testifying in court and suing. "A slave's answer can be relied on when 
there is no other means of discovering the truth."244 These disabilities 
were a result of the slave's being within the power of another. The 
slave was under the private dominion or propriety of his owner. 
"Someone is not regarded as being willing if he obeys the command of 
a father or master."245 
Roman citizenship was a prerequisite for a variety of private rights and 
capacities.246 According to Frederick Tomkins and William George 
Lemon, translators of Gaius writing in 1869: 
The man must be a civis to have a civil personality. It was not enough that he 
be free. He must own himself in Quiritarian ownership in order to be a persona 
in the eye of the Roman law. When a man was free but not a civis Romanus, 
he was entitled to every benefit to be derived from the jus gentium, but he had 
no right to the privileges arising from the jus civile.247 
241. INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 235, at 408-09 (quoting DR. TAYLOR'S 
ELEMENTS 429). 
242. GAITJS, supra note 26, at 154. 
243. 1 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 15, ch. 1, § 41, at 434. 
244. 2 Id. bk. 22, ch. 5, § 7. 
245. 4 Id. bk. 50, ch. 17, § 4. 
246. INSTITUTES OF GAITJS AND RULES OF ULPIAN, supra note 236, at 471-73. 
247. THE COMMENTARIES OF GAITJS ON THE ROMAN LAW 164 (Frederick Tomkins 
& William George Lemon trans., 1869). 
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Only Roman citizens could contract a civil law marriage with other 
Roman citizens. This capacity was termed connubium, and where it was 
present, the issue of the marriage followed the condition of the father 
and were also citizens. Only a citizen could have patria potestas over 
his children. Only citizens could have or be agnates. Quiritarian 
ownership was confined to citizens (dominium ex Jure Quritium). Only 
citizens could make certain kinds of contracts. Only citizens could make 
testaments. Many judicial remedies were available only to and against 
citizens. Only citizens could act as witnesses in certain contexts. Lastly, 
only citizens possessed commercium, "the capacity for reciprocally 
acquiring and alienating [according to the forms of the ius ciuile]."248 
Therefore, it was only the class of citizens that possessed certain civil 
capacities with respect to person and property in Roman society under 
the civil law. 
Slaves were not parties to the social compact and, thus, were not 
members of society. The same may be said of other classes of 
individuals who were aliens to Rome such as freedmen or peregrines. 
These individuals did possess certain rights under the }us gentium, a 
separate body of law, but these rights were clearly inferior to those 
possessed by citizens of Rome under the }us civile. For example, 
according to Tomkins and Lemon, "[t]here was a period at Rome when 
non cives were held to be devoid of that capacity which could alone 
entitle them to the protection of the courts of justice."249 However, 
gradually the rights available under the }us gentium were enlarged 
by treaties with foreign States, and by the incorporation of other cities or 
political associations into the Roman family, without, however, their attaining 
to the full privileges conferred by the civitas. In this way non cives, if they 
were free, came to be regarded as fit for the enjoyment of certain legal rights. 
Still there was a wide ~If between the Roman citizen and those new members 
of the commonwealth. 50 
Individuals who were not citizens 
lacked not merely full political rights, but also the privileges of the jus civile 
which were kept from them as "proprium jus civium Romanorum" . . . . The 
correct idea to attach to the peregrinus is, that he was simply a non civis, that 
248. INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN, supra note 236, at 396-97. 
249. THE COMMENTARIES OF GAilJS ON THE ROMAN LAW, supra note 247, at 651. 
250. Id. 
751 
he was neither entitled to the advantages of the commercium, nor enjoyed those 
of the connubium.251 
The Roman model is analogous to the system of Black Codes put into 
place in the Southern states after the Civil War. These were separate 
bodies of law applicable to freed blacks, which denied them the exercise 
of certain civil capacities inherent in citizenship.252 It is not surprising 
that the Black Codes resembled institutions found in the Roman law, 
since the slave codes of the South were heavily influenced by the Roman 
law.253 The status of free blacks in the South under the Black Codes 
was merely one step up from that of slaves. They possessed freedom, 
but were denied the civil authority accompanying the status of citizen. 
a. Privileges 
Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar have asserted that the terms 
"rights," "liberties," "privileges," and "immunities" were used inter-
changeably prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.254 
However, in reality there was probably a subtle distinction between the 
terms "right" and "privilege." A privilege was a power, faculty, or 
capacity possessed by an individual, while a right was a moral quality, 
which was bestowed through positive law upon an individual. In 
English parlance, the term "privilege" was often used as a synonym for 
"liberty" or "franchise."255 In a sense, all of the civil capacities that 
existed for Roman citizens under the law conferred a type of private 
law-making power (privilegium). For example, a citizen could make a 
contract that was binding under the law just as if a legislature had passed 
a law commanding the performance of certain actions or forbearance 
from certain actions. A citizen could leave his property through 
inheritance, and those named in the will would have a right under the 
law to the property just as if the legislature had commanded the transfer. 
In Rome, only citizens enjoyed these capacities or privileges under the 
civil law. This translation is supported by the historical understanding 
of the term "privilege."256 The notion that property involves a power 
of dominion over a thing, a private law-making power with respect to a 
251. Id. (citation omitted). 
252. For a description of the Black Codes, see THEODORE B. WILSON, THE BLACK 
CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965). 
253. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
· 254. See CURTIS, supra note 12, at 64-65; Amar, supra note 2, at 1220 (stating that 
the terms rights, freedoms, privileges, and immunities are "virtually synonymous"). 
255. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *37; 13 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL 
ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 508 (2d ed. 1791). 
256. See INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 235, at 404. 
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thing, is repeated by the natural law writers, and its origin may be traced 
to the Roman law. 
Several of the natural law writers seem to have also differentiated 
between powers and rights.257 For example, Pufendorf noted the 
ambiguous nature of the term "right": 
The word "right" (ius) is highly ambiguous. For in addition to the meanings 
where it is used for law, and for a body or system of homogeneous laws, as 
well as for the decision rendered by a judge, it very frequently happens that it 
is taken as the moral quality by which we legally either command persons, or 
possess things, or by virtue of which something is owed us. 258 
Pufendorf distinguished the terms "power" and "right," stating that the 
difference between the two is that 
the former tends more to introduce into things or persons the actual presence 
of the quality mentioned, and less expressly connotes the mode by which one 
has secured it. Right, however, directly and clearly indicates that a thing has 
been lawfully acquired and is lawfully now retained. Because, however, most 
kinds of power have a distinguishing name, which that quality, whereby 
something is understood to be owed us, lacks, it is convenient to designate this 
quality in a special way by the word "right", although we have not seen fit to 
avoid the other meanings of this word, because of customary usage.259 
Therefore, powers are, in a sense, divorced from their embodiment in the 
municipal law, which gives rise to civil rights-the modes by which 
257. For example, Burlamaqui distinguished between power and right, referring to 
Pufendorf's theory in the process. According to Burlamaqui: 
We must not ... confound simple power with right. A simple power is a 
physical quality; it is a power of acting in the full extent of our natural 
strength and liberty; but the idea of right is more confined. This includes a 
relation of aggreeableness to a rule, which modifies the physical power, and 
directs its operations in a manner proper to conduct man to a certain end. It 
is for this reason we say that right is a moral quality .... The main point is 
to distinguish between physical and moral; and it seems that the word right, 
as Pufendorf himself insinuates, is fitter of itself than power, to express the 
moral idea. In short, the use of our faculties becomes a right only so far, as 
it is approved by reason, and is found agreeable to this primitive rule of 
human actions. 
1 BURLAMAQUI, supra note 132, pt. I, ch. 7, § 3, at 48-49 (citation omitted). However, 
Burlamaqui also acknowledged that at times the term "right" was used to denote a power 
or faculty: "Right is frequently taken from a personal quality, for a power of acting or 
faculty. It is thus we say, that every man has a right to attend to his own preservation; 
that a parent has a right to bring up his children; that a sovereign has a right to levy 
troops for the defence of the state, &c." Id. § 2, at 48. 
258. PUFENDORF, supra note 78, at 19. 
259. Id. (emphasis added). 
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certain powers may be exercised. Pufendorf described the right of 
citizenship as a "complex arising from power and right," which involved 
the "faculty to exersize [sic] ... the acts pertaining to members of the 
commonwealth. "260 According to Pufendorf: 
Many things commonly pass under the head of rights, which, if we cared to 
speak accurately, are a kind of complex arising from power and right, used each 
in its proper sense, and at the same time involve or suppose some obligation, 
or honour, or something similar. Thus citizenship, or the right of citizenship, 
embraces the faculty to exercise, to their fullest effects, the acts pertaining to 
the members of that commonwealth, and the right to enjoy the benefits proper 
to it, supposing likewise an obligation toward the commonwealth.261 
Therefore, a plausible understanding of the term "privilege" is that it 
denotes powers or "faculties" that pertain "to the members of the 
commonwealth"---capacities inherent in the concept of citizenship. Civil 
rights, on the other hand, represent merely the modes by which these 
powers may be exercised. They are embodied in positive municipal 
regulations passed by legislatures. 
b. Immunities 
The etymological roots of the term "immunity" suggest a freedom 
from a public service (munera), which under the Roman law certain 
individuals were required to perform on behalf of their community. In 
the United States, the term was used as a synonym for "exemption."262 
However, the origin of the term may be traced to the Roman Code. In 
Justinian's Institutes it is stated: 
Properly speaking, a "munus" is what we are forced to undertake by law or 
custom or the command of someone who has the right to command . . . . 
"Munus publicum" is the duty of a private individual as a result of which an 
extraordinary benefit is conferred on his fellow citizens, individual1x or as a 
whole, and on their commonwealth at the command of a magistrate. 63 
Under the Roman law, some of these public services were personal 
while others involved burdens on property, including payment of 
taxes.264 These public burdens were described in detail in Justinian's 
Institutes and included "collect[ing] the regular taxes," the "defense of 
one's community," the "appointment as advocate," the "supervision of 
the corn supply," the "supervision of the water supply," and other sundry 
260. Id. at 20. 
261. Id. 
262. GILES JACOB, LAW DICTIONARY (1810); NATHANIEL LINDLEY, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE§§ 30-32, app. note § 31 (1855). 
263. 4 DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 227, bk. 50, ch. 16, §§ 214, 239. 
264. 1 Id. at xxii. 
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duties such as "camel management."265 Justinian's Institutes indicated 
that the enumeration was not exclusive and that 
other duties also can be grasped under the laws of each community by analogy 
with those which we have listed, because of established custom . . . . In general, 
something is to be regarded as a personal munus if it regularly arises from 
bodily activity together with the conscientious exercise of the mental faculties; 
as a patrimonial munus if it particularly involves expense.266 
The Institutes divided these duties, or civil munera, into three 
categories: personal; patrimonial, and mixed. According to the 
Institutes, "[t]he personal ones are those which are carried out by mental 
application and by the deployment of bodily effort without any loss to 
the man undertaking them, like tutelage or care, also the care of the 
account book."267 Among the personal munera were "upkeep of public 
roads," "heating for baths," and "supervision of the water supply," as 
well as various offices involving carrying out public duties.268 Patri-
monial munera were analogous to taxes----munera "carried out at the 
expense of the patrimony and at a loss for the person undertaking 
them."269 Mixed munera involved aspects of both personal service and 
personal expense. 
These civic duties were seen as being burdensome rather than 
beneficial. Although there were many offices that were of value to the 
officeholder in ancient Rome, those required to be undertaken for the 
munera involved personal expense and were therefore burdensome to the 
officeholder. Freedom from these burdensome civic duties could be 
obtained under certain circumstances. For example, if others were 
available to perform the services in one's place, freedom from these 
duties could be obtained. In Justinian's Institutes it is stated that "the 
appropriate reward of immunity is thus given to fathers on account of 
their sons because they themselves will undertake the munera."270 
Such exemptions were termed the right· of immunity (iure immunita-
tis).271 Therefore, under the Roman law an immunity was a right to 
265. 4 Id. bk. 50, ch. 4, § 1. 
266. Id. 
· 267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. bk. 50, ch. 4, § 3. 
271. Id. bk. 50, ch. 6, § 1. 
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be free from having to fulfill some burdensome public duty, including 
payment of taxes. 
5. Peonage 
Status was not necessarily permanent under Roman law and could be 
changed in a variety of ways.272 For example, one's status could be 
reduced to that of a slave through punishment for a crime. In Justinian's 
Institutes we find that "those ordered to execution or who are given to 
the beasts forthwith become servi poenae."273 "Those condemned to 
the extreme penalty immediately lose their citizenship and their freedom. 
This fate therefore anticipates their death."274 All property is lost upon 
such a condemnation by law: "On [a man's] condemnation to lose life 
or citizenship or to be reduced to slavery, [his] property is confiscat-
ed."21s 
This loss of property is analogous to the effects of the Black Codes in 
the South, which were characterized as putting blacks in the condition 
of slaves through a system of peonage. For example, Senator Henry 
Wilson commented to the effect that Virginia used its vagrant laws to 
make slaves of men declared free.276 Similarly, Senator Stewart stated 
that the Civil Rights Bill was an attempt to prevent the Southern states 
from "reduc[ing] the negro to a system of peonage."277 The Black 
Codes placed certain civil disabilities upon free blacks, which were 
272. Justinian's Institutes stated: 
Status is a position of unimpaired standfog, which is established by law and 
custom and under the authority of the laws may be reduced or removed by our 
delict . . . . Status is reduced if we are assigned a penalty which affects our 
standing, although liberty remains, as, for instance, if someone is banished or 
removed from the ordo or debarred from holding public office or if a plebeian 
is beaten with rods or assigned to forced labor or if anyone falls under any 
heading which is listed in the perpetual edict as bringing infamy . . . . Status 
is removed if magna capitis minutia occurs, that is, if deprivation of liberty 
occurs, as, for instance, if someone is forbidden fire and water, which occurs 
when he is deported or if a plebeian is assigned to mine work or to a mine; for 
it makes no difference, nor is there any distinction between a public work and 
a mine, except that those who escape from a public work are punished not by 
. death, but by assignment to a mine. 
Id. bk. 50, ch. 13, § 5. 
273. Id. bk. 48, ch. 19, § 12. 
274. Id. bk. 48, ch. 19, § 29. 
275. Id. bk. 48, ch. 20, § 1. 
276. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 138. 
Elsewhere, Wilson stated in discussing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill that the black codes 
of South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, and other states were "codes of laws that 
practically make the freedman a peon or a serf." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
340 (1866). 
277. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES, supra note 38, at 204. 
756 
[VOL. 34: 681, 1997] Citizenship 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
inconsistent with the status of"citizen." According to Senator Trumbull, 
the Black Code of Mississippi provided "that no negro shall own or hire 
lands . . . that he shall not sue or testify against a white man; that he 
must be employed by a master before the second Monday in January or 
he will be bound out-in other words sold into slavery."278 The Black 
Codes essentially prevented free blacks from exercising the inherent 
powers of citizens. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was designed, 
according to Senator William Stewart, to "remove the disabilities 
existing by laws tending to reduce the negro to a system of peonage. It 
strikes at that; nothing else."279 
Much of the terminology used by members of Congress in the debates 
over Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment finds its origin in the 
terminology of the Roman law. Legal terms such as "citizen," 
"privileges," "immunities," and "peonage" may be traced to the Roman 
law. This body of law influenced both the natural law writers and the 
legal system in the United States. In particular, the Roman model of 
citizenship and the Roman law distinctions among various grades of 
status were influential in the United States and were discussed by certain 
members of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Having discussed both 
the Roman law and social compact theories that served as a background 
to the decision, a detailed examination of the opinions in that case is 
useful in determining the nature of the problems that the Republicans 
sought to address with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
III. DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: SOCIAL COMPACT THEORY AND THE 
ROMAN MODEL OF CITIZENSHIP 
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that freed blacks were not citizens within the meaning of the 
Constitution of the United States.280 The Court concluded, therefore, 
that they were not entitled to the privilege of suing in the courts of the 
United States under Article III of the United States Constitution. Chief 
Justice Taney framed the question addressed by the Court as follows: 
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as 
slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into 
278. Id. at 135. 
279. Id. at 204. 
280. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
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existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled 
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied [sic] by that 
instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a 
court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.281 
Justice Taney's statement of the question before the Court as whether 
freed blacks were members of the political community of the United 
States, indicates the relevance of social compact theory to the decision 
of the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford. The question was whether free 
blacks could be parties to the social compact among citizens of the 
United States. 
Justice Daniel, in his concurring opinion, framed the issue before the 
Court in a similar manner, but emphasized state citizenship: 
And it now becomes the province of this court to determine whether the 
plaintiff below, (and in error here,) admitted to be a negro of African descent, 
whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought into this country 
and sold as negro slaves---such being his status, and such the circumstances 
surrounding his position--whether he can, by correct legal induction from that 
status and those circumstances, be clothed with the character and capacities of 
a citizen of the State of Missouri?282 
Justice Daniel, citing the "theories of writers on Government," empha-
sized the Lockean notion that status as a slave-as property-was 
wholly inconsistent with membership in the political community and 
distinguished between the relation of the individual to the state based on 
the social compact and the relation of the citizen to the government. 
According to Justice Daniel: 
It may be assumed as a postulate, that to a slave, as such, there appertains and 
can appertain no relation, civil or political, with the State or the Government. 
He is himself strictly property, to be used in subserviency to the interests, the 
convenience, or the will, of his owner . . . . 283 
Justice Daniel therefore concluded: 
[A] slave, the peculium or property of a master, and possessing within himself 
no civil nor political rights or capacities, cannot be a CITIZEN. For who, it 
may be asked, is a citizen? What do the character and status of citizen import? 
Without fear of contradiction, it does not import the condition of being private 
property, the subject of individual power and ownership. Upon a principle of 
etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from civitas, conveys the ideas of 
connection or identification with the State or Government, and a participation 
of its functions. But beyond this, there is not, it is believed, to be found, in the 
theories of writers on Government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, 
an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as conferring 
281. Id. at 403 (emphasis added). 
282. Id. at 475. 
283. Id. at 475-76. 
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the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right' of acfillisition and 
enjoyment, of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political.2 
This statement by Justice Daniel perfectly echoes the social compact 
theory of Locke as well as the distinctions in status recognized under the 
Roman law. Status as a slave, or property, was recognized by Justice 
Daniel to be fundamentally inconsistent with status as a citizen. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Daniel discussed social compact theory as 
expressed by Vattel in order to argue that free blacks were not citizens 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.285 Slaves were under 
disabilities due to their status as property. They were under the 
dominion of others, and because of this status, they could not exercise 
the sovereignty necessary to enter into the social compact. Justice 
Daniel quoted Vattel as stating that '"[t]he citizens are the members of 
the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to 
its authority; they equally participate in its advantages. "'286 Justice 
Daniel then concluded: 
From the views here expressed, and they seem to be unexceptionable, it must 
follow, that with the slave, with one devoid of rights or capacities, civil or 
political, there could be no pact; that one thus situated could be no party to, or 
actor in, the association of those possessing free will, power, discretion. He 
could form no part of the design, no constituent ingredient or portion of a 
society based upon common, that is, upon equal interests and powers. He could 
not at the same time be the sovereign and the slave. 287 
Therefore, Justice Daniel explicitly recognized the theory of society as 
being based upon a compact and deduced from this that slaves could not 
have been counted among citizens at the time of ratification of the 
Constitution. 
The Lockean notion that citizenship is defined as being part of a 
political community, a party to the social compact, is clearly stated in 
Chief Justice Taney's and Justice Daniel's statement of the question 
Id. 
284. Id. at 476 (emphasis added). 
285. According to Justice Daniel: 
Vattel, in the preliminary chapter of his Treatise on the Law of Nations, says: 
"Nations or States are bodies politic; societies of men united together for the 
purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage, by the joint efforts 
of their mutual strength." 
286. Id. at 476 (citing EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS bk. 1, cap. 19, at 
101). 
287. Id. at 477. 
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before the Court. Both Taney and Daniel concluded that, under this 
definition, free blacks were not citizens. According to Chief Justice 
Taney, free blacks certainly were not citizens at the time of the framing 
of the Constitution: 
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous 
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, 
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the 
power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are 
what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this 
people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us 
is; whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a 
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We 
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be 
included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim 
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures 
to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time 
considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been 
subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet 
remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as 
those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. 288 
The "republican institutions" mentioned by Justice Taney were based 
upon the sovereignty of the people wherein they entered into a compact 
among themselves and subsequently established the government, 
retaining certain pre-existing privileges or capacities. Individuals who 
were under the dominion of others were incapable of contracting, a 
notion familiar under the Roman law,289 and were therefore incapable 
of undertaking the obligations inherent in the social compact.290 
288. Id. at 404-05. As Professor Maltz has noted, both Taney and McLean tended 
to take extreme positions on the issue of whether slaves or free blacks were citizens 
under the Constitution: 
In Dred Scott itself, both Taney and McLean took extreme positions. The 
Chief Justice argued that the framers of the Constitution did not consider free 
blacks to be citizens of the United States and that the descendants of slaves 
could never become citizens. McLean, by contrast, embraced the radical 
Republican position, arguing that all free men should be considered citizens 
of the United States. 
Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the 
Constitutional Law of Slavery, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1995, 2008 (1995). 
289. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text. 
290. In order to support his argument that individuals who have been under the 
dominion of others cannot achieve the status of citizens, Chief Justice Taney contrasted 
the situation oflndians with that of blacks brought to the United States as slaves. Taney 
concluded that "[t]he situation of this population [blacks] was altogether unlike that of 
the Indian race" because the "Indian race" was "a free and independent people, 
associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by their own laws." Dred Scott, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403. 
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According to the reasoning of Chief Justice Taney, slaves, because of 
their state of servitude at the time of formation of the social compact and 
the establishment of the federal government, could not have been 
counted as being among the parties to these compacts. 
The Court was not unanimous, however, in its opinion that Dred Scott 
was not a citizen and therefore not entitled to sue in the courts of the 
United States. Justice McLean, in his dissent, argued that Dred Scott 
might have been a citizen of Missouri and that state citizenship was 
enough to exercise the frivilege of suing in the courts of the United 
States under Article III.2 1 
Furthermore, Justice Curtis reached in his dissent the conclusion that 
free blacks were indeed considered to be citizens of the United States at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution based upon his own 
historical inquiry into the status of blacks and his examination of the 
constitutional text. Justice Curtis could 
find nothing in the Constitution which, proprio vigore, deprives of their 
citizenship any class of persons who were citizens of the United States at the 
time of its adoption, or who should be native-born citizens of any State after its 
adoption; nor any power enabling Congress to disfranchise persons born on the 
soil of anv State, and entitled to citizenship of such State by its Constitution 
and laws.2'92 
Justice Curtis argued that "under the Constitution of the United States, 
every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that 
emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the different 
Governments which succeeded each other. 
Id. at 404. Taney pointed to the fact that treaties were negotiated with the Indian tribes 
and the fact that the Indians were sought as allies in times of war as evidence that they 
were considered sovereign peoples. Therefore, the position oflndians differed from that 
of free blacks in that they were not subject to the dominion of others as property. They 
were capable of becoming citizens since they possessed the capacity of a free people to 
be bound and undertake an obligation with the government through compact. Therefore, 
they were more nearly like aliens who may become citizens through action of the 
government's power of naturalization. 
291. According to Justice McLean: 
There is no averment in this plea which shows or conduces to show an 
inability in the plaintiff to sue in the Circuit Court. It does not allege that the 
plaintiff had his domicil in any other State, nor that he is not a free man in 
Missouri. He is averred to have had a negro ancestry, but this does not show 
that he is not a citizen of Missouri, within the meaning of the act of Congress 
authorizing him to sue in the Circuit Court. 
Id. at 531. 
292. Id. at 576. 
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State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United 
States."293 Arguably, Justice Curtis was appealing to the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article Iv, Section 2, which confers upon 
"Citizens" the privileges and immunities of "Citizens in the several 
States." Thus, citizens of a state might achieve United States citizen-
ship-citizenship in the several states-----derivatively through the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
However, the Taney Court denied that after ratification of the 
Constitution non-aliens could be made citizens of the United States and 
be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the 
states. In effect, the Taney Court construed the Clause as reading: The 
Citizens of the United States of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States in the several 
States. The importance of this outcome in terms of interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is that this was the construction of the Clause 
adopted by Senator Bingham, the principle draftsman of Section 1 of the 
Amendment, who had pointed to the decision of the Taney Court in 
arguing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guaranteed certain 
rights of citizens of the United States against abridgement by the 
states.294 Arguably, by guaranteeing the privileges and immunities of 
"citizens of the United States" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Bingham sought to constitutionalize this view of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 espoused by Taney. 
Subpart III.A discusses the historical debate concerning the status of 
free blacks at the time of ratification of the Constitution. Were free 
blacks considered citizens upon ratification, they would indeed be 
members of the political community entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens flowing from the social compact. However, the 
majority concluded that the term "citizen" as used in the Constitution did 
not originally encompass free blacks. 
Having determined that historically free blacks were not considered 
citizens, the Court next addressed potential mechanisms through which 
they might achieve this status. Subpart III.B discusses the positions of 
the majority and the dissenters concerning the ability of free blacks to 
become citizens. The majority concluded that, in effect, short of 
293. Id. 
294. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). Professor Maltz has also 
noted that Taney's opinion in Dred Scott indicates that he believed the Comity Clause 
protected certain rights inherent in citizenship of the United States. See Maltz, supra 
note 22, at 344 (noting that "the concept that the comity clause protected a national 
citizenship which was independent of state citizenship formed the basis for Chief Justice 
Taney's argument on the citizenship issue in Dred Scott."). 
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constitutional amendment, free blacks could not become citizens. In 
contrast, Justice Curtis argued that any residual power to confer 
citizenship was left with the states. This aspect of the Court's decision 
necessitated that the American people ratify the first sentence of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in order to confer the status of citizen of the 
United States upon free blacks. 
Subpart 111.C addresses the interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause given by the majority and dissent. Both the majority 
and dissent indicated that the Clause conferred a "general citizenship." 
However, language in Chief Justice Taney's opinion seems to indicate 
that he thought the Clause mandated ( or at least assumed) uniformity in 
the privileges and immunities of citizens among the states, whereas 
Justice Curtis's opinion indicates that he thought that (the people of) 
each state remained free to determine the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship within the state, and that the Clause afforded merely 
antidiscrimination protection. 
A. The Historical Evidence Concerning the Status of Free Blacks 
During the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Taney examined the 
historical evidence concerning the status of free blacks in the United 
States before and after ratification of the Constitution in an attempt to 
buttress his argument that free blacks were not considered citizens at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution. In Lockean terms, they were 
not original parties to the social compact. The fact that the majority 
placed free blacks in an intermediate status between citizenship and 
slavery is an indication of the Court's reliance upon the Roman model 
of citizenship.295 Chief Justice Taney first appealed to the wording of 
the Declaration of Independence, which declared that "all men are 
created equal," and contrasted these words with the condition of slaves 
as being in a state of servitude. According to Chief Justice Taney, the 
language of the Declaration of Independence concerning the equality of 
295. Some prior decisions had rejected the existence of any such intennediate status. 
See, e.g., State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 122, 127-29 (1838) (concluding 
that free blacks were indeed citizens although their rights were reduced); State v. 
Edmund, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 290 (1833) (holding that a free black was qualified as a 
citizen for purposes of a state law protecting citizens' right to hold property in slaves). 
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all men was inconsistent with inclusion of slaves within the category of 
"the People."296 Taney argued: 
The general words [of the Declaration] above quoted would seem to embrace 
the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this 
day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved 
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people 
who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the language, as understood in 
that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who 
framed the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly 
inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of 
mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and 
. received universal rebuke and reprobation. 297 
Therefore, the existence of the Declaration stating that all citizens were 
equal, while blacks were not in practice enjoying equality, indicated that 
free blacks were not members of the "body politic" constituting the 
citizenry. 
Chief Justice Taney observed that there was no definition of the term 
"citizen" in the Constitution, but argued that the term as used in the 
Constitution was "so well understood, that no further description or 
definition was necessary. "298 Echoing a common theme found in 
Locke, among others, that status as property and status as a citizen are 
incompatible,299 Chief Justice Taney also appealed to the language of 
the Constitution as recognizing the status of slaves as property rather 
than citizens. According to Chief Justice Taney, the "negro race" were 
not a "portion of the people." Taney pointed to the Slave Importation 
Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause as evidence that the "negro race" 
formed a "separate class of persons." According to Taney: 
[T]hese two clauses were not intended to confer on them or their posterity the 
blessings of liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the 
citizen . . . . It is obvious that they were not even in the minds of the framers 
of the Constitution when they were conferring special rights and privileges 
upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the Union. Indeed, when we 
look to the condition of this race in the several States at the time, it is 
296. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 410. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 411. 
299. Justice Daniel, in his concurrence, also expressed this idea that slavery and 
property were inconsistent, engaging in an extensive discussion of slavery over the ages 
in civilized society and concluding that Africans had 
been by all the nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture or purchase; 
as subjects of commerce or traffic; and that the introduction of that race into 
every section of this country was not as members of civil or political society, 
but as slaves, as property in the strictest sense of the term. 
Id. at 475. 
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impossible to believe that these rights and privileges were intended to be 
extended to them. 300 
To further support his position, Chief Justice Taney discussed congres-
sional legislation that he argued indicated that blacks were not consid-
ered citizens at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, including 
the naturalization law of 1790 that confined "the right of becoming 
citizens 'to aliens, being free white persons,"' and the militia law of 
1792 that applied to "every 'free able-bodied white male citizen. "'301 
From his historical inquiry into congressional practice, Chief Justice 
Taney concluded that free blacks as well as slaves were not considered 
citizens, did not enter into a social compact with the people, and 
therefore were not entitled to the "personal rights" or "special rights and 
privileges" of citizens. 
Chief Justice Taney examined not only evidence pertaining to national 
citizenship, but also evidence pertaining to state citizenship.302 He 
built his case that a race subject to the dominion of others was incapable 
of citizenship by looking to the practice of the states with respect to free 
blacks after ratification of the Constitution. Citing Chancellor Kent's 
Commentaries, Chief Justice Taney argued that "in no part of the 
country except Maine, did the African race, in point of fact, participate 
equally with the whites in the exercise of civil and political rights."303 
Therefore, free blacks not only lacked the status of "citizen" of the 
United States, but in most of the states, they did not even possess the 
status of "citizen" of the state. 
300. Id. at 411-12 (emphasis added). 
301. Id. at 419-20. 
302. Id. at 414-15. Chief Justice Taney examined the status of blacks in some of 
the more "liberal" states and determined that even in these states, blacks did not possess 
the status of "citizen." For example, Chief Justice Taney cited Chief Justice Dagget's 
opinion in Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 340 (1834), concerning a Connecticut law 
which made it penal to set up or establish any school in that State for the 
instruction of persons of the African race not inhabitants of the State, or to 
instruct or teach in any such school or institution, or board or harbor for that 
purpose, any such person, without the previous consent in writing of the civil 
authority of the town in which such school or institution might be. 
Id. In this case, the court held "that persons . . . [ of the African race] were not citizens 
of a State, within the meaning of the word citizen in the Constitution of the United 
States, and were not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
other States." Id. at 415. 
303. Id. at 416. 
765 
Taney also discussed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Articles of Confederation as preserving the primary nature of state 
citizenship. The states were free to choose who was to be a member of 
their own political communities, and citizenship of the United States was 
dependent upon pre-existing citizenship of a particular state at the time 
of adoption of the Articles of Confederation. According to Taney, 
"members of the African race" were not considered to be "free 
inhabitants" under the Clause and were therefore not entitled to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens under the Articles.304 Further-
more, Taney argued that the change in language from "free inhabitants" 
in the Articles of Confederation to "citizens" in the Constitution was 
intended to make it clear that "an emancipated slave" would not be 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause.305 An aspect of protecting the sovereignty of 
the individual states was that no individual could be forced upon them 
within their own jurisdiction, possessing the status of a citizen, without 
their consent. The states consented to recognize the citizens of the 
United States, parties to the national compact at the time of ratification 
of the Constitution, as possessing the same status in all of the states as 
304. Id. at 416-19. Chief Justice Taney argued: 
[U]nder this Confederation, each State had the right to decide for itself, and 
in its own tribunals, whom it would acknowledge as a free inhabitant of 
another State. But no example, we think, can be found of his admission to all 
the privileges of citizenship in any State of the Union after these Articles were 
formed, and while they continued in force. And, notwithstanding the 
generality of the words "free inhabitants," it is very clear that, according to 
their accepted meaning in that day, they did not include the African race, 
whether free or not . . . . 
Id. at 418. Taney concluded: 
Words could hardly have been used which more strongly mark the line of 
distinction between the citizen and the subject; the free and the subjugated 
races . . . . [I]t cannot for a moment be supposed, that a class of persons thus 
separated and rejected from those who formed the sovereignty of the States, 
were yet intended to be included under the words "free inhabitants," in the 
preceding article, to whom privileges and immunities were so carefully secured 
in every State. 
Id. at 418-19. 
305. Id. at 416-19. Chief Justice Taney noted that in the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Constitution "the comprehensive word inhabitant, which might be 
construed to include an emancipated slave, is omitted; and the privilege is confined to 
citizens of the State." Id. at 419. Note that Chief Justice Taney referred to the right to 
be recognized as a citizen in all of the states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
as a "privilege." Therefore, since the right is embodied in the United States Constitu-
tion, one can only conclude that it is among the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States. Thus, contrary to the decision of the Court in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, it would seem that enjoyment of privileges and immunities traditionally within 
the regulatory control of the state governments was considered a privilege of citizens of 
the United States. 
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native citizens through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, Section 2. However, membership in this political community 
composing the union was to be restricted to those individuals possessing 
the status of citizens of the United States at the time of ratification, their 
heirs, and those aliens naturalized by Congress. This argument is fully 
consistent with the social compact theory previously expounded by the 
majority. 
Justice Curtis, in his dissent, also appealed to a historical approach in 
order to determine whether free blacks were considered citizens at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution. However, his conclusion 
concerning the status of free blacks at the time of ratification of the 
original Constitution contradicted that of the Taney majority. According 
to Justice Curtis: 
substantial facts evinced by the written Constitutions of States, and . . . the 
notorious practice under them .... [showed] in a manner which no argument 
can obscure, that in some of the original thirteen States, free colored persons, 
before and at the time of the formation of the Constitution, were citizens of 
those States. 306 
Curtis argued that possessing the status of citizen of a particular state 
prior to ratification of the Constitution was evidence of entitlement to 
citizenship of the United States and all of the privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several states under Article IV, Section 2. 
Disagreeing with the conclusion of the Taney majority, Justice Curtis 
also contended that free blacks might have been recognized as citizens 
under the Articles of Confederation. According to Justice Curtis, free 
blacks fell within the phrase "free inhabitants" used in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation. Curtis further 
argued that the change from "free inhabitants" in the Articles to 
"citizens" in the Constitution did not show an intent to exclude 
emancipated slaves because the phrases had substantially the same 
meaning at the time--"the words 'free inhabitants,' as then used, were 
synonymous with citizens."307 
306. Id. at 575. 
307. Justice Curtis noted that "the Constitutions and State papers of that period" 
used the terms "the inhabitants or people of these colonies, or the inhabitants of this _ 
State, or Commonwealth, employed to designate those whom we should now denominate 
citizens." Id. at 585. See also Maltz, supra note 288, at 2008 (noting that Curtis 
thought that "[u]nder the Articles of Confederation, these [free] blacks would have been 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Thus, for Curtis, the 
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The arguments of the dissenters in the Dred Scott decision more 
accurately reflect the historical truth concerning the status of free blacks 
in the United States at the time of ratification of the Constitution.308 
Paul Finkelman has contended that "[w]hile Taney was correct that most 
blacks in 1787 were slaves, he was clearly wrong about black citizen-
ship."309 At least one court still considered free blacks to be "citizens" 
soon after the Dred Scott decision.310 Furthermore, according to 
question was whether the Constitution had deprived free blacks of their right to 
citizenship") (citation ommitted). 
308. This is the conclusion reached by James H. Kettner. See KETTNER, supra note 
14, at 326-28. However, Kettner focuses on the fact that free blacks were considered 
citizens of various states and not on whether they were considered citizens of the United 
States. He contends that Taney's distinction between state and national citizenship 
"countered a long popular and judicial tradition of considering the two as inseparable 
dimensions of the same status." Id. at 328. 
309. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND 
COMITY 279-80 (1981). Finkelman notes the argument of Justice Curtis that: 
"At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native-
born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, 
New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from African slaves, were 
not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary 
qualifications possessed the franchise of electors on equal terms with other 
citizens." 
Id. at 280 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-08, 572-73). However, it was 
necessary not only that they be considered citizens of the individual state in which they 
resided but also citizens of the United States, equal parties in the social compact that 
formed the basis of the union. Finkelman also cites a number of cases involving acts 
of southern states which restricted free black seamen venturing within their states as 
showing that there had been controversy concerning whether free blacks qualified as 
citizens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Among 
the cases cited by Finkelman are Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (1823), The 
Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102 (1844), Calder v. Deliesseline, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 186 (1824), 
and State v. Shaw, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 480 (1828). Id. at 280 n.118. See also 
WIECEK, supra note 74, at 132-40; 1 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL 
OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 576-86 (1872); A.E. Keir Nash, Negro Rights, 
Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary 
Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S.C. L. REV. 141, 146-48 (1969) [hereinafter 
Nash, Negro Rights]; A.E. Keir Nash, Reason of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial 
Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 7 (1979) [hereinafter Nash, Reason 
of Slavery]. 
310. In Anderson v. Millikin, involving an individual who had one-eighth African 
blood but was otherwise qualified to vote and who was denied the right to vote for 
electors of president and vice-president of the United States in the election of 1856, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio argued that blacks were not precluded from being citizens of the 
United States. 9 Ohio St. 568, 577 (1859). The court reasoned: 
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We think it entirely clear, that the phrase "citizen of the United States" was 
inserted in our constitution with a view to the exclusion of aliens until they 
should be naturalized, and thus become citizens of the United States. We are 
confident that the phrase was used with no reference to color, and can not 
believe that the idea was then entertained that, independent of the word 
"white," the phrase "citizen of the United States" would operate to exclude any 
person, on account of color, from the exercise of the elective franchise. 
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Justice Story in his Commentaries, prior to the Dred Scott decision, 
Missouri was admitted as a state on the condition that it could not deny 
any privileges and immunities to blacks, indicating that members of 
Congress believed that free blacks might be citizens. 311 
This was certainly the position adopted by Senator Bingham, the 
principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, who 
expressed his opinion concerning this matter during the debate over the 
admission of Oregon as a state soon after the Supreme Court's Dred 
Scott decision.312 Senator Bingham adopted the view of the dissenters 
in the Dred Scott decision, that the constitutional text and the historical 
record indicated that free blacks did possess the status of citizens and 
were included within the definition of the term as used in the Constitu-
Id. In support of its position, the court examined the historical origins of the term in the 
Constitution of the United States. According to the court: 
It so happens, that we are not left merely to presumption that the phrase 
"citizen of the United States" was used by the framers of the constitution in 
a general sense. A motion was made in the convention, to strike out from the 
section under consideration the words "United States," and insert "this state;" 
and, singularly enough, the danger of using an expression, the meaning of 
which might be altered or controlled by an authority independent of the state, 
suggested itself to a member, and was expressed. But in answer, it was said: 
"Who shall be considered citizens of this Union? I take the broad but tenable 
ground, that all should be regarded as citizens of the United States who owe 
allegiance to the government of the Union, whether they are vested with the 
elective franchise or not." ... [Said by another,] "American citizenship is a 
generic and comprehensive term, and much more so than the term 'subject,' 
under a monarchical form of government. The term 'a citizen of the United 
States,' therefore, includes men, women, and childrell-every one, in short, 
who can demand the official protection of the federal government, or may be 
amenable for the crime of treason." 
Id. at 578 (citations omitted). In general, citizenship was not necessarily tied to an 
individual's color. Any individual might be a party to the social coinpact among the 
members of society and therefore entitled to the rights of members of the political 
community. In fact, there were free blacks in the United States while slavery existed 
as an institution who enjoyed some of the privileges of citizenship under the various 
state governments. However, as the Taney Court argued in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
freedom alone did not necessarily imply that there was a constitutional right to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
311. 2 STORY, supra note 3, at 637 n.1. 
312. It may have been the view among Republicans in general that free blacks were 
intended to be included among citizens of the United States at the time of ratification 
of the Constitution, as Michael Kent Curtis has argued. See CURTIS, supra note 12, at 
46 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (Trumbull), 1115 (Wilson), 1832 
(Lawrence) (1866)). · 
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tion. Bingham engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning the status of 
free blacks and their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, Section 2, reiterating some of the very same arguments 
that the Dred Scott dissenters had made. Bingham pointed to the 
constitutional text and the text of the Articles of Confederation, stating 
that the Constitution of the United States included 
all free persons born and domiciled within the United States-not all free white 
persons, but all free persons. You will search in vain, in the Constitution of the 
United States, for that word white; it is not there. You will look in vain for it 
in that first form of national govemment--the Articles of Confederation; it is 
not there. 313 
Bingham termed the word "white" a "phrase of caste" and stated that its 
omission "from our national charter, was not accidental, but intentional." 
According to Bingham, the rejection of this language "was a clear and 
direct avowal that all free inhabitants, white and black, except 'paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice,' (which were expressly excepted,) 
were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several States .... "314 Bingham examined the practices of the states, 
noting that in five states "the elective franchise was exercised by free 
inhabitants, black and white; and therefore, in five of the States, black 
men cooperated with white men in the elections, and in the formation of 
the Constitution of the United States."315 He returned to the constitu-
tional text, stating: 
Inasmuch as black men helped to make the Constitution, as well as to achieve 
the independence of the country by the terrible trial by battle, it is not 
surprising that the Constitution of the United States does not exclude them from 
the body politic, and the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States. That great instrument included in the new body politic, by the name of 
"the people of the United States," all the then free inhabitants or citizens of the 
United States, whether white or black, not even excepting, as did the Articles 
of Confederation, paupers, vagabonds, or fugitives fromjustice. Thenceforward 
all these classes, being free inhabitants, irrespective of age, or sex, or 
complexion, and their descendants, were citizens of the United States. No 
distinctions were made against the . . . free-born blacks and in favor of the 
whites.316 · 
Finally, Bingham made a distinction between "natural" and "convention-
al" rights similar to Kent's distinction between absolute and relative 
313. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859). 
314. Id.; see also CURTIS, supra note 12, at 59-62 (discussing Bingham's statements 
concerning the admission of Oregon into the Union). 
315. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra note 
12, at 59-62. 
316. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984-85 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra 
note 12, at 59-62. 
770 
[VOL. 34: 681, 1997] Citizenship 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
rights, stating that "[t]his Government rests upon the absolute equality 
of natural rights amongst men. There is not, and cannot be, any equality 
in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights, because that is 
impossible."317 Therefore, the Taney Court's opinion that free blacks 
were not counted among the members of the political community 
comprising the United States---citizens of the United States---at the time 
of ratification of the Constitution is of dubious historical validity. 
Having determined that free blacks were not citizens of the United 
States, the Court next turned to the question of whether and by what 
means, if any, they could achieve this status. 
B. The Power to Confer Citizenship: Implications of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 
The most important aspect of the Dred Scott decision handed down by 
the Taney Court was not that freed blacks lacked citizenship of the 
United States, but rather that they could not become citizens of the 
United States under the existing constitutional regime. According to the 
Court, there was no constitutionally-provided-for mechanism to confer 
citizenship of the United States upon this class of individuals. The 
importance of this aspect of the decision was recognized by the Miller 
majority in the Slaughter-House Cases. Justice Miller stated that the 
Dred Scott decision held that "a man of African descent, whether a slave 
or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United 
States."318 However, modern commentators have not fully recognized 
the implications of this aspect of the Court's decision. 
Chief Justice Taney acknowledged the distinction between state 
citizenship and United States citizenship upon which the Miller majority 
rested its opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases. According to Chief 
Justice Taney, a state and the United States were two separate political 
communities founded upon two separate social compacts. The constitu-
ents to the state compacts were citizens of the state while the constitu-
ents to the federal compact included not only citizens of the United 
States but also, perhaps, the states conceived of as artificial persons. 
Chief Justice Taney stated: 
317. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859); see also CURTIS, supra note 
12, at 59-62. 
318. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873) (emphasis added). 
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[W]e must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer 
within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. 
It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of 
a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may 
have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and ret not be 
entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other State.31 
Therefore, the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States 
included the "rights and privileges of a citizen in any other state." This 
is an indication that, at a minimum, being a citizen of the United States 
entailed entitlement to privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states under Article IV, Section 2. However, this status entailed 
entitlement to certain privileges and immunities that were peculiarly 
national as well. 32° Chief Justice Taney thought that the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States included the privileges and 
immunities traditionally within the control of state governments. Taney 
argued that this implied that the states could not unilaterally confer 
citizenship of the United States. 
[P]revious to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State 
had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of 
citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character of course was 
confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in 
other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity 
of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these 
rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. Each 
State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon 
any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense 
in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled 
to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a 
citizen in the other States. The rights which he would acquire would be 
restricted to the State which gave them. The Constitution has conferred on 
Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right 
is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so. 
Consequently, no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can by 
naturalizing an alien invest in him with the rights and privileges secured to a 
citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State 
alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a 
319. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,405 (1856). 
320. In fact, the privilege of exercising the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states is essentially itself a "peculiarly national" privilege, forming the "basis 
of the Union." Another peculiarly national privilege would be the right to sue in the 
courts of the United States under Article III, which was at issue in Dred Scott. The right 
of access to federal tribunals was held to be a privilege beyond the power of the states 
in several cases prior to Dred Scott. See, e.g., Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co., 5 F. Cas. 291, 
296 (N.Y. 1826) (No. 2,517); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 74 (1840); 
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 326 (1853); Union 
Bank of Tennessee v. Vaiden, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503, 507 (1855). 
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citizen, and clothed with all the rights and immunities which the Constitution 
and laws of the State attached to that character.321 
Therefore, in Justice Taney's opinion, the states had no power to confer 
national citizenship, "citizenship of the United States," either directly or 
indirectly through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 upon individuals whose ancestors were not citizens at the time 
of ratification of the Constitution. This would be an infringement of the 
sovereignty of the other states in the Union since they had not consented 
to recognize such individuals as citizens within their jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the above passage indicates that, besides the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship in the several states, citizenship of the United 
States entitled one to exercise peculiarly "national" privileges including 
the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article Ill. 
If one keeps in mind the social compact theory of Locke, the meaning 
of Chief Justice Taney's argument becomes clear. The political 
community is founded upon a compact. In order to enter into this 
community, it is necessary to have the acquiescence or consent of the 
other parties to the compact. Unilateral conferral of national citizenship 
on the part of a single state violates this principle. As Chief Justice 
Taney argued: 
It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, 
passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the 
political community created by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot 
make him a member of this community by making him a member of its own. 
And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or description of 
persons, who were not intended to be embraced in this new political family, 
which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded 
from it.322 
Chief Justice Taney then addressed the question of whether the states 
could indirectly, via the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2, confer "citizenship of the United States." He concluded that 
they could not. 323 
321. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405-06. 
322. Id. at 406. 
323. Chief Justice Taney concluded: 
Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him [a member of the 
African race] whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and 
raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the 
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts? 
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It is true, every person, and every class and description of persons, who were 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution recognised [sic] as citizens in the 
several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none other; 
it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. 
And the personal rights and privileges guarantied [sic] to citizens of this new 
sovereignty were intended to embrace those only who were then members of the 
several State communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise 
become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the 
principles on which it was founded. It was the union of those who were. at that 
time members of distinct and separate political communities into one political 
family, whose power, for certain specified purposes, was to extend over the 
whole territory of the United States. And it gave to each citizen rights and 
privileges outside of his State which he did not before possess, and placed him 
in every other State upon a perfect equality with its own citizens as to rights of 
person and rights of property; it made him a citizen of the United States.324 
Chief Justice Taney argued that there had been no consent for allowing 
free blacks into the national political community and that, furthermore, 
there had been no consent to a mechanism for accomplishing this end. 
According to Taney, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 provided no such mechanism. Therefore, only through the 
consent of the whole political community of the United States----through 
amendment of the Constitution---could free blacks become citizens of the 
United States. Otherwise, the most that free blacks could hope to enjoy 
would be the privileges and immunities that the states were willing to 
grant them within their individual jurisdictions as citizens of a particular 
state. 
Id. 
The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. 
And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of 
Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, 
consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts. 
324. Id. at 406-07 (emphasis added). This passage was quoted by Senator Bingham 
in his speech against the admission of Oregon as a state in order to show the equivalence 
of the phrases "citizens of the several states" and "citizens of the United States." CONG. 
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). See also supra notes 312-316 and accompany-
ing text. 
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Justice Daniel agreed with Chief Justice Taney that the states had no 
power to confer citizenship in the other states.325 As Justice Daniel 
stated: 
It is evident that, after the formation of the Federal Government by the adoption 
of the Constitution, the highest exertion of State power would be incompetent 
to bestow a character or status created by the Constitution, or conferred in 
virtue of its authority only. Upon those, therefore, who were not originally 
parties to the Federal compact, or who are not admitted and adopted as parties 
thereto, in the mode prescribed by its paramount authority, no State could have 
power to bestow the character or the rights and privileges exclusively reserved 
by the States for the action of the Federal Government by that compact.326 
325. Justice Daniel also argued that emancipation alone did not confer any 
privileges or immunities of citizenship. Emancipation merely granted to blacks their 
freedom, but did not necessarily make them members of the political community entitled 
to the privileges and immunities of citizenship. This argument was based, in part, upon 
his understanding of the Roman Code. Justice Daniel asked: 
Can it be pretended that an individual in any State, by his single act, though 
voluntarily or designedly performed, yet without the co-operation or warrant 
of the Government, perhaps in opposition to its policy or its guaranties, can 
create a citizen of that State? . . . The argument thus urged must lead to these 
extraordinary conclusions. It is regarded at once as wholly untenable, and as 
unsustained by the direct authority or by the analogies of history. 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 477. According to Justice Daniel, just as a state could 
not make an individual a member of the national political community, so a master by 
freeing his slave could not make him a member of the political community of the state. 
Historically, "citizenship was not conferred by the simple fact of emancipation." Id. at 
479-80. This would establish "one equal and universal slavery." Id. at 480. Justice 
Daniel urged that the argument, if valid, would have "revolting consequences." An 
individual might 
emancipate his negro slave, by which process he first transforms that slave into 
a citizen of his own State; he may next, under color of article fourth, section 
second, of the Constitution of the United States, obtrude him, and on terms of 
civil and political equality, upon any and every State in this Union, in defiance 
of all regulations of necessity or policy, ordained by those States for their 
internal happiness or safety. Nay, more: this manumitted slave may, by a 
proceeding springing from the will or act of his master alone, be mixed up 
with the institutions of the Federal Government, to which he is not a party, and 
in opposition to the laws of that Government which, in authorizing the 
extension by naturalization of the rights and immunities of citizens of the 
United States to those not originally parties to the Federal compact, have 
restricted that boon to free white aliens alone. 
Id. at 480-81. Therefore, under Justice Daniel's argument, only the political community 
itself may confer membership upon an individual. It is only through consent that the 
social compact is entered into among the members of society. 
326. Id. at 482. 
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However, in Justice Daniel's op1mon, the states could grant certain 
special privileges and immunities within their own jurisdictions. 
The States, in the exercise of their political power, might, with reference to 
their peculiar Government and jurisdiction, guaranty the rights of person and 
property, and the enjoyment of civil and political privileges, to those whom they 
should be disposed to make the objects of their bounty; but they could not 
reclaim or exert the powers which they had vested exclusively in the Govern-
ment of the United States. They could not add to or change in any respect the 
class of persons to whom alone the character of citizen of the United States 
appertained at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. They could 
not create citizens of the United States by any direct or indirect proceeding. 327 
This conclusion is important because it meant that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause guaranteed the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States in the several states and not the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of each state in the several states. The Taney 
Court's construction of the Clause was adopted by Senator Bingham, 
who cited the above passage in Chief Justice Tanets opinion in his 
speech against the admission of Oregon as a state.32 The implication 
is that Article IV, Section 2 guarantees the privileges and immunities 
traditionally within the control of the states to citizens of the United 
States. Thus, even if one concludes, as the majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases did, that "citizens of the United States" as used in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
equivalent to "citizens in the several states/' as used in the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, one could argue that one 
of the privileges of citizens of the United States is to be guaranteed the 
privileges and immunities traditionally under the regulatory control of 
the states under Article IV, Section 2. 
Justice Daniel and Justice Taney's conclusion that the states had no 
power to confer citizenship upon individuals might not have held under 
the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution granted Congress the 
exclusive enumerated power to make aliens citizens, whereas under the 
Articles of Confederation this power had remained with the states. 
According to Justice Story in his Commentaries, one of the defects of 
the Articles of Confederation was that any state might make an 
individual a citizen of all the other states under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Articles by conferring citizenship upon that 
individual within the state.329 Justice Story termed this "a power as 
327. Id. (emphasis added). 
328. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 {1859). 
329. According to Justice Story, because under the Articles of Confederation 
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mischievous in its nature as it was indiscreet in its actual exercise." 
However, under the United States Constitution, the federal government 
was vested with the exclusive power of naturalization, and according to 
Justice Story, by implication this meant that the states could not make 
individuals citizens of the United States.330 William Rawle, in The 
Constitution of the United States of America, also recognized this 
problem. According to Rawle, because of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, 
if each state retained the power of naturalization, it might impose on all the 
other states, such citizens as it might think proper . . . . The evil could not be 
better remedied than by vesting the exclusive power in Congress. It cannot 
escape notice that no definition of the nature and rights of citizens appears in 
the Constitution. The descriptive term is used, with a plain indication that its 
meaning is understood by all ... ,331 · 
The issue that divided the majority and the dissent, other than whether 
free blacks were citizens at the time of ratification of the original 
the free inhabitants of each State were entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in all the other States, it followed that a single State 
possessed the power of forcing into every other State, with the enjoyment of 
every immunity and privilege, any alien whom it might choose to incorporate 
into its own society, however repugnant such admission might be to their 
polity, conveniences, and even prejudices. 
2 STORY, supra note 3, at 41. 
330. Chief Justice Taney analogized the power of naturalization to the power of 
. conferring citizenship upon non-aliens: 
No State was willing to permit another State to determine who should or 
should not be admitted as one of its citizens, and entitled to demand equal 
rights and privileges with their own people, within their own territories. The 
right of naturalization was therefore, with one accord, surrendered by the 
States, and confided to the Federal Government. And this power granted to 
Congress to establish an uniform rule of naturalization is, by the well-
understood meaning of the word, confined to persons born in a foreign 
country, under a foreign Government. It is not a power to raise to the rank of 
a citizen any one born in the United States, who, from birth or parentage, by 
the laws of the country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class .... The 
Constitution upon its adoption obviously took from the States all power by any 
subsequent legislation to introduce as a citizen into the political family of the 
United States any one, no matter where he was born, or what might be his 
character or condition; and it gave to Congress the power to confer this 
character upon those only who were born outside of the dominions of the 
United States. And no law of a State, therefore, passed since the Constitution 
was adopted, can give any right of citizenship outside of its own territory. 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417-18. 
331. WILLIAM RAWLE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
79 (1st ed. 1825). 
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Constitution, was what governmental body, if any, had the constitutional 
power to make free blacks citizens. 
Chief Justice Taney also made a more pragmatic argument concerning 
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2. Taney argued that free blacks could not have been intended 
to be citizens under the Clause because of the consequences that this 
would have had in the Southern states, consequences that would have 
been intolerable for Southern delegates to the Constitutional Convention: 
It cannot be supposed that they [State sovereignties] intended to secure to them 
[blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body throughout 
the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own 
dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding 
States regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented 
to a Constitution which might compel them to receive them in that character 
from another State. 332 
Taney enumerated several specific rights to which free blacks would 
have been entitled under the Clause were they citizens of the United 
States, indicating that he may have envisioned the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause as guaranteeing a uniform set of privileges and 
immunities in all of the states. 333 
If they [free blacks] were so received, and entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizens, it would exempt them from the operation of the special 
laws and from the police regulations which they considered to be necessary for 
their own safety. It would give to persons of the negro race, who were 
recognised [sic] as citizens in any one State of the Union, the right to enter 
every other State whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, without pass 
or passport, and without obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they pleased, 
to go where they pleased at every hour of the day or night without molestation, 
unless they committed some violation of law for which a white man would be 
punished; and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in 
private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold 
public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever 
they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject race of the 
same color, both free and slaves, and· inevitably producing discontent and 
332. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416. 
333. It is not necessarily the case that Taney thought the Clause mandated a 
uniformity of privileges and immunities traditionally within the control of the states. 
Taney may have thought that there would be certain privileges and immunities of 
citizens that would be uniform among the several states, although not constitutionally 
mandated. However, in his dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, Chief Justice 
Taney had previously argued that the right to pass from state to state was a right 
possessed by all citizens of the United States. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 
482 (1849). Taney reasoned, "[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and, as 
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every 
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Id. at 492. 
778 
[VOL. 34: 681, 1997) Citizenship 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
insubordination among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the 
State.334 
Among the privileges and immunities of citizens that black citizens 
would have enjoyed under Article IV, Section 2, Taney listed not only 
the right to enter a state and remain there and the right to be free from 
molestation, but also "full liberty of speech," the right to hold "public 
meetings on political affairs," and the right to "keep and carry arms." 
The fact that Chief Justice Taney thought that these rights were among 
those included in the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens" 
militates against Raoul Berger's conclusion that the rights covered by the 
phrase, "privileges or immunities of citizens," as used in Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, were intended to be limited to certain rights of 
"trade and commerce."335 Furthermore, this usage either presupposes 
the existence of such rights in the Southern states or indicates that Taney 
thought that Article IV, Section 2 mandated uniformity in certain 
fundamental privileges and immunities among the states. 
Chief Justice Taney stated explicitly that, were free blacks citizens of 
a state and of the United States, they would be entitled to the privileges 
and immunities of citizens in the several states. The fact that free blacks 
were not citizens of the United States implied that they were not entitled 
to the privileges and immunities of citizenship under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Chief Justice Taney's 
remarks on this point deserve quotation at length: 
[T]he provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other 
States, does not apply to them. [free negroes and mulattoes] 
[S]o far as mere rights of person are concerned, the provision in question is 
confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in another State without 
taking up their residence there. It gives them no political rights in the State, as 
to voting or holding office, or in any other respect. For a citizen of one State 
has no right to participate in the government of another. But if he ranks as a 
citizen in the State to which he belongs, within the meaning of the Constitution 
of the United States, then, whenever he goes into another State, the Constitution 
clothes him, as to the rights of person, with all the privileges and immunities 
which belong to citizens of the State. And if persons of the African race are 
334. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416-17. 
335. Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Essay, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1043, 1058 (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENlH 
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988)); See also 
Berger, Wishing Well, supra note 20, at 18-20, 27-28; Berger, Reply to Curtis, supra 
note 20, at 7-8; Berger, Response to Zuckert, supra note 20, at 24-25. 
779 
citizens of a State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of 
these privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict 
them; for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount 
authority of the Federal Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain 
and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary 
notwithstanding. And if the States could limit or restrict them, or place the 
party in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning, 
and could have no operation; and would give no rights to the citizen when in 
another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose to allow 
him. This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in 
question. It guaranties [sic] rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold 
them. And these rights are of a character and would lead to consequences 
which make it absolutely certain that the African race were not included under 
the name of citizens of a State, and were not in the contemplation of the 
framers of the Constitution when these privileges and immunities were provided 
for the protection of the citizen in other States. 336 
Chief Justice Taney's argument was that if free blacks were considered 
citizens of the United States, they would be entitled to the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship in the several states under Article Iv, Section 
2. His enumeration of certain rights that such individuals would be free 
to exercise, 337 and his statement that the states would not be free to 
withhold these rights, indicate the existence of a general conception of 
citizenship and the privileges and immunities that were a necessary 
consequence of this status in a free government prior to ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 338 
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment exactly parallels the 
language of Chief Justice Taney's opinion.339 By declaring individuals 
naturalized or born in the United States citizens of both the state in 
which they reside and of the United States, these individuals become 
entitled through the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 to the privileges and immunities of citizenship in all foreign 
336. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422-23 (emphasis added). 
337. See supra note 334 and accompanying text. 
338. Other cases also acknowledged such fundamental privileges and immunities 
and seemed to indicate that they must be uniform among the states. For example, in 
1795 the Supreme Court affirmed that "the right of acquiring and possessing property, 
and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man." 
Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). Other state and federal courts 
counted this among the privileges and immunities of citizens. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 51 
(1815). Furthermore, Justice Story stated in Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 
657 (1829), that the "fundamental maxims of free government seem to require, that the 
rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred." 
339. Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri quoted from the above passage of the 
Court's decision during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, indicating 
that this reasoning was in the minds of congressional republicans responsible for drafting 
the Amendment and that the parallel in language was intentional. CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3032 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson). 
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states. This principle was restated in the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, not only purely "national" 
rights of citizens of the United States, but also rights of state citizenship 
would be guaranteed if freed blacks were to qualify as citizens of the 
United States. This exact argument was made by Justice Field in his 
Slaughter-House dissent. In order to support his argument, Justice Field 
quoted John C. Calhoun, a noted states' -rights advocate, as stating: 
[E]very citizen is a citizen of some State or Territory, and as such, under an 
express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several States; and it is in this and no other sense that we are 
citizens of the United States.340 
Thus, Justice Field argued that the phrase "privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States" was equivalent to "privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the several States." 
The Dred Scott dissenters, in contrast to the majority, argued that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause entitled blacks who were citizens of 
one state to the privileges and immunities of citizens in all of the other 
states without the added requirement of United States citizenship. 
Justice McLean and Justice Curtis recognized that the power of 
naturalization was vested in Congress, but argued that that did not mean 
the states had no power to confer citizenship to non-aHens. Alternative-
ly, they argued that the text of Article III seemed to indicate that 
citizenship conferred by a state would be sufficient to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Therefore, Dred Scott, even if he were 
not a citizen of the United States, would be entitled to sue in the courts 
of the United States if he were merely a citizen of any state.341 
Justice Curtis argued that the power of conferring citizenship granted 
to Congress only extended to conferring citizenship upon aliens through 
naturalization and that, contrary to the conclusion of the Taney majority, 
any other power of conferring citizenship remained with the states or the 
people under the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the states might retain the 
right to confer citizenship upon freed blacks, although the power to 
confer citizenship upon aliens was delegated to the federal government 
under the Constitution. Justice Curtis agreed that the power of 
340. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1873). 
341. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 532-33. 
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naturalizing aliens was granted exclusively to Congress.342 However, 
he argued that the residual power of conferring citizenship of the United 
States upon non-aliens was retained by the states.343 In response to 
Justice Curtis's argument, one might contend, as did the majority, that 
the power of conferring national citizenship to freed blacks remained 
with the people-all of the people of the United States-and not just the 
people of each individual state.344 Therefore, a constitutional amend-
ment would be necessary in order to delegate this power to the national 
government or to confer citizenship upon non-aliens. 
Justice Curtis responded that the Constitution implicitly recognizes the 
principle espoused by numerous writers on the law of nations that 
individuals born upon the soil of a given country automatically become 
citizens of that country. If the state governments recognized individuals 
born within their jurisdictions as citizens of the state, then these same 
individuals must automatically be recognized as citizens of the United 
States. 345 However, he pointed to no explicit textual provision in order 
342. Id. at 578-79. Justice Curtis argued that "the only power expressly granted to 
Congress to legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal of the disabilities 
of foreign birth." Id. at 578. Appealing to the "principle of public law, recognised [sic] 
by the Constitution, itself, that birth on the soil of a country both creates the duties and 
confers the rights of citizenship," Justice Curtis argued: 
Among the powers unquestionably possessed by the several States, was that 
of determining what persons should and what persons should not be citizens. 
It was practicable to confer on the Government of the Union this entire power. 
It embraced what may, well enough for the purpose now in view, be divided 
into three parts. First: The power to remove the disabilities of alienage, either 
by special acts in reference to each individual case, or by establishing a rule 
of naturalization to be administered and applied by the courts. Second: 
Determining what persons should enjoy the privileges of citizenship, in respect 
to the internal affairs of the several States. Third: What native-born persons 
should be citizens of the United States. 
The first-named power, that of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, 
was granted; and here the grant, according to its terms, stopped. 
Id. at 579. The "principle of public law" recognized by the Constitution was also 
recognized by Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Coriflict of Laws. According 
to Story, "persons who are born in a country, are generally deemed to be citizens and 
subjects of that country." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
43 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., 7th ed. 1872) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *366, *369 (photo. reprint 1986) (1883)) (footnote 
omitted). 
343. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 578-79. 
344. See supra notes 327. 
345. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 581-82. Justice Curtis argued: 
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[W]e find that the Constitution has recognised [sic] the general principle of 
public law, that allegiance and citizenship depend on the place of birth; ... 
when we tum to the Constitution for an answer to the question, what free 
persons, born within the several States, are citizens of the United States, the 
only answer we can receive from any of its express provisions is, the citizens 
of the several States are to enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
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to support his claim. According to Justice Curtis, this power to 
determine the status of individuals born within a state was retained by 
the states: 
The Constitution has left to the States the determination what persons, born 
within their respective limits, shall acquire by birth citizenship of the United 
States; it has not left to them any power to prescribe any rule for the removal 
of the disabilities of alienage. This power is exclusively in Congress.346 
Justice Curtis reasoned that freed blacks would therefore be entitled to 
all of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
However, he acknowledged that the rights conferred did not include 
political rights such as the right to vote.347 Once individuals were 
recognized as citizens of a state, they were automatically citizens of the 
United States and entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
in the several states through Article IV, Section 2. If they were not born 
citizens of any state then arguably they remained non-citizens. In this 
way, state citizenship was "primary" while national citizenship was 
"secondary." An individual must first be born a citizen of a particular 
state before he could enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizenship 
Id. 
every State, and their franchise as electors under the Constitution depends on 
their citizenship in the several States. Add to this, that the Constitution was 
ordained by the citizens of the several States; that they were "the people of the 
United States," for whom and whose posterity the Government was declared 
in the preamble of the Constitution to be made; that each of them was "a 
citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution," 
within the meaning of those words in that instrument; they by them the 
Government was to be and was in fact organized; and that no power is 
conferred on the Government of the Union to discriminate between them, or 
to disfranchise any of them--the necessary conclusion is, that those persons 
born within the several States, who, by force of their respective Constitutions 
and laws, are citizens of the State, are thereby citizens of the United States. 
346. Id. at 582. 
347. Id. at 582-83. Justice Curtis stated: 
It has been further objected, that if free colored persons, born within a 
particular State, and made citizens of that State by its Constitution and laws, 
are thereby made citizens of the United States, then, under the second section 
of the fourth article of the Constitution, such persons would be entitled to all 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and if so, then 
colored persons could vote, and be eligible to not only Federal offices, but 
offices even in those States whose Constitution and laws disqualify colored 
persons from voting or being elected to office. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
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in the several states. According to Justice Curtis, the Constitution made 
individuals who were born possessing state citizenship, citizens of the 
United States. 
As has already been said, it [the Constitution] recognises [sic] the great 
principle of public law, that allegiance and citizenship spring from the place of 
birth. It leaves to the States the application of that principle to individual cases. 
It secured to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in every other State. But it does not allow to the States the power to make 
aliens citizens, or permit one State to take persons born on the soil of another 
State, and, contrary to the laws and policy of the State where they were born, 
make them its citizens, and so citizens of the United States. No such deviation 
from the great rule of public law was contemplated by the Constitution; and 
when any such attempt shall be actually made, it is to be met by applying to it 
those rules of law and those principles of good faith which will be sufficient to 
decide it, and not, in my judgment, by denying that all the free native-born 
inhabitants of a State, who are its citizens under its Constitution and laws, are 
also citizens of the United States. 348 
Therefore, in Justice Curtis's opinion, the only limitation upon the states 
in conferring citizenship was in conferring citizenship upon individuals 
not born within their own jurisdiction. Under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, any individuals born within 
a state and recognized by the state as citizens would be entitled to all of 
the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the several states outside 
the jurisdiction of the state in which they were born. 
Justice Curtis argued that this was the accepted understanding of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was the mechanism by which 
individuals recognized as citizens in one state were recognized as 
citizens in all of the states-"citizens of the United States." According 
to Justice Curtis, the congressional understanding was that "free negroes" 
qualified as citizens in some of the states and were therefore "entitled to 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in all the states."349 Thus, 
348. Id. at 586. Professor Maltz has noted that Justice Curtis's opinion was based 
on basic notions of interstate comity and mirrored law that had been developed with 
respect to the status of fugitive slaves: 
Curtis's argument was nothing more than the flip-side of his analysis in 
Commonwealth v. Aves. Just as basic notions of comity required that free 
states recognize slave states' determinations of domiciliary status, the same 
principles mandated that slave states accept the principle that free states had 
the authority to emancipate slaves whose masters had voluntarily allowed them 
to become domiciliaries of free states. Thus, once again, Curtis's analysis was 
based more on general theories of interstate relations than opposition to slavery 
per se. 
Maltz, supra note 288, at 2014 (footnote omitted). 
349. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 588. In order to show that this was the 
congressional understanding of the Clause, Justice Curtis pointed to the controversy over 
the admission of Missouri as a state and the state's proposed constitutional provision that 
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Justice Curtis concluded that United States citizenship was automatically 
conferred through operation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, Section 2 once an individual was born a citizen of some 
state.350 
Despite Justice Curtis's protestations, after Dred Scott, the states had 
no power either directly or indirectly to confer citizenship of the United 
States upon any individuals, whether aliens351 or free blacks. Congress 
possessed the power to confer citizenship upon aliens. However, 
according to the Taney majority, Congress had no power to confer 
citizenship of the United States upon non-aliens, such as free blacks. 
Arguably, this part of the Court's decision was dicta since the majority 
concluded that free blacks, including Dred Scott, historically were not 
citizens. Nevertheless, under the majority's opinion, there was no way 
in which free blacks could become citizens of the United States other 
than by constitutional amendment. 
C. "General" Citizenship 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Dred Scott illustrate a 
common conception of citizenship as based upon a social compact 
among the members of society, existing anterior to the establishment of 
would mandate that the legislature make laws to prevent free blacks from entering the 
state. According to Justice Curtis: 
One ground of objection to the admission of the State under this Constitution 
was, that it would require the Legislature to exclude free persons of color, who 
would be entitled, under the second section of the fourth article of the 
Constitution, not only to come within the State, but to enjoy there the 
privileges and immunities of citizens. 
Id. This illustration of the congressional understanding of the status of free blacks was 
also noted by Justice Story. See supra note 311. 
350. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 588-89. Professor Maltz has concluded that 
Justice Curtis used state citizenship as the "benchmark for the determination that a 
person was entitled to national protection for the rights appurtenant to that status." 
Maltz, supra note 288, at 2009. Moreover, he has concluded that one implication of 
Justice Curtis's theory was that if an individual were born in a state that did not consider 
him a citizen, he could never achieve that status. Id. See also id. at 2011 ("From 
Curtis's perspective, the Constitution in both cases assigned to a single state the authority 
to make an initial determination regarding status; in the case of national citizenship, that 
state was the individual's place of birth, and in the case of the master/slave relationship, 
the relevant state was the owner's domicile."). 
351. Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries on American Law noted that under the 
Constitution of the United States the individual states could not pass naturalization laws. 
1 KENT, supra note 47, at *423. 
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government. Both sets of opinions expressed the view that Article IV, 
Section 2 embodied a "general" citizenship--all citizens were entitled to 
the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. This 
conception of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was certainly not 
novel.352 However, the Taney majority argued that citizenship of the 
United States was a prerequisite for exercising the rights under the 
Clause. In contrast, Justice Curtis argued in his dissent that only state 
citizenship was a necessary prerequisite and that, even if there were a 
distinct national citizenship of the United States, state citizens who did 
not possess United States citizenship would still be entitled to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
As we have seen, the Taney Court held that Dred Scott was neither a 
citizen of Missouri nor a citizen of the United States. Chief Justice 
Taney argued that under the law of Missouri, Dred Scott was not even 
made a citizen of that state. 
[W]hatever doubts or opinions may, at one time, have been entertained upon 
this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all cases decided 
in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the 
decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their 
return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the 
defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction, 
when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen. 353 
Thus, in a sense, the majority's opinion concerning Article IV, Section 
2 and its inapplicability to individuals who were merely citizens of a 
state and not citizens of the United States was merely dicta. However, 
this opinion concerning the effect of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause had larger implications beyond the case. The Court's opinion 
meant that neither the states nor Congress had the power to make free 
blacks citizens of the United States.354 Thus, slave states were saved 
from the possibility of having to tolerate free black citizens within their 
jurisdictions, a condition that might upset the institution of slavery, as 
Chief Justice Taney had suggested.355 
352. See, e.g., Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627 (1848). Judge William P. Chilton 
stated that under the Clause, "the citizens of the different states are, as it respects the 
privileges and immunities they enjoy in their respective states, brought into a general 
citizenship .... " Id. at 629. 
353. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 453. The Taney majority came to the 
conclusion that "the plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense in which 
that word is used in the Constitution; and that the Circuit Court of the United States, for 
that reason, had no jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it." Id. at 
454. 
354. Id. at 430. 
355. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Curtis indicated in his dissent that there was a conception of 
"general citizenship" expressed in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion. He argued that some free blacks were recognized as possessing the 
.status of citizen of the United States from the time of the Articles of 
Confederation. According to Justice Curtis, under the "fourth of the 
fundamental articles of the Confederation": 
The fact that free persons of color were citizens of some of the several 
States, and the consequence, that this fourth article of the Confederation would 
have the effect to confer on such persons the privileges and immunities of 
general citizenship, were not only known to those who framed and adopted 
those articles, but the evidence is decisive, that the fourth article was intended 
to have that effect, and that more restricted language, which would have 
excluded such persons, was deliberately and purposely rejected.356 
Justice Curtis examined the historical evidence concerning the adoption 
of the Clause and the rejection of adding the phrase "free white" before 
the word "inhabitants" in order to exclude blacks from the privileges and 
immunities guaranteed under the Clause. Justice Curtis concluded, "it 
is clear, that under the Confederation, and at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution, free colored persons of African descent might be, and, 
by reason of their citizenship in certain States, were entitled to the 
privileges and immunities of general citizenship of the United 
States."357 Therefore, he initially equated citizenship of the United 
States under the Articles of Confederation with "general citizenship." 
Justice Curtis continued by discussing the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution and the concept of 
citizenship upon which it was based. This concept of citizenship 
involved certain privileges and immunities that were guaranteed by the 
social compact among the people of all of the states. In Justice Curtis's 
opinion, the privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed under 
Article IV, Section 2 were "national rights" of citizenship guaranteed to 
the "Citizens of each State." The remarks of Justice Curtis deserve 
quotation at length: 
"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the several States." Nowhere else in the Constitution 
is there anything concerning a general citizenship; but here, privileges and 
immunities to be enjoyed throughout the United States, under and by force of 
the national compact, are granted and secured. In selecting those who are to 
356. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 575. 
357. Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added). 
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enjoy these national rights of citizenship, how are they described? As citizens 
of each State. It is to [the citizens that] these national rights are secured. The 
qualification for them is not to be looked for in any provision of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States. They are to be citizens of the several States, 
and, as such, the privileges and immunities of general citizenship, derived from 
and guarantied by the Constitution, are to be enjoyed by them .... 
And if it was intended to secure these rights only to citizens of the United 
States, how has the Constitution here described such persons? Simply as 
citizens of each State.358 
Therefore, Justice Curtis argued that the "general citizenship" conferred 
upon the citizens of each state was identical to citizenship of the United 
States.359 There was no separate citizenship of the United States that 
was necessary for exercising the rights under the Clause. 
Justice Curtis made a detailed analysis concerning the effect of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. He :first 
countered the argument that it conveyed political as well as civil rights, 
observing that there were qualifications placed on political rights such 
as holding the office of Senator, Representative, or President in the 
Constitution itself, which prevented the exercise of these political rights 
by certain citizens.360 Justice Curtis even went so far as to suggest 
that the Clause did not guarantee all civil rights. According to Curtis: 
[C]itizenship, under the Constitution of the United States, is not dependent on 
the possession of any particular political or even of all civil rights; and any 
attempt so to define it must lead to error. To what citizens the elective 
franchise shall be confided, is a question to be determined by each State, in 
accordance with its own views of the necessities or expediencies of its 
condition. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and whether all 
shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be determined 
. in the same way. 
One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens; another may 
extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow all persons above a 
prescribed age to convey property and transact business; another may exclude 
358. Id. at 580-81 (emphasis added). Justice Curtis also noted that political rights 
such as the right to vote were not inherent rights of citizenship conferred under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Id. 
359. Id. at 581. 
360. Id. at 583. This is an important illustration that Justice Curtis thought that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause addressed both rights of state citizenship as well as 
rights of national citizenship. Justice Curtis reasoned: 
Id. 
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A naturalized citizen cannot be President of the United States, nor a Senator 
till after the lapse of nine years, nor a Representative till after the lapse of 
seven years, from his naturalization. Yet, as soon as naturalized, he is 
certainly a citizen of the United States. Nor is any inhabitant of the District 
of Columbia, or of either of the Territories, eligible to the office of Senator or 
Representative in Congress, though they may be citizens of the United States. 
So, in all the States, numerous persons, though citizens, cannot vote, or cannot 
hold office, either on account of their age, or sex, or the want of the necessary 
legal qualifications. 
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married women. But whether native-born women, or persons under age, or 
under guardianship because insane or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or 
holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no one will deny that they are 
citizens of the United States.361 
Thus, the implication is that possession of the privileges and immunities 
of citizens entitles one to exercise only a subset of civil rights, or that 
it does not entitle one to a full equality of civil rights. This is consistent 
with Pufendorf's distinction between power and right discussed 
previously. 362 The privileges and immunities of citizenship were 
certain civil capacities of citizens distinct from the municipal regulations 
governing their exercise, which represented civil rights. Therefore, it 
was not inconsistent to argue that all would be entitled to the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship while there might remain certain 
inequalities in regulation of these civil capacities (as long as the 
regulations were consistent with the public good). Justice Curtis argued 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not confer any specific 
privileges but only those that were inherent in the concept of citizenship 
in each separate state, those for which citizenship alone was suffi-
cient.363 
[T]his clause of the Constitution does not confer on the citizens of one State, 
in all other States, specific and enumerated privileges and immunities. They 
are entitled to such as belong to citizenship, but not to such as belong to 
particular citizens attended by other qualifications. Privileges and immunities 
361. Id. (emphasis added). 
362. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text. 
363. This seems to have been one understanding of the Clause prior to the decision. 
For example, Chancellor Kent stated that the Clause "means only that citizens of other 
states shall have equal rights with our own citizens." Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 
507, 577 (N.Y. 1812). Alabama's Chief Justice Henry W. Collier stated that the Clause 
was meant to "communicate all the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the 
same State would be entitled to, under the like circumstances." Wiley v. Parmer, 14 
Ala. 627, 632 (1848). Chancellor Nicholas Ridgely of Delaware also emphasized the 
antidiscrimination directive of the Clause: 
To what purpose are all privileges and immunities reserved to the citizens of 
each State, if a State can discriminate between its own citizens and the citizens 
of another State in the privileges of a citizen, and unless the same method to 
protect their property is allowed to them. If we may cut and carve and limit 
and restrain other citizens in the exercise of our privileges as citizens, it is 
evident that they are not entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens 
in this State. 
Douglass v. Stephens, I Del. Ch. 465, 472-73 (1821). 
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which belong to certain citizens of a State, by reason of the operation of causes 
other than mere citizenship, are not conferred. 364 
Justice Curtis continued: 
It rests with the States themselves so to frame their Constitutions and laws as 
not to attach a particular privilege or immunity to mere naked citizenship. If 
one of the States will not deny to any of its own citizens a particular privilege 
or immunity, if it confer it on all of them by reason of mere naked citizenship, 
then it may be claimed by every citizen of each State by force of the 
Constitution . . . . 365 
Thus, it would seem that, unlike Chief Justice Taney, Justice Curtis did 
not envision a uniformity of privileges and immunities among the states 
under the Clause.366 Each state, being founded upon distinct social 
compacts, might separately determine the terms of these compacts, 
resulting in different outcomes with respect to the set of privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by citizens in each state. There would still be a 
uniform core of peculiarly "national" privileges and immunities, such as 
the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article III, but 
no such uniformity need exist at the state level. 
Finally, Justice Curtis argued that even if there were a "citizenship of 
the United States" distinct from the "general citizenship" conferred under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause to citizens of each state, such 
distinction did not prevent freed blacks who were citizens of a state from 
being recognized as citizens in every other state. 
364. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583 (emphasis added). 
365. Id. at 584 (emphasis added). 
366. This may have been the position of Justice Bushrod Washington as well. 
Justice Washington, in a famous passage from his opinion in Corfield v. Coryell, made 
a lengthy enumeration of fundamental privileges and immunities that are guaranteed 
antidiscrimination protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2. However, in another opinion, Justice Washington seemed to indicate that the 
Clause gave citizens the rights of citizenship in all of the other states, but he did not say 
whether these fundamental rights of citizenship were to be uniform. "With respect to 
the inununities which the rights of citizenship can confer, the citizen of one state is to 
be considered as a citizen of each, and every other state in the union." Butler v. 
Farnsworth, 4 F. Cas. 902, 903 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 2,240). Based on a review of 
the historical materials, Professor Maltz has asserted that "the prevailing view of the 
comity clause in the early nineteenth century was that it was simply an 
antidiscrimination provision." Maltz, supra note 22, at 336; See also id. at 339 
( contending that "judicial support for the absolute rights theory of the comity clause was 
equivocal at best"). However, Professors Kettner and Kaczorowski have come to the 
opposite conclusion, determining that the comity clause was thought to guarantee certain 
absolute rights to all citizens throughout the several states. See KETTNER, supra note 14, 
at 258; Kaczorowski, supra note 40, at 886-87 (noting that Justice Taney's Dred Scott 
opinion indicates that he may have interpreted the Comity Clause to provide substantive 
guarantees of certain absolute rights). 
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[I]t must be borne in mind, that the difficulties which attend the allowance of 
the claims of colored persons to be citizens of the United States are not avoided 
by saying that, though each State may make them its citizens, they are not 
thereby made citizens of the United States, because the privileges of general 
citizenship are secured to the citizens of each State. The language of the 
Constitution is, "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States." If each State may make such 
persons its citizens, they become, as such, entitled to the benefits of this article, 
if there be a native-born citizenship of the United States distinct from a native-
born citizenship of the several States. 367 
Therefore, in Justice Curtis's opinion, there were certain rights inherent 
in the concept of citizenship that were guaranteed under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to citizens of the United 
States. These privileges and immunities of citizenship were to be 
distinguished from political privileges, or rights of participation in the 
government, and certain civil rights not essential to the concept of 
citizenship. Privileges and immunities that were inherent in the concept 
of citizenship or essential to citizenship were privileges and immunities 
for which the only prerequisite was possessing the status of citizen. 
Justice Curtis argued, however, that the states were free to determine 
which privileges and immunities were inherent in the concept of 
citizenship by making mere citizenship alone the only prerequisite for 
enjoyment of these privileges and immunities. If this were the case, 
there need be no uniformity in privileges and immunities among the 
states under the Clause as long as within each state all citizens were 
entitled to exercise these rights. However, the Taney majority enumerat-
ed certain rights, including the right to enter any state and remain, the 
right to be free from molestation, full liberty of speech, the right to 
"hold public meetings on political affairs," and the right to "keep and 
carry arms," which free blacks would be entitled to exercise under the 
Clause were they citizens.368 The majority's enumeration indicates that 
there was a conception of a set of rights (including some that were 
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments) that 
were inherent in the concept of citizenship in all free governments.369 
367. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 584 (emphasis added). 
368. See supra notes 332-34 and accompanying text. 
369. This was the language used by Justice Bushrod Washington in Co,jield v. 
Coryell when discussing the fundamental privileges and immunities guaranteed under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. As James H. Kettner has 
noted, the tension between the interpretation of the Clause as guaranteeing a uniformity 
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Perhaps the most accurate understanding of the original meaning of the 
Clause is that, although uniformity of all privileges and immunities 
among the states was not constitutionally mandated, due to the meaning 
of citizenship, there might be a core set of privileges and immunities of 
citizens found in all free governments. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TANEY DECISION: A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED SYSTEM OF CASTE 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was, in large measure, a 
response to the decision of the Dred Scott Court that free blacks were 
not and could not become citizens of the United States absent constitu-
tional amendment. However, there were two prior attempts made by 
Congress to ensure that free blacks would be entitled to certain basic 
rights. The first of these efforts was the Thirteenth Amendment. 
However, this amendment was inadequate to prevent the development of 
caste systems in the states along the lines of the Roman model since, 
upon its face, it only prohibited the institution of slavery and no other 
level of status intermediate between slaves and citizens. The second of 
these efforts was the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This act conferred the 
status of citizen of the United States upon free blacks. However, under 
the reasoning of the Taney majority in Dred Scott v. Sanford, mere 
of fundamental privileges and immunities in all of the states through substantive 
protection and the interpretation of the Clause as guaranteeing antidiscrimination 
protection for whatever fundamental privileges and immunities were part of the social 
compact of each state, thereby allowing for differences among the states, is illustrated 
in the case of Douglass v. Stephens. See KETTNER, supra note 14, at 260-61. In that 
case, Chancellor Ridgely, in a dissenting opinion, argued that "[t]he rights of enjoying 
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring and protecting reputation and property,-and, 
in general, of attaining objects suitable to their condition, without injury to another, are 
the rights of a citizen; and all men by nature have them." Douglass v. Stephens, I Del. 
Ch. 465,470 (1821) (emphasis added). However, ChiefJustice Kensey Johns concluded 
for the majority that no such uniformity was necessary: 
The privileges and immunities to be secured to all citizens of the United 
States are such only as belong to the citizens of the several States; which 
includes the whole United States, and must be understood to mean, such 
privileges as should be common, or the same in every State .... 
The privileges and immunities, &c., are not enumerated or described; but 
they are all privileges common in the Union,-which certainly excludes those 
privileges which belong only to citizens of one or more States, and not to 
those in every other State. 
Id. at 476-77 (emphasis added). Both opinions at least assume, however, that there was 
a notion of the privileges and immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship in the 
United States. The former argued that these privileges and immunities were guaranteed 
substantive constitutional protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, while 
the latter disputed this conclusion. 
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congressional legislation was not sufficient to confer citizenship, given 
the social compact model of citizenship as membership in a political 
community based upon consent. The consent of the whole people 
through amendment of the Constitution was necessary in order to 
accomplish this result. 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment 
Raoul Berger is not completely accurate in his statement that the 
"Thirteenth Amendment sheds little, if any, light on the meaning of the 
Fourteenth."370 Some members of Congress evidently thought the 
Thirteenth Amendment sufficient to preclude the establishment of caste 
systems in the United States. As Senator Richard Yates stated, "by the 
amendment to the Constitution . . . the freedman becomes a free man, 
entitled to the same rights and privileges as any other citizen of the 
United States."371 This interpretation of the Amendment is understand-
able if one equates the inability to exercise fundamental capacities of 
citizenship with slavery, as did Locke. 
However, one could argue that the Thirteenth Amendment did not 
effectively prevent the states from developing caste systems because it 
merely prohibited slavery-the status of civil nonexistence. It did not 
prevent the states from developing an intermediate status between 
slavery and full citizenship, similar to the status of freedman (mentioned 
by Senator Yates) under the Roman law, which would deprive blacks of 
the exercise of many of the civil capacities thought to be inherent in the 
concept of citizenship. Thus, the first sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was necessary to ensure that all individuals born or 
naturalized in the United States would possess the status of "citizen" 
with respect to both the state and federal governments. As Senator 
Lyman Trumbull stated, the Fourteenth Amendment would "end that 
very controversy, whether the negro is a citizen or not."372 Similarly, 
Senator Jacob Howard stated that the first sentence "settles the great 
370. BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 20, at 22. 
371. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1780 (1866). As Earl Maltz has noted, 
there is "substantial evidence" to support the conclusion that the Thirteenth Amendment 
was designed to give Congress the power to protect certain rights that were "essential 
to the status of a freedman." Maltz, supra note 46, at 251. However, as Maltz notes, 
"from the language of the amendment, the grant of such power is far from clear." Id. 
372. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1285 (1866). 
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question of citizenship and removes all doubt as to what persons are or 
are not citizens of the United States."373 
The Fourteenth Amendment was widely viewed as an attempt to 
enlarge upon the principles embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment. For 
example, in the Slaughter-House Cases, counsel for the plaintiffs, John 
A. Campbell, a former Justice of the Supreme Court who sat at the time 
the Dred Scott case was decided, argued that the act in question violated 
not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. However, Justice Miller stated that the Louisiana act establishing 
an exclusive slaughterhouse monopoly was "even more plainly in the 
face of the fourteenth amendment. That amendment was a development 
of the thirteenth, and is a more comprehensive exposition of the 
principles which lie at the foundation of the thirteenth."374 Therefore, 
the interrelationship between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
as having a common theoretical basis was not disputed. 
Several members of Congress indicated their belief that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, like the Fourteenth, guaranteed certain fundamental rights, 
which if violated would render men little more than slaves.375 For 
example, Congressman James Wilson stated that there were "many . . . 
constitutional rights of the citizen which slavery had disregarded and 
373. Id. at 2890. 
374. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51 (1872). 
375. For example, Senator Lot M. Morrill stated that the states could not deny equal 
rights to their citizens and that the federal government "should protect its citizens against 
State authority and State interpretations in [sic] their rights, privileges, and immunities 
as citizens of the United States." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1866). 
Senator Henry Wilson stated that the goal of Reconstruction was "security of the 
libertie·s of all men, and the security of equal, universal, and impartial liberty." CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 111 (1865). Michael Kent Curtis has noted that some 
Republicans thought that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to 
guarantee free blacks the rights of citizenship. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 139. For 
example, Curtis quotes Judge Noah Davis who stated: 
By force of the amendment the former slaves were at once made freemen, 
possessed of the rights that belong under the federal Constitution to persons 
who are free. The right freely to buy and sell; to do lawful labor and have its 
fruits; peaceably to assemble and petition against grievances; to keep and bear 
arms; to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; to have liberty of 
conscience; to migrate from one State to another, carrying with them these 
constitutional rights; to "due process of law," in the protection of life, liberty 
and property; to the care and custody of their own children and families--all 
these with their necessary incidents became theirs as absolutely as they ever 
were the rights of the proudest of their masters .... It is a badge of slavery 
when a freeman, without conviction of a crime, is made subject, without his 
consent, to laws depriving him of these rights, or unjustly restricting their 
exercise, and especially to such laws as do not equally affect all other citizens 
of the state. 
Id. at 140 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE REPUBLICAN UNION STATE CONVENTION 35 
(Sept. 5, 1866)). 
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practically destroyed," including "freedom ofreligious opinion, freedom 
of speech and press, and the right of assemblage for the purpose of 
petition[.]"376 According to Senator Trumbull, under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, a "law that does not allow a colored person to hold 
property, does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is 
certainly a law in violation of the rights of freeman, and being so may 
properly be declared void."377 Therefore, at least some members of 
Congress understood the Thirteenth Amendment as not only abolishing 
the lowest form of status, or slavery, but also intermediate forms of 
status under which individuals were not entitled to enjoy the full 
measure of rights inherent in citizenship in the United States. However, 
the language of the Thirteenth Amendment does not explicitly seem to 
prohibit such intermediate grades of status characterized by a deprivation 
of certain powers of citizenship. Thus, clarification was needed in order 
to preclude the development of systems of caste in the states. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was an attempt to provide such a clarification. 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
The fact that under the Taney Court's decision there was no mecha-
nism for conferring the status of citizen of the United States upon free 
blacks meant that there was effectively a constitutionally-mandated 
system of caste within the United States with respect to national 
citizenship. The Thirteenth Amendment had merely outlawed the lowest 
form of status, that of slavery. However, it remained unclear whether 
an intermediate form of status was still constitutionally permissible. 
There was no method of remedying this situation other than by 
amending the United States Constitution.378 This fact was recognized 
376. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). Wilson stated that these 
rights, which he enumerated, belonged "to every American citizen, high or low, rich or 
poor, wherever he may be within the jurisdiction of the United States. With these rights 
no State may interfere." Id. -
377. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1866). 
378. Justice Taney said as much in his opinion: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, 
in relation to this unfortunate race . . . should induce the court to give to the 
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they 
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an 
argument would be altogether inadmissible .... If any of its provisions are 
deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which it 
may be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as 
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during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was 
designed to confer citizenship upon free blacks through congressional 
legislation. 379 Some members of Congress thought that free blacks 
already possessed the status of citizens and that the Taney Court was in 
error in its Dred Scott decision. For example, Senator Trumbull believed 
that the provision in the Civil Rights Act making individuals born in the 
United States citizens was "declaratory of what in my judgment, the law 
now is."380 Similarly, Senator Bingham stated originally that the 
clause conferring citizenship in the Civil Rights Act was "simply 
declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human 
being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not 
owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your 
Constitution itself, a natural-born citizen."381 However, a need to 
clarify the status of free blacks in light of the opinion was felt. 
it was understood at the time of its adoption. [The Constitution] speaks not 
only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it 
spoke when it came from the hands of its framers . . . . Any other rule of 
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it 
the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1856). 
379. See BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 20, at 23 n.12. The 
Civil Rights Bill declared that "all persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed" were "citizens of the United States." 
Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of the Act then stated: 
Id. 
[S]uch citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to 
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
380. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1866). Trumbull reiterated this 
position in 1871. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576-77 (1871). Trumbull 
asserted that a 
colored man in Massachusetts before the fourteenth amendment was adopted, 
in my judgment, was a citizen of the United States as well as a citizen of 
Massachusetts. That was my opinion about it then; and this amendment 
carries out what I believed to be the law of the land at that time. However, 
as I have already explained, others took a different view in consequence of the 
existence of slavery which they held to be the normal condition of the colored 
man .... This amendment simply carries out the provisions of the law, as I 
understood it before, and makes it certain that all persons of whatever color 
born in the United States are citizens. 
Id. at 577. 
381. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866). 
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Some members of Congress thought that a constitutional amendment 
was necessary in order to pass the Civil Rights Act.382 In particular, 
Senator Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, eventually came to hold the belief that an amendment was 
necessary to effect the goals of the Civil Rights Act.383 By automati-
cally conferring both state and national citizenship, the first sentence of 
the Fourteenth Amendment destroyed the constitutionally-mandated 
system of caste with respect to citizenship of the United States and made 
it unconstitutional for the states to employ a caste system with respect 
to state citizenship. Thus, the first sentence struck at both the Dred 
Scott decision as well as the Black Codes, which were widely recognized 
as establishing caste systems in the Southern states.384 
V. SECTION 1 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The foregoing discussion of citizenship illustrates the necessity of 
declaring through constitutional amendment that free blacks were citizens 
of both the United States and the state in which they resided, the origins 
of the distinction between political and civil privileges and immunities 
drawn in nineteenth century legal scholarship, and the nature of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as being fundamental--existing anterior to the 
establishment of the government, whether because they are inherent, 
belonging to all persons as natural rights, or because they flow from the 
382. During the debate over the proposed amendment, Representative Henry 
Raymond of New York agreed that the bill would have been unconstitutional, but that 
the amendment obviated any objections. Id. at 2502. Representative Thomas Eliot of 
Massachusetts believed that the amendment ensured the constitutionality of the Bill. Id. 
at 2511. Representative James Doolittle of Wisconsin stated that several Republicans, 
including Senator Bingham "had doubts, at least, as to the constitutionality of the civil 
rights bill that [the] proposition to amend the Constitution now appears to give ... 
validity and force." Id. at 2896. See also id. at 2961 (Sen. Poland), 2498 (Rep. 
Broomall). Justice Field also stated in the Slaughter-House Cases that the amendment 
had been "adopted to obviate objections ... to the validity of the Civil Rights Act .... " 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872). 
383. See BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 20, at 20; CURTIS, supra 
note 12, at 107. See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1290-93, 1367 (1866) 
(noting that Bingham voted against the Act). 
384. The Black Codes deprived free blacks of certain of the rights that were 
inherent in citizenship such as the right to move, to contract, to own property, to 
assemble, to speak freely, and to bear arms. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 35; KENNETH M. 
STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 80 (1965). 
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social compact among the members of the political community, its 
citizens. However, as the Taney and Curtis opinions in Dred Scott 
indicate, the nature of the protection afforded under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, whether antidiscrimination 
or substantive, was unclear prior to ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Although constitutionalizing conditions sufficient for the conferral of 
state and national citizenship was one of the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a second purpose was nationalization of citizenship and a 
federal guarantee of those rights embodied in the phrase "privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States."385 The precursor of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 guaranteeing that the "Citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."386 
Justice Curtis, in his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, discussed the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, stating "if it 
was intended to secure these rights [privileges and immunities] only to 
citizens of the United States, how has the Constitution here described 
such persons? Simply as citizens of each State."387 As the foregoing 
discussion has illustrated, Justice Curtis was arguing that state citizenship 
was sufficient in order to possess citizenship of the United States. The 
Taney majority disagreed with this position. However, the majority 
agreed with Justice Curtis that citizenship of the United States entailed 
being able to exercise the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
several States"-privileges and immunities traditionally within the 
regulatory control of the state governments. In contrast, the Slaughter-
House majority later held that "Citizens in the several States" as used in 
Article IV, Section 2 was not equivalent to "citizens of the United 
States" as used in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the 
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed in Section 1 did not 
385. For example, Senator Edmunds later said of Section 1 of the Amendment that 
it had changed entirely "the description of the class of persons who are entitled to 
protection . . . . [It] provides that the citizens of the United States, whether they are 
citizens of any particular State or not, shall have universal citizenship in the United 
States." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1871). 
386. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Professor Maltz has noted that a few state 
constitutions, such as the constitutions of Ohio, Texas, and Virginia, also contained 
privileges and immunities language prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, he has ·concluded that "the state constitutions were not the direct precursors 
of section one [of the Fourteenth Amendment]." Maltz, supra note 22, at 334. 
387. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 581 (1856). 
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include those rights traditionally within the regulatory control of state 
governments. 
A. The Primary Nature of United States Citizenship 
As we have seen, in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court 
determined that a free black of the African race, whose ancestors were 
brought to the United States and sold as slaves was not a citizen within 
the meaning of the United States Constitution and could not achieve this 
status.388 According to the Court, when the Constitution was adopted, 
free blacks were not regarded as members of the political community 
that constituted the state in most of the states and, thus, were not 
members of "the people," or citizens, within the meaning of the state 
constitutions. Therefore, the "special rights and immunities" that 
attached to citizens did not apply to free blacks. Furthermore, according 
to the majority, free blacks certainly were not considered citizens of the 
United States, parties to the national compact. Thus, they were not 
entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, 
including the privilege of suing in the courts of the United States under 
the United States Constitution. · 
The Court dismissed the congressional power of naturalization 
enumerated in the Constitution as a means of conferring United States 
citizenship upon freed blacks. Freed blacks were not "aliens," and thus, 
the power of naturalization could not be employed by Congress to confer 
citizenship of the United States upon them. The Court also declared that 
since the adoption of the United States Constitution, no state could make 
an alien or any other person a citizen of the United States and entitle 
him to the rights and privileges guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution. The state could give the individual privileges and 
immunities within the state, but could not confer the character of a 
"citizen of the United States" upon the individual. Therefore, the state 
could not give the individual the right to the privileges and immunities 
of citizenship in the several states under Article IV, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution or the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship, such as the right to sue in courts of the United States, 
conferred to citizens of the United States under other provisions of the 
Constitution such as Article III. This result was based upon the 
388. See supra Part III. 
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majority's view of the United States as founded upon a national compact 
to which free blacks were not parties and could not become parties 
absent the consent of "We the People" through constitutional amend-
ment. Thus, the result of the Court's decision was that there existed in 
the United States a constitutionally-mandated system of caste, with 
respect to national citizenship where free blacks possessed lesser rights 
based on the fact that they possessed a different civil status. 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wished to make citizenship 
of the United States "primary" and state citizenship "secondary," 
whereas prior to ratification of the Amendment, arguably, state 
citizenship had been primary and national citizenship was secondary. 
This point was recognized by Justice Bradley in his Slaughter-House 
dissent. Justice Bradley stated, "[t]he question is now settled by the 
fourteenth amendment itself, that citizenship of the United States is the 
primary citizenship in this country; and that State citizenship is 
secondary and derivative, depending upon citizenship of the United 
States and the citizen's place of residence."389 As counsel for the 
plaintiffs in the Slaughter-House Cases argued: 
The doctrine of the "States-Rights party," led in modem times by Mr. Calhoun, 
was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States, except sub modo 
and by the permission of the States. According to their theory the United States 
had no integral existence except as an incomplete combination among several 
integers. The fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such 
doctrines. 390 
389. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 112 (1872). This point was 
also made subsequently by Judge Woods in United States v. Hall: 
By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence 
of citizenship in a state. By this clause this order of things is reversed. 
Citizenship in the United States is defined; it is made independent of 
citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in the 
United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or laws, 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the 
United States to citizens thereof. 
26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). 
390. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 52. The plaintiffs continued, 
arguing that 
the confederate features of the government have been obliterated. The States 
in their closest connection with the members of the State, have been placed 
under the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress. The 
purpose is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United 
States ONE PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall understand 
and appreciate the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged 
by State authority; that State laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, 
property from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all. 
Id. at 53. 
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Justice Field echoed these sentiments in his dissent, stating that "[t]he 
fundamental rights, privileges, and immunities which belong to him as 
a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a citizen of the 
United States, and are not dependent upon his citizenship of any 
State."391 In the :first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, individu-
als born or naturalized in the United States are declared citizens of the 
United States and of the state in which they reside. Therefore, the 
power of denying the status of "citizen" to any individual or group of 
individuals is withdrawn from the states, eliminating the ability of the 
states to erect caste systems with respect to state citizenship. Prior to 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state citizenship was viewed 
as the primary form of citizenship, with citizenship of the United States 
following from the compact among the states embodied in the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and therefore being 
derivative in nature. Section 1 made it clear that the privileges and 
immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship flowed from the 
national compact. Citizens were guaranteed the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States. 
Therefore, it would seem that the most natural construction of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is that there was to be a uniformity in the privileges and 
immunities of citizens exercised by citizens in the several states. Among 
these privileges and immunities were the inalienable rights of men as 
well as certain capacities of citizens flowing from the national compact. 
There might be distinctions in the mode in which these rights were 
exercised in the different states--differences in the positive municipal 
regulations governing the exercise of these civil capacities--differences 
in civil rights. However, as Justice Bradley stated,392 in America 
citizenship meant something--there were certain capacities inherent in 
the concept of citizenship with which no government could interfere. 
391. Id. at 95. 
392. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Nature of the Protection Afforded Under Section 1: 
Substantive or Antidiscrimination? 
It might be contended that it is somewhat surprising that the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not employ the phrase, "citizens in the 
several States," in Section 1 to indicate their intent to guarantee rights 
traditionally within the regulatory control of the states since they 
repeatedly stated that the privileges and immunities that they wished to 
protect were identical to those of Article IV, Section 2. However, if 
they had used this phrase, Section 1 might have been construed to 
guarantee only those privileges and immunities of citizens that had 
traditionally been solely within the control of the state governments. A 
desire to guarantee the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, 
such as the right to sue in the courts of the United States under Article 
III, as well as those traditionally within the control of the states may 
have led to this wording.393 Furthermore, the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment may have wished to make it clear that the fundamen-
tal privileges and immunities of citizenship were to be guaranteed 
throughout the nation as flowing from an individual's status as a citizen 
of the United States, a member of the national political community.394 
The states retained the right to regulate these privileges and immunities 
of citizenship within their respective jurisdictions. However, the federal 
government was given the power through Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ensure that the state governments did not abridge these 
rights of citizens of the United States. 
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the 
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford is overruled by granting automatic 
393. As Senator Carpenter later stated concerning the privileges and immunities of 
citizens: 
There are certain privileges and immunities of American citizens that are 
recognized in every State of the Union and by every American as being 
peculiarly and especially the privileges of an American citizen, and that 
Constitution means to protect those, or else it is mere idle talk and protects 
nothing. 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., !st Sess. 576 (1871). 
394. In this connection, it is interesting to note that President Johnson proposed 
substituting the language "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states" for the language "[ n ]o state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
· United States" found in § I of the Fourteenth Amendment. JOSEPH JAMES, THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 142-44 (1984). James suggests that 
this change was an attempt to limit the role of the federal courts in determining the 
federal rights of citizens. However, more broadly, it might also have been an attempt 
to leave determination of the privileges and immunities of citizens with the state 
governments. 
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citizenship, both state (in the case of an individual residing in a state) 
and national, to those naturalized or born in the United States. In the 
congressional debate over the admission of Oregon as a state, prior to 
the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment, John Bingham, citing Justice 
Story,395 William Rawle,396 Chancellor Kent,397 and the Dred Scott 
Court,398 had expressed his view that the phrase "people of the several 
States" was equivalent to the phrase "people of the United States" and 
that "[a]ll free persons born and domiciled within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, are citizens of the United States from birth; all aliens 
become citizens of the United States only by act of naturalization, under 
395. Bingham sought to justify his position by referring to a number of contempo-
rary authorities. Citing Justice Story's Commentaries, Bingham appealed to the language 
of the social compact theorists, stating: 
The people here referred to [people of the several States] are the same 
community, or body-politic, called, in the preamble of the Federal Constitu-
tion, "the people of the United States." They are the citizens of the United 
States, and no other people whatever. It has always been well understood 
amongst jurists in this country, that the citizens of each State constitute the 
body-politic of each community, called the people of the State; and that the 
citizens of each State in the Union are ipso facto citizens of the United States 
Who are citizens of the United States? Sir, they are those, and those only, 
who owe allegiance to the Government of the United States .... What I have 
said on this question of United States citizenship, and the words "the people," 
as used in the Constitution of the United States, is sustained by jurists and the 
decisions of the courts, Federal and State. 
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (citation omitted). 
396. Bingham quoted Rawle as stating: 
The citizens of each State constituted the citizens of the United States when 
the Constitution was adopted. The rights which appertain to them as citizens 
of those respective Commonwealths accompanied them in the formation of the 
great compound Commonwealth which ensued. They became citizens of the 
latter, without ceasing to be citizens of the former; and he who was subse-
quently born a citizen of a State, became, at the moment of his birth, a citizen 
of the United States. 
Id. ( citation omitted). 
397. Bingham quoted Chancellor Kent as stating: "'If a slave, born in the United 
States, be manumitted, or otherwise lawfully discharged from bondage, or if a black man 
be born within the United States, and born free, he becomes thenceforward a citizen."' 
Id. ( citation omitted). 
398. Bingham quoted Chief Justice Taney as stating: 
The words "people of the United States," and "citizens," are synonymous 
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, 
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold 
the power and conduct the Government through their representatives. 
Id. ( citation omitted). 
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the laws of the United States. "399 The equivalence of these phrases 
was reiterated by the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases in arguing 
that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States 
included more than merely the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship enumerated by the majority.400 The :first sentence of Section 
1 was drafted in order to constitutionalize this position with respect to 
citizenship, which Bingham had argued was already the position of the 
courts and commentators on the subject.401 Under the first sentence of 
Section 1, individuals born or naturalized in the United States are 
guaranteed both state citizenship in the state where they reside and 
citizenship of the United States. The question that the Slaughter-House 
Court addressed was whether they also obtain a federal guarantee of the 
privileges and immunities traditionally within the regulatory control of 
state governments as well as those fl.owing from "national citizenship." 
However, the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases was in error in 
confining the meaning of "privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States" to merely "national" privileges and immunities. Use of 
the phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" as 
opposed to "privileges or immunities of citizens in the several states" 
indicates an intent on the part of the framers of the Amendment to make 
it clear both that the privileges and immunities traditionally within the 
control of the federal government were to be guaranteed against state 
abridgment, as well as to emphasize that these privileges and immunities 
fl.owed from an individual's status as a citizen of the United States. 
Thus, it would seem that the protection afforded under the Clause is not 
merely equality-based (forbidding discrimination), but also substan-
tive.402 There is a closed set of privileges and immunities of citizens 
that must be recognized in all the states, although differences may exist 
from state to state in the regulation of these privileges and immunities. 
399. Id. 
400. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1872) (Field, J. dissenting). 
401. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). 
402. Akhil Amar has concluded that those rights of citizens specified in the pre-
1866 Constitution receive what he terms "full" or "fundamental rights" protection under 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which presumably includes both substantive as 
well as antidiscrimination protection. Amar, supra note 2, at 1231. Amar leaves the 
question of whether other common-law rights that are also privileges and immunities of 
citizens receive full protection or merely what he terms "equal" or "antidiscrimination" 
protection. Id. However, protection afforded the peculiarly "national" privileges and 
immunities of citizenship should not differ from that afforded those privileges and 
immunities traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments since all 
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States flow from an 
individual's status as a citizen of the United States. 
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400. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 94 (1872) (Field, J. dissenting). 
401. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). 
402. Akhil Amar has concluded that those rights of citizens specified in the pre-
1866 Constitution receive what he terms "full" or "fundamental rights" protection under 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which presumably includes both substantive as 
well as antidiscrimination protection. Amar, supra note 2, at 1231. Amar leaves the 
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individual's status as a citizen of the United States. 
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C. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
The theory presented in this Article implies that the incorporation 
thesis-that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights are "incorporated" 
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment-is a misnomer. The Bill of Rights may be 
viewed as declaring certain of the fundamental privileges and immunities 
of citizens that shall be guaranteed against abridgment ( and in some 
cases, regulation) on the part of the federal government. In this light, it 
is not surprising that certain of the privileges and immunities of citizens 
should resemble certain of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
However, to understand the effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as applying word for word certain provisions in the Bill of Rights 
against the state governments is a mistake.403 The state governments 
remain free to regulate the mode in which the fundamental privileges 
and immunities of citizens are exercised. Furthermore, not every 
provision in the Bill of Rights represents a privilege or immunity of 
citizens, and conversely, not every privilege or immunity of citizens may 
be found in the Bill of Rights or explicitly in the body of the United 
States Constitution.404 For example, privileges and immunities that 
were traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments 
and which were explicitly mentioned in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
such as the capacity to enter into contracts, testify in court, and pass 
property through inheritance are certainly privileges and immunities of 
citizens.405 However, these privileges and immunities are not explicitly 
403. Akhil Amar has tentatively come to the same conclusion. Amar, supra note 
2, at 1265-66. 
404. See id. 
405. Michael Kent Curtis has argued that Republicans thought these rights to be 
"incidents of the absolute rights of individuals to 'personal liberty,' 'personal security,' 
and 'private property' embraced by article IV" and therefore indirectly mentioned in the 
constitutional text itself. CURTIS, supra note 12, at 116. However, this conclusion 
seems to be at odds with several statements made by Republicans to the effect that the 
privileges and immunities of citizens included rights not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution. For example, in 1871 Representative George F. Hoar stated that the 
Fourteenth Amendment referred to "all the privileges and immunities declared to belong 
to the citizen by the Constitution itself' plus "those privileges and immunities which all 
republican writers of authority agree in declaring fundamental and essential to 
citizenship." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871). The "republican writers" 
of which Representative Hoar spoke probably included individuals such as Vattel, 
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guaranteed against encroachment by the federal government within the 
body of the Constitution. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the 
privileges and immunities of citizenship include both more than and less 
than those rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights-a conclusion that has 
also been reached by Akhil Amar.406 However, the conclusions 
reached in this Article differ somewhat from Amar's conclusions in two 
respects. 
First, the capacities of citizens that are termed "privileges and 
immunities" of citizens include certain capacities that are nowhere 
mentioned in the body of the Constitution. Capacities of citizenship 
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments, such 
as the right to testify, are clearly within the scope of the terms "privileg-
es" and "immunities." However, neither the first eight Amendments nor 
the body of the original Constitution refer to such a right. The only 
possibility is that the Ninth Amendment's reference to "other rights not 
enumerated" includes certain capacities of citizenship that are not 
expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution.407 
Second, this Article argues that looking to the Bill of Rights for 
provisions to "incorporate" through the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
mistaken project. For one thing, "privileges" and "immunities" are 
Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui. 
406. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1228, 1265-66 (stating that "[t]he best reading of 
the Amendment suggests that it 'incorporates' the Bill of Rights in a far more subtle way 
than [Justice] Black admitted, including both more and less than Amendments I-VIII."). 
Amar's observation that the "English common law offers a crude but helpful test to sort 
out which aspects of the pre-1866 Constitution were indeed privileges of individuals . . . 
and which were instead structural provisions unique to the federal government and 
inappropriate for imposition on states" is telling. Id. at 1268. However, Amar does not 
carry his analysis far enough in order to explain why it is that the English common law 
may act as an appropriate filter for his model of"refined incorporation." See also Maltz, 
supra note 68, at 970 ("[T]he background of the privileges and immunities clause 
provides evidence that the language encompasses not only the entire Bill of Rights, but 
other rights as well."). 
407. This idea seems to have been expressed by Senator Nye, who stated: 
In the enumeration of natural and personal rights to be protected, the framers 
of the Constitution apparently specified everything they could think of-"life," 
"liberty," "property," "freedom of speech," "freedom of the press," "freedom 
in the exercise of religion," "security of person," ... and then, lest something 
essential in the specifications should have been overlooked, it was provided in 
the ninth amendment that "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
should not be construed to deny or disparage other rights not enumerated." 
This amendment completed the document. It left no personal or natural right 
to be invaded or impaired by construction. All these rights are established by 
the fundamental law. Congress has no power to invade them; but it has power 
"to make all laws necessary and proper" to five them effective operation, and 
to restrain the respective States from infracting them. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1072 (1866). 
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guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment and not the mode in which 
they are exercised. Thus, this Article's conclusion that historically a 
distinction was made between privileges and rights indicates that insofar 
as the provisions of the Bill of Rights represent the modes in which 
certain privileges and immunities may be exercised with respect to the 
federal government, these modes are not constitutionalized as constraints 
placed upon the states. It is true that certain "individual-rights" 
provisions found in the Bill of Rights will mirror certain of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the Bill of Rights is declaratory of certain 
fundamental powers of the citizenry that exist anterior to the establish-
ment of all governments--both state and federal. It is also true that 
what Amar terms "federalism provisions" will not be "incorporated" 
since these cannot represent fundamental capacities of the citizenry 
existing anterior to the establishment of government: one must have state 
and federal governments established before one can worry about 
"federalism protections."408 Thus, the theory presented in this Article 
explains the conclusions that Amar has reached with respect to his 
distinction between "individual rights" and "federalism" provisions. 
However, it also shows the misguidedness of the incorporation approach 
to understanding the original meaning of Section 1. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By analyzing the social compact theories of political philosophers such 
as Locke, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel as well as the Roman law 
of persons, this Article has presented a theory concerning the meaning 
of citizenship in nineteenth century America and its relation to Section 
408. Amar rejects Frankfurter's terminology of fundamental rights protected under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Amar, "the right question is not whether a 
clause is fundamental, but whether it is truly a private right of the citizen rather than a 
right of states or the public generally." Amar, supra note 2, at 1265. However, as the 
analysis in this Article indicates, the capacities or powers to be protected under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause are the privileges and immunities of citizens--those 
privileges and immunities inherent in the concept of citizenship, which are fundamental 
in the sense that they exist anterior to the establishment of any form of government. 
Thus, "fundamental rights" become analogous to Amar's "private right[s] of the citizen." 
Id. However, as already stated, one must look beyond the constitutional text in order 
to discover the full range of privileges and immunities of citizens. Section I guarantees 
the "privileges or immunities of citizens" and not all of the "private right[s] of the 
citizen" enumerated in the body of the Constitution. 
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1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. During this period, citizens were 
conceived of as members of a political community based on a social 
compact, which was distinct from the form of government, from which 
certain fundamental powers or capacities flowed. These relative rights 
coupled with the absolute or inalienable rights of persons are the 
privileges and immunities to which Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment refers. Section 1 struck down the constitutionally-mandated 
system of caste with respect to citizenship of the United States erected 
by the Court in Dred Scott as well as constitutionally-permitted systems 
of caste with respect to state citizenship, which had arisen in the form 
of the Black Codes. Section 1 nationalized citizenship, making 
citizenship of the United States the primary form of citizenship. As a 
result, the protection afforded under Section 1 was most probably 
intended to be both substantive and antidiscrimination protection with 
respect to both those privileges and immunities of citizens that were 
peculiarly national in character and those privileges and immunities that 
traditionally were within the regulatory control of the state governments. 
However, some inequalities with respect to the way in which these 
privileges and immunities were regulated by the states (the mode in 
which citizens could exercise these privileges and immunities) may have 
been permissible. The Amendment was not intended to dictate the civil 
or criminal codes of the states. 
As I have noted, there is an alternative interpretation of the 
Clause--that one of the privileges of citizens of the United States is the 
privilege of exercising the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states under Article N, Section 2, and, thus, there may not be a 
constitutionally-mandated uniformity of privileges and immunities among 
the states with respect to those privileges and immunities traditionally 
within the regulatory control of the state govemments.409 However, 
the better interpretation is likely the former. For the moment, this 
Article has attempted to shed some light on the original meaning of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as illustrated the value 
of examining more closely, where appropriate, the writings of the natural 
law theorists as well as those of civilian writers in gaining greater 
understanding of our own written Constitution. 
409. See supra text accompanying notes 328-29. 
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